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Abstract
No exegesis or act of interpretation is presuppositionless. Accordingly, this study
addresses the question of the influence of philosophical presuppositions upon the
interpretation of the God-human relation in Exodus. Chapter 1 provides a brief
introduction to why such analysis is necessary. The chapter explores the neglected issue
of presuppositions in exegesis and why Exodus is an appropriate platform upon which to
evaluate them. This introductory chapter also presents the purpose and methodological
approach of this study, namely, the descriptive analysis of the text. Chapter 2 addresses
the philosophical issues behind the conception of the God-human relation, namely the
notion of ontology (God), the notion of epistemology (human), and the notion of history

(relationship). Chapter 3 identifies these philosophical conceptions in the foundation of
two interpretative traditions: the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods.
Chapter 4 traces the influence of these presuppositions within the interpretation of
Exodus in general, and in the context of the notion of the God-human relation in
particular. The dissertation concludes by summarizing the findings and conclusions and
exploring the academic and existential implications of the study.
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“My charming reader, in this [study] you will find something that you perhaps
should not know, something else from which you will presumably benefit by coming
to know it. Read, then, the something in such a way that, having read it, you may be
as one who has not read it; read the something else in such a way that, having read
it, you may be as one who has not forgotten what has been read.”
Kierkegaard, Either/Or, pp. 14-15
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Question1
This study attempts to trace the influence of macro-hermeneutical2 or
philosophical presuppositions3 relating to the God-human relation4—found within

This section introduces the reader to the issues that lead up to the research
question this study will address. It provides a taste of what is to come throughout this
study. At this stage, the reader is invited to exercise the virtue of patience.
1

Fernando L. Canale, borrowing the language of Hans Hüng, emphasizes the
significance and influence of philosophical presuppositions upon biblical
interpretation and systematic theology in terms of “macro-hermeneutics.” Canale
writes: “Macro hermeneutics is related to the study and clarification of philosophical
issues directly or indirectly related to the criticism and formulation of concrete
heuristic principles of interpretation. Meso hermeneutics deals with the interpretation
of theological issues and, therefore, belongs properly to the area of systematic
theology. Micro hermeneutics approaches the interpretation of texts and,
consequently, proceeds within the realm of biblical exegesis.” In Fernando L.
Canale, “Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical Understanding
of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology,” Journal of the Adventist
Theological Society 12, no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 21. This study is grounded on the macrohermeneutical level. It aims to uncover, critique, and clarify the principles that
function as presuppositions in the macro-hermeneutical framework of biblical
scholars and theologians. A more familiar way of explaining these terms may be to
understand macro-hermeneutical questions as philosophical questions, mesohermeneutical questions as doctrinal/theological questions, and micro-hermeneutical
questions as exegetical questions.
2

Presuppositions in this study is a term that will be used interchangeably with
the terms assumptions, conceptions, macro-hermeneutical principles, pre-understandings, and
3

1

the presuppositional frameworks5 of biblical scholars and interpretative methods—

interpreted notions. As the expression already suggests, presuppositions are “previous
suppositions.” The term presupposition may include a wide variety of intended (or
interpreted notions) and unintended (feelings, experiences, memories) elements.
Even so, the use of the term presupposition in this study will carry the connotation of
“interpreted” or intended philosophical conceptions that include notions of God,
humans, history, etc.
The God-human relationship in this study refers to how God relates to
humanity through presence, revelation, speech, theophany; as for the human aspect,
the conditions that allow humans to understand and interpret such dynamic in the
context and flow of history. Thus the macro-hermeneutical (philosophical) notion of
the God-human relationship carries basic philosophical categories to be interpreted,
namely ontology (questions of Being, God, and the conditions of God’s actions),
epistemology (questions of how humans can know and interpret reality), and history
(questions concerning the locus or context where the interaction between God and
humans takes place). This study will trace how extrabiblical conceptions of the Godhuman relation within the presuppositional frameworks of scholars and methods
shape the interpretation of the God-human relation the text presents in itself.
4

By presuppositional framework, I mean the categories in the mind of an
interpreter that carry intended and unintended conceptions. These categories include
conceptions of God, humans, the world, history, etc. The reader could think of this
in the following way: human beings carry, among many other things, “philosophical
buckets” in their minds. These “buckets” relate to the general way in which
humanity perceives broad philosophical notions such as the understanding of God
(as a reality or non-reality), the world, humans, history, etc. These are basic, general
notions, present within the worldview or philosophical framework of any human
being. Biblical interpreters normally have an intentional interpretation of these
categories even before biblical interpretation takes place. So, when interpretation
begins, the categories or “buckets” of God, humans, the world, and history within
the human mind are already filled with pre-established notions derived from different
sources (philosophy, natural philosophy, science, tradition, the Bible, etc.). These
notions are hypothetical in nature, that is, open to the choice of the individual
interpreter. Perhaps a better term to describe this presuppositional framework would
be worldview, or historical point of view of the interpreter. Even so, it is my hope that the
reader becomes familiar with the expression presuppositional framework. Furthermore,
the reader must be aware that presuppositional frameworks carry more than
“interpreted” notions that fill the “philosophical buckets” of the mind.
Presuppositional frameworks also carry personal experiences, feelings, memories,
etc.: that is, elements that are beyond the awareness of the interpreter and might still
be influential in interpretation. These unintended conceptions fall beyond the scope
5

2

upon the interpretation of Exodus. The notion of how God relates to humans may be
the most basic macro-hermeneutical (philosophical) conception in the
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars.6 This study will attempt to show
how an extrabiblical7 interpretation of God’s relationship to humans can determine
the parameters of biblical interpretation in general, and the interpretation of Exodus
in particular.
This introductory section raises two preliminary questions to demonstrate the
value and necessity of this study, as well as the one question it will directly address.8
First, is an analysis of the presuppositions of biblical scholars and their effects upon
biblical interpretation necessary? Second, is the book of Exodus the best text to

of this study, since the focus will be on the notions that are interpreted before biblical
interpretation takes place. In sum, any interpreter has a presuppositional framework
that carries intended and unintended presuppositions. This study will focus on the
intended interpretation of how God relates to humanity that functions as a
presupposition in the process of biblical interpretation.
The thesis of this study is that the broadest conceptions and assumptions
that influence biblical interpretation follow the God-human relationship pattern.
Certainly there are other assumptions that influence biblical interpretation, but I
chose the God-human relationship framework because of its scope. Many
assumptions not listed in this framework can still be traced back to these basic
categories.
6

By extrabiblical I mean that the scholarly understanding of the God-human
relation is not always based on conceptual pointers emerging from the biblical text.
The first chapter will clarify these issues and how they are generally interpreted
before the interpretation of the text begins.
7

Although there are many questions in this introductory section, they may
not all find proper answers in this study. Sometimes the best answer to a question is a
better question. To answer is to conclude; to answer with a question is to move
forward, opening new paths of study. These two preliminary questions prepare the
reader to understand the research question, in the hope that by the end of this study
the reader finds not an answer, but an even better question.
8

3

engage, compare, and contrast the interpreted notion of how God relates to humans
within the presuppositional framework of biblical scholars and methods? To the first
question I now turn.
The Question of Presuppositions
Biblical exegetes and theologians have long recognized that the clarification
of presuppositions is not only necessary but imperative.9 Gerhard Maier addresses
the interpretative imperative of clarifying presuppositions: “It is precisely our
presuppositions that the Bible wants to place in question, correct, and to some extent
obliterate.”10 Yet in order for a possible “obliteration” of presuppositions to occur,

Virtually all contemporary books on hermeneutics deal at least briefly with
the issue of presuppositions. Even so, a few examples of scholars who observe the
influence of presuppositions upon biblical interpretation are in order: Rudolf
Bultmann and Schubert M. Ogden, New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic
Writings (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 145–53; Richard S. Hess and Gordon J.
Wenham, Make the Old Testament Live: From Curriculum to Classroom (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 72–73; Andrew E. Hill and John H. Walton, A Survey of the
Old Testament, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 24; Grant R. Osborne,
The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2006), 407, 516–17; Gerhard Maier, Biblical
Hermeneutics (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994), 16; Jeannine K. Brown, Scripture as
Communication: Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
2007), 121–24; Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 13–16.
9

Maier, Biblical Hermeneutics, 25. One of the questions this study raises is: can
the philosophical perspective of the authors of the biblical text shape in any way the
philosophical presuppositions of the biblical interpreter? If so, how? It is important
to, first, assess the assumptions brought into interpretation by biblical interpreters,
and second, compare and contrast them to the perspective of the biblical authors
concerning the same assumptions. This study focuses on the first step: assessing the
philosophical assumptions that shape interpretation. Another example of this
sensitivity toward the text and need to revise assumptions is found in Alister E.
McGrath: “If the idea of revelation is taken seriously, however, we must be prepared
10

4

the interpreter must have a grasp of which presuppositions influence the
interpretation of the text.11
Scholars who see the need to allow the text to deconstruct the presuppositions
within their presuppositional framework suggest that a conscious “bracketing out”12
is necessary. For instance, Grant R. Osborne writes:
The problem is that our preunderstanding too easily becomes prejudice, a set of a
prioris that place a grid over Scripture and make it conform to these preconceived
conceptions. So we need to “bracket” these ideas to a degree and allow the text to
deepen or at times challenge and even change those already established ideas.13
to revise, even to abandon, such prior ideas of God and to refashion them in the light
of who and what Jesus of Nazareth is recognized to be.” See Alister E. McGrath,
The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 175.
The need for allowing the text to judge presuppositions has been recognized
by several scholars. I strongly agree with Thiselton that “texts must translate us
before we can translate them.” See Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 8. Furthermore, John
Walton, commenting on the literary structure of Leviticus, writes: “Interpreters have
found it difficult to identify a cohesive structure to the book. One possible
explanation may be that we have been deterred by presuppositions.” See John H.
Walton, “Equilibrium and the Sacred Compass: The Structure of Leviticus,” Bulletin
for Biblical Research 11, no. 2 (2001): 293. The issue of presuppositions, although
commonly recognized in biblical interpretation, is commonly set aside due to the
philosophical nature of the discussion. In the study of Ancient Near Eastern
(henceforth, ANE) texts, the natural tendency is to focus on the objective meaning of
the text and its historical context. Yet, as Walton describes above, the issue of
presuppositions cannot be ignored at the level of biblical interpretation, since they
inevitably affect the interpretation of the text.
11

The action of “bracketing out” presuppositions does not imply the
possibility of arriving at the text with suspended presuppositions or biases, but it does
imply that one is able to recognize and critique the presuppositions that influence
one’s own interpretation of the biblical text. The value of such an approach is not in
the naïve belief that presuppositions can be fully suspended, but in the interpreter’s
awareness of that which influences his perspective of, and approach to, the biblical
text.
12

13

Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 29.

5

Walter Brueggemann also speaks of “bracketing out” as he writes:
By using the word history I mean simply the concrete interactions among persons,
communities, and states which partake of hurt and healing. Thus I mean to
bracket out the issues evoked by modern understandings, e. g., the problematic of
Geschichte and Historie.14
Yet the way scholars commonly “bracket out” assumptions lacks methodological
clarity. Why are some assumptions bracketed out and not others? Failure to
methodologically verify how intentional presuppositions are inserted or bracketed
out in interpretation may lead to a lack of clarity between what the text says and
what the presuppositions of the interpreter shape the text to say.15
Walter C. Kaiser observes that in the history of Old Testament theology, “the
imposition of theological conceptuality and even theological categories derived from

14

Walter Brueggemann, Hope within History (Atlanta: John Knox, 1987), 2.

Knowing the crucial role played by presuppositions within the interpreter’s
presuppositional framework, for exegesis to be, to some extent, consistent
methodologically, it cannot rely only on results. Brevard Childs writes, “Whether or
not the exegesis is successful cannot be judged on its theory of interpretation, but on
the actual interpretation itself.” Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical,
Theological Commentary, Old Testament Library (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974),
xiii. The question I would raise in return is: how and through which terms will the
interpreter know that the “actual interpretation” is close to the meaning of the text?
It seems to me that distancing methodological concerns from the actual praxis of
exegesis does not solve the dilemma, but only strengthens it. Kevin J. Vanhoozer is
right in seeing the interrelation between questions of God, Scripture, and
hermeneutics in theological thinking and practice, and the need to treat them “as one
problem.” See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture, & Hermeneutics
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2002), 9. This study only affirms the concern of
treating these three questions as one.
15

6

systematic or philosophical theology became common.”16 These impositions, though
sometimes elusive and unnoticed in scholarly writings, have become so common that
no one is able to know “how or by which process”17 they are implemented, especially
since they are established a priori.18
The postmodern context of biblical interpretation enhances the necessity of
exposing and justifying the interpreted notions within one’s presuppositional
framework. Dan R. Stiver writes: “In a time of transition in philosophy and in a time
of flux in theology, being clear about one’s epistemological commitments and
presuppositions continues to be desirable.”19
The present study is not only a response to this desire, but an expansion of it.
Awareness of the interpretative biases present in biblical interpretation is important,

Walter C. Kaiser Jr., Toward an Old Testament Theology (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 1978), 6. At least one initial example of this problem in Old Testament
theology is in order. Samuel Terrien in The Elusive Presence uses anthropological and
sociological insights to evaluate the biblical text. Inevitably, the outcome of his entire
biblical theology is conditioned by the set of paradigms he chooses. Remarks such as
“The theology of presence is the anthropology of communion” and “[The
resurrection] does not evoke the thought of Jesus redivivus, a mortal brought back for
a season of mortal existence, but it sings the exaltatio of authentic humanity” prove
this to be true. See Samuel L. Terrien, The Elusive Presence: Toward a New Biblical
Theology, Religious Perspectives 26 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978), 462.
16

17

Kaiser, Old Testament Theology, 6.

A priori means an interpretative commitment established before
interpretation itself. The challenge of this study is to trace the influence of these basic
assumptions relating to the notion of the God-human relationship upon biblical
interpretation.
18

Dan R. Stiver, “Theological Method,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 175.
19

7

and so is understanding their philosophical roots and their influence upon the
interpretation of the biblical text. Moshe Greenberg writes:
A translation of and commentary on a biblical text should bridge the gap that
separates the present-day reader—with his culture and tradition bound range of
knowledge, assumptions, and conventions—from the ancient Israelite, who
encountered the text with different knowledge, assumptions, and conventions
conditioned by circumstances.20
Concerning the book of Exodus itself, Brevard Childs understands that the “author
does not share the same hermeneutical position of those who suggest that biblical
exegesis is an objective, descriptive enterprise, controlled solely by scientific
criticism.”21 This study is another attempt to help bridge the interpretative gap. And,
as this study will attest, perhaps one of the most forgotten aspects of the
interpretative gap is the relation of the philosophical assumptions within the
presuppositional frameworks of interpreters to the philosophical assumptions of the
authors and readers of the text themselves expressed in the text.
At least one introductory and representative example of how presuppositions
affect the interpretation of the text can be found in the recent work of John W.
Walton. Walton begins his treatise on the lost world of Genesis by affirming that his
interpretation attempts to be “faithful to the context of the original audience and
author, and one that preserves and enhances the theological vitality of the text.”22

Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and
Commentary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983), 18.
20

21

Childs, Book of Exodus, xiii.

John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the
Origins Debate (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009), 7.
22

8

Yet macro-hermeneutical commitments established a priori lead Walton to write,
later in the same volume, that “what science provides is the best explanation of the
data at the time,”23 and furthermore, that such a perspective is accepted within
evangelical circles “by consensus, and often with few detractors.”24 For Walton and
others, science is the source and key to understanding the reality the biblical text is
attempting to depict.25 Consequently, the implicit philosophical conceptions of the
biblical author within the biblical text are divested of their value by scientific
philosophical presuppositions established a priori.
The starting point, then, for a proper interpretative approach that is sensitive
to the issues above, is to identify the interpreted notions within the presuppositional
frameworks of biblical interpreters and methods and to trace their influence upon the
interpretation of the biblical text.
One question remains to clarify the background of this study: why choose the

23

Ibid., 17.

24

Ibid.

At least one simple implication of this position is that supernatural
revelation, a common feature in the Hebrew Bible, is immediately dismissed by
scientific methodology. Jack Bonsor writes: “Supernatural revelation is excluded a
priori from scientific debate. The scientific method excludes revelation as data. This
exclusion is intrinsic to the scientific method and, thereby, occurs prior to (a priori)
any particular investigation.” See Jack Arthur Bonsor, Athens and Jerusalem: The Role
of Philosophy in Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), 179. In other words,
Walton’s reliance on scientific methodology in his depiction of Gen 1 eliminates, a
priori, a basic feature of biblical theology—the possibility and reality of divine
revelation. Can the biblical text challenge such an approach along with its
conclusions? The challenge of this study is to allow the assumptions of the
author/audience to shape the macro-hermeneutical or philosophical assumptions
biblical interpreters impose upon the text without biblical or methodological
justification.
25

9

book of Exodus to engage the assumptions within the presuppositional frameworks
of biblical scholars? To this question I now turn.
The Question of Exodus
Langdon B. Gilkey understands that the clash between modern assumptions
and the orthodox nature of the text itself—which includes supernatural activities and
speeches—demands a threefold reinterpretation of the biblical narratives.26 Gilkey
describes this reinterpretation in the following way:
First, the divine activity called the “mighty deeds of God” is now restricted to
one crucial event, the Exodus-covenant complex of occurrence. Whatever else
God may not have done, we say, here he really acted in the history of the Hebrew
people, and so here their faith was born and given its form. Second, the vast
panoply of wonder and voice events that preceded the Exodus-covenant event, in
effect the patriarchal narratives, are now taken to be Hebrew interpretations of
their own historical past based on the faith gained at the Exodus. . . . Third, the
biblical accounts of the post-Exodus life—for example, the proclamation and
codification of the law, the conquest, and the prophetic movement—are
understood as the covenant people’s interpretation through their Exodus faith of
their continuing life and history.27
Gilkey presents biblical interpreters with a sober reminder of the inherent
paradoxes created by the intermix of modern assumptions and the biblical text, with
the significance of the book of Exodus in the midst of the problem. According to
Gilkey, the validity and significance of the Hebrew Bible hinge upon the reality
depicted in the book of Exodus.28 The way in which one understands the God-

Langdon B. Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical
Language,” Journal of Religion 41, no. 3 (July 1961): 194–205.
26

27

Ibid., 197.

Even for Baruch Spinoza, the event at Sinai represents “the only instance of
a real voice” recorded in the prophetic writings. See Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus
28
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human relationship in the book of Exodus, to some extent, determines both the
nature of the Hebrew Bible and how it should be interpreted. Because of this, Exodus
seems like an appropriate and natural choice for this study.29
Another question that might arise about the use of Exodus in this study
relates to the possibility that the text lends itself to a possible evaluation of scholarly
assumptions. In regards to this, some considerations are in order: (1) although the
text is not explicitly laid out with the intent of providing a scientific or philosophical
depiction of reality, and (2) reading the book of Exodus with the assumption that it is
found in its final form,30 the author of the book of Exodus has an implicit outlook on
how God relates to humans in the context of history throughout the book. This
philosophical outlook is in the background of the writing.31

Theologico-Politicus, trans. Samuel Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 61. Furthermore, he
adds: “So it would be more in conformity with Scripture that God did really create a
voice by which he revealed the Decalogue.” Ibid., 62.
There are other reasons for choosing the book of Exodus to engage the
assumptions of biblical interpreters; among these is the idea of Exodus as a resource
for methodological development. Some see that the “book of Exodus has been and
continues to be a significant resource for the development of biblical methodologies
in the Modern and Postmodern periods.” See Thomas B. Dozeman, Methods for
Exodus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2.
29

The question of authorship and unity will be properly dealt with in the
subsequent chapters.
30

Recently, this new field of study—the uncovering of the philosophical
outlook of the Hebrew Bible—has been developed with fruitful results. A few
significant works that motivated the formulation of the present study are: Yoram
Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2012); Jaco Gericke, The Hebrew Bible and Philosophy of Religion (Atlanta: Society of
Biblical Literature, 2012); Dru Johnson, Biblical Knowing: A Scriptural Epistemology of
Error (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2013). Hazony, for example, also sees the problem of
presuppositions influencing the interpretation of biblical texts and the only reason
31
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In the first chapters of Exodus, this implicit perspective can be noticed in texts
that express God’s relation to humanity as well as humanity’s ability to interact with
and know God.32 Texts like Exod 1:21, “Because the midwives feared God, He
established households for them,”33 or Exod 2:25, “God saw the sons of Israel and
God took notice of them,” express the divine ability to see and react to human
suffering within the flow of history. Texts like Exod 3:6, “Moses hid his face, for he
was afraid to look at God,” attest to the possibility that humanity can hear and
respond to God’s revelation. In this sense, within the description of the narrative and
its events, the biblical text gives some indications of how the author and readers at
the time of its composition understood the dynamic of how God relates to humans.
In sum, the need for this study co-appears with: (1) the need for
presuppositions to be understood and laid out in biblical interpretation; (2) the need
for the interpretative gap between contemporary interpreter and author/audience to
be bridged; and (3) the need for the biblical text to validate or critique assumptions

why theologians fail to assess this is because of “alien interpretative framework[s]
that prevents us from seeing much of what is in these texts,” and adds: “the Hebrew
Scriptures can be read as works of philosophy, with an eye to discovering what they
have to say as part of the broader discourse concerning the nature of the world and
the just life of man.” See Hazony, Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, 3, 4. The present
study is aimed at expanding this initiative to take the content of the Hebrew
Scriptures seriously since its authors also develop in their writings a solid
philosophical viewpoint, in the case of this study, of the manner in which God
relates to humanity.
These are introductory examples given without any analysis, as they are, in
the text. Later in this study I will provide an overview of how the book of Exodus
expresses the dynamic of the God-human relationship.
32

All Bible quotations are taken from the New American Standard Version
unless noted.
33
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interpreters, including myself, bring into the process of interpretation. If a
philosophical understanding of the God-human relation is founded on extrabiblical
sources, this could create a problem in interpretation, especially if the text’s
conception of the God-human relation differs from the assumptions scholars and
methods carry by default.
This study, then, addresses a problem hidden in one research question, a
question that if ignored will create a multitude of interpretative problems to be
resolved.

The Question
How do philosophical notions of the God-human relation within the
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars and interpretative methods
influence the interpretation of the God-human relation in the book of Exodus?34

Note that I will evaluate the assumptions of interpreters based on not the
assumptions of the author/audience, but the assumptions within the text. This is
because the only access I have to the author or audience is found in the written
words of the text. Although archaeology provides many windows into the past, my
task as a biblical scholar is to find the meaning of the text within the text. I side with
John Sailhamer in the assumption that through “language, modern readers can
understand the thoughts of biblical authors who lived thousands of years ago in a
culture very different from our own” and the “goal is always to understand what the
author has written.” See John H. Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch: Revelation,
Composition and Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009), 68. In regard
to archaeology, I also side with Sailhamer in his “supplemental” position,
recognizing that our “knowledge of ancient history supplements what we know of
the events from the biblical narratives.” Ibid., 101. In this sense, the control of the
meaning of the text is not outside the text (in archaeological findings), but within the
text.
34

13

The Purpose
The present study has a threefold purpose: (1) to clarify presuppositions
regarding the God-human relation and identify them within the presuppositional
frameworks of biblical scholars and theologians; (2) to identify the presence of these
same presuppositions within the most influential approaches to the book of Exodus,35
that is, the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods; (3) to trace how
these presuppositions influence the interpretation of the textual depiction of how
God relates to humanity within the book of Exodus.

The Approach to the Study
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation, its methodological
approach is varied. Below is a brief outline of the steps to be taken in order to reach
the goals of this study.

Some clarifications are in order concerning the methods to be analyzed.
The third chapter of this study examines the philosophical underpinnings of the
historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods. It seems appropriate to focus
on these two methods, since they are used in the majority of commentaries on the
book of Exodus. Although a reader-oriented approach is becoming more popular
today, no major work has been produced using it exclusively. Thus, because the
study of the book of Exodus so far has been guided by the historical-critical and
historical-grammatical methods, this study will focus on the philosophical
presuppositions inherent in them. Secondly, although both of these approaches have
undergone significant changes over the years (the historical-critical method is no
longer understood as a single approach, but is split into different critical tasks like
form criticism, tradition criticism, “new” literary criticism, discourse analysis, etc.),
the choice of these two approaches remains. The analysis here is not intended to
deconstruct modern methods that influence the interpretation of Exodus in order to
present a better interpretation: it is intended to show how interpretative methods are
not exempt from the influence of philosophical presuppositions. Examining the roots
of the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods (at the turn of the
eighteenth century) seems like a fruitful place to start.
35
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The second chapter is aimed at clarifying and identifying the interpreted
notion of how God relates to humans within the presuppositional frameworks of
biblical scholars.36 The first task, then, is to focus on the interpreter: that is, on
humanity’s ability to reason and know in the context of the God-human relation,
and on the epistemological (how humans arrive at knowledge) context of
interpretation. The second task is to introduce how scholars understand the notion of
God in the God-human relation. The assumption of God touches on the issue of
ontology, of Being, and on the possibility of God acting in the world. The third task
relates to the locus or context of the relation between God and humanity: that is, the
notion of history. Thus, the chapter clarifies three basic components of the Godhuman relationship within the presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars and
theologians: the notion of human knowledge (epistemology); the notion of God
(ontology); and the notion of relationship (history).
The third chapter is aimed at identifying the presence of philosophical notions
relating to God (ontology), humanity (epistemology), and relationship (history)
within two interpretative approaches to the text of Exodus: the historicalgrammatical method and the historical-critical method. Since each interpretative
tradition inherently carries an interpretation of these categories, this chapter will
show how each method assumes an interpretation of the God-human relationship.

For an introductory attempt to evaluate the influence of philosophy upon
interpretation, see Craig G. Bartholomew, “Uncharted Waters: Philosophy,
Theology and the Crisis in Biblical Interpretation,” in Renewing Biblical Interpretation,
ed. Craig G. Bartholomew, Colin Greene, and Karl Möller, Scripture and
Hermeneutics Series 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 1–39.
36
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These two chapters, then, will not deal with the book of Exodus in particular, but
with the presuppositions that influence both interpreters and interpretive traditions.37
The fourth chapter traces the influence of these assumptions on the
interpretation of the book of Exodus, in the context of how the book itself presents its
understanding of the God-human relation. The textual approach to the book of
Exodus in this study is a matter that deserves separate attention, and is covered in the
section below.

The Approach to the Text
The fourth chapter of this study takes a phenomenological, or descriptive,
approach to the text that I will simply call descriptive analysis.38 Even though the

Paying attention to these presuppositional and philosophical questions
seems like an appropriate first step before one can provide a common-sense
evaluation of the text. Ludwig Wittgenstein shares this same vision, since for him a
“philosopher is a man who has to cure many intellectual diseases in himself before
he can arrive at the notions of common sense.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and
Value, ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 44e. In this sense, Chapters 2 and 3 are aimed at
identifying the disease (which can be considered a first step toward the cure), and
Chapter 4 attempts to discover if the disease has spread out into the interpretation of
the text itself.
37

Phenomenology as a philosophical approach can be traced back to Husserl,
Kant, and Hegel, yet the approach is not unified, since it is “neither a school nor a
trend in contemporary philosophy” but “rather a movement whose proponents, for
various reasons, have propelled it in many distinct directions, with the result that
today it means different things to different people.” See Joseph J. Kockelmans,
“Phenomenology,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, 2nd
ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 664. The perspective of
phenomenology will be no different in this study. I can think of at least two works
that use phenomenology as an approach to the text with fruitful results: Fernando L.
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987), 321; and
38
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study focuses on the influence of philosophical presuppositions upon the
interpretation of Exodus, I will still deal indirectly with how the text itself describes
the God-human dynamic.
The descriptive analysis of the text in this study understands the text as a
phenomenon comprising different constituents: language, meaning, author, context,
external referentiality, readers, telos, reception and transmission, discourse, etc.39 Yet
since the object of the descriptive analysis is the authorial understanding of
philosophical notions that include the God-human relationship depicted in the text,40
the way in which the descriptive analysis will be used here differs from traditional
exegetical approaches.41

Oliver Glanz, Understanding Participant-Reference Shifts in the Book of Jeremiah: A Study
of Exegetical Method and Its Consequences for the Interpretation of Referential Incoherence
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), 57–75.
For a detailed analysis of these constituents see Glanz, Understanding
Participant-Reference Shifts, 57–75.
39

The God-human relation structure is also open to criticism and obliteration
by descriptive analysis. Does the text explain this dynamic in these terms? If not,
how does it depict the relation between the divine and humans? These questions will
be addressed in Chapter 4 of this study.
40

Umberto Cassuto’s Commentary on the Book of Exodus is an example of one
“descriptive” approach to the text. Cassuto opens his commentary by affirming that
his commentary is concerned with “the plain meaning of the text.” See Cassuto,
Commentary on the Book of Exodus (Skokie, IL: Varda, 2005), 2. Even so, because
Cassuto maintains a “scientific” orientation toward the text, his descriptive approach
is guided by “all the resources that modern scholarship” sets before him. Ibid., 1. In
other words, his descriptive analysis is guided by the inherent presuppositions within
these modern approaches. The difference, then, between the descriptive analysis in
this study and others is that it begins with an evaluation of the philosophical
presuppositions that might influence a proper reading of the text. The primary focus
is on how the reality being depicted in the text is interpreted by the subject even
before the interpretation of the text itself takes place.
41
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Traditional exegetical approaches involve the actions the interpreter makes to
interpret the biblical text following a set of principles of interpretation (philosophical
notions that include conceptions of God, humans, and history) that are normally
established, as noted earlier, a priori.42 This is the default mode of biblical
interpretation, and it can be found in most—if not all—exegetical works in Old
Testament studies.
Descriptive analysis of the text, on the other hand, attempts: (1) to identify the
philosophical notions that might influence one’s understanding of the biblical text;43
(2) to suspend these philosophical notions in order for them to be validated or
obliterated by the biblical text itself; and (3) to approach the text in a descriptive
manner so that the philosophical outlook within the biblical text might be
understood as it appears to the reader. In these senses, the approach is both
descriptive and analytical.
At this stage, I will expand on each of these three levels to further explain the

For example, Anthony C. Thiselton comments on Wycliffe’s preunderstandings of Scripture: “Wycliffe argued that the interpretation of Scripture
must follow the intention of its Divine author.” See Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 125. The
common understanding that Scripture has a divine author inherently carries an
interpretation of Scripture: it assumes that there is a divine author. Thus, the
presuppositions an interpreter brings into the act of biblical interpretation inevitably
carry a pre-understanding of the text. Yet this is not to be seen as negative. An
interpretation that claims to be strictly objective is, to say the least, suspicious. The
task at hand, as outlined previously, is to allow the biblical text itself to determine or
judge which of these pre-understandings are in harmony with the text and which are
not, especially the broad pre-understandings that interpret macro-hermeneutical
notions such as the God-human relationship. This movement is an attempt to allow
the biblical text to be the arbiter of that which interpreters bring into interpretation.
42

43

In this sense the approach moves beyond the descriptive to the analytical.
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textual approach this study proposes.
Identify and Suspend
In relation to the identification of interpreted philosophical notions and their
suspension: how can one identify that which influences an interpreter in
interpretation and suspend it? Here one finds oneself beyond conventional methods,
because, as mentioned earlier, the presuppositional framework of a particular
interpreter includes not only chosen philosophical concepts, but experiences and
emotions that are as influential as they are unnoticed. Because of this, the interpreter
must exercise self-criticism before biblical criticism, identifying presuppositions that
might shape the application and results of interpretation, with the intent to align
these assumptions with that which the text might be presenting regarding the content
of the same presuppositions.44 In other words, descriptive analysis of the text begins
with descriptive analysis of the self.
Yet how are the interpreted philosophical notions the interpreter is aware of
in his/her own presuppositional framework to be suspended? In order for this to take

Although it seems impossible for all interpreters to be aware of all
philosophical elements that might influence interpretation, here the biblical text
might be of help. When reading a particular text, along with the common exegetical
questions, one must ask questions about reality. To which reality is this text
pointing? The reality of God, of man, of world, etc.? Once the implicit textual reality
is identified, interpreters should ask what in their presuppositional framework might
impede a proper understanding of how the text portrays that particular reality. In this
sense, the descriptive analysis begins as a posture before the text, an interpretative
awareness, rather than a method proper.
44
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place, this study will apply epoché,45 or what I will call in this study suspension. On the
concept of suspension or epoché, Canale writes that there is a “need to place all
previous scientific interpretations of the God principle under Husserlian epoché, that
is, in methodological brackets.”46 Fundamentally, the concept of suspension removes
the usage of the scientific or philosophical principle of doubt from the control of the
subject (interpreter),47 and instead, places it under the control of the object (biblical
text), which now investigates the validity of the philosophical assumptions of the
interpreter. Canale adds, “The phenomenological approach aims to grasp what is

On the concept of phenomenological epoché, Søren Overgaard writes that
the “problem for Husserl is how to ensure that no natural knowledge, whether
scientific, common sense, or otherwise, enters into our constitutive
phenomenological investigation . . . the general name that Husserl gives this
procedure of ‘bracketing’ (Einklammerung) is epoché (Greek: restraint, holding back;
Zurückhaltung).” See Søren Overgaard, Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World
(Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic, 2004), 42. If the reader is tempted to see such a
category being applied to biblical interpretation as another modernistic attempt to
approach the text, I invite the reader to think again. Phenomenological epoché in this
study is applied as a remedy against critical, scientific, and philosophical
preconceived notions that interpreters have inherited from the rise of modernity
onward. One must suspend that which is understood as “common sense” in order to
see what the text presents as “common sense.”
45

Fernando L. Canale, “Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical
Sanctuary,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 36 (1998): 185. For further insight
into the origins and first usages of epoché, see Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Muirhead Library of Philosophy (London: Allen
& Unwin, 1969).
46

The principle of doubt is commonly attributed to Descartes, since he “had
declared that universal doubt should purge his mind of all opinions held merely on
trust and open it to knowledge firmly grounded in reason.” See Michael Polanyi,
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997), 283.
47
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being thought in the text.”48
This, to me, is as close as one can arrive to articulating a biblical approach to
dealing with subjective elements that might impede a balance between the
assumptions of the interpreter and the assumptions of the biblical text. The first two
steps of the descriptive approach to the text are, then, (1) identifying philosophical
assumptions that might influence interpretation and (2) suspending them through
phenomenological epoché.
Look and See
Much can be said about the need to approach the text in a common-sense or
descriptive manner. On this last and important point in the descriptive analysis of the
text, I begin with what could be conceived as Calvin’s original intention for biblical
interpretation. Gilkey writes:
If we had asked an orthodox theologian like Calvin this confessional and
systematic question: “What do you believe God did at the Exodus?” he would
have given us a clear answer. “Look at the book of Exodus,” he would have
answered, “and see what it says God did.”49
Although Gilkey’s portrayal of Calvin’s answer is speculative, it leads interpreter and
interpretation on a fruitful path—one of looking at the text and seeing what it says
about the actions of God. This same idea is found in the philosophical work of

48

Canale, Criticism of Theological Reason, 321.

49

Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology,” 198.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein concerning language: “Look at it! That’s how it is!”50
While biblical interpretation is grounded on the action of looking and seeing,
it often looks at and sees what interpreters project into the text via philosophical
presuppositions. Even Calvin was not able to free himself from the temptation of
seeing in the text what his implicit philosophical presuppositions conditioned him to
see. The descriptive analysis applied in this study, then, will follow the action of
looking and seeing the notion of how God relates to humanity in text and interpreter.
The descriptive analysis proposes not the construction of a new model of how God
relates to humans,51 but a description of how God relates to humans according to the
biblical text of Exodus, beginning with how this dynamic is interpreted a priori. This
description will provide the ground for an analysis of the same interpreted
philosophical notion of the God-human relation within the presuppositional
frameworks of biblical scholars.
Descriptive analysis of the text differs from traditional approaches to biblical
interpretation not as an alternative proper, but as a starting point. Traditional
approaches to the biblical text operate with an inherent conception of the Godhuman relationship that may or may not have the Bible as a source of its formation.
Thus, a traditional approach to the text at this philosophical level could lead to some

Tim Labron, Wittgenstein’s Religious Point of View (New York: Continuum,
2006), 51.
50

Labron's depiction of Wittgenstein’s rejection of constructing new models
to understand concepts serves as an appropriate basis for what I am attempting to do
here: “Someone who is not familiar with the landscape is not helped by constructing
theories, but by becoming familiar with their concrete surroundings.” Ibid., 36.
51
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confusion. To look and see the God-human relation in the text with an approach that
already assumes a God-human relation leads to looking and seeing what one projects
into the text. Starting with descriptive analysis does not eliminate this confusion, but
it does reduce it. The approach accomplishes this by identifying philosophical
notions, suspending these philosophical notions, and providing a textual description
that either critiques or validates these philosophical notions.
Presuppositions and Text
In Chapter 4, the philosophical presuppositions within the interpretative
frameworks of biblical scholars will be evaluated in a unique way. In order to trace
the influence of philosophical presuppositions upon the interpretation of Exodus, I
will need two platforms: first, a textual basis that points to possibilities regarding how
the text understands the God-human relation; and second, a interpretative basis that
points to how scholars interpret issues relating to the God-human relation. I will
attempt to accomplish this via the literary structure of Exodus. From the literary
structure of Exodus, the reader can derive an idea of how the author/redactor of the
book articulated—or not—the notion of the God-human relation. From these textual
pointers, I will move into how biblical interpreters understood and interpreted these
same texts under extrabiblical philosophical categories. In this way, the issues
concerning the God-human relation are not dictated beforehand; rather, they emerge
from the text. Once these issues are identified in the text via the literary structure of
the book, I will move into how scholars interpret them as I attempt to trace the
philosophical presuppositions at work in such interpretation.
In short, this study’s descriptive approach to the text does not imply a method
23

proper,52 nor does it lead to a presuppositionless hermeneutic; rather, it must be seen
as an interpretative awareness, a posture before the text.53 The phenomenological
approach allows interpreters to ascertain the philosophical conceptions they bring
into interpretation via their own assumptions and interpretative methods, and
harmonize them with what the biblical text implicitly depicts regarding the same
issues. The approach begins with a description of the self, before describing the text
and its interpretation.
I hope that this introduction has sufficiently explained the question this study
addresses and the approach it will take to arrive at either answers or better questions.

I am not implying here that these steps are not methodological; I am only
assuming their limitation. Terence J. Keegan is correct in observing that “scholars
fail to recognize the limitations of their methodologies. There are some who proceed
almost as if one given method could solve everything. What is really dangerous
about this approach is not so much that the method will fail but that the scholars
using the method will be satisfied with inadequate results.” See Terence J. Keegan,
Interpreting the Bible: A Popular Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics (Mahwah, NJ:
Paulist Press, 1985), 7.
52

This interpretative awareness also implies the critical nature of this study. It
is a study on the necessary contexts the interpreter of any text must consider. While
general criticism is aimed at the biblical text, this attempts to bring the text to a
higher standing as it criticizes the philosophical standpoint of the interpreter.
53
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CHAPTER 2
THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION IN PRESUPPOSITIONAL
FRAMEWORKS

Introduction
This section begins the process of evaluating the presence, influence, and
roots of the philosophical notion of how God relates to humans in the
presuppositional frameworks of biblical interpreters.54 I will begin by addressing the
principle of epistemology:55 that is, humanity’s ability to know and reason,56 and the

This chapter does not intend to provide a chronological analysis of the
philosophical influences that shape biblical interpretation, nor will it attempt to place
them in theological (liberal, conservative, progressive) or religious (Christian, Jewish,
etc.) categories. Rather, it attempts to present presuppositions relating to
epistemology, ontology, and history as they emerge in their particular historical
contexts. Among the many chronological treatments of Old Testament
interpretation, see Magne Saebø, ed., Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History of Its
Interpretation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008); Mark S. Gignilliat, A
Brief History of Old Testament Criticism: From Benedict Spinoza to Brevard Childs (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2012); and the four-volume series by Henning Graf
Reventlow, History of Biblical Interpretation (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature,
2010).
54

In this study I will follow the basic definition of epistemology given by Paul
K. Moser, that is, epistemology as the explanation of knowledge or the study of the
nature of knowledge, “from Greek episteme, ‘knowledge,’ and logos, ‘explanation.’”
See Paul K. Moser, “Epistemology,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed.
Robert Audi, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 273.
55

Several theories of how the mind functions in the process of knowledge
have been proposed over the history of philosophy. Labron writes that “knowledge is
56
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notion of “human” in the God-human relation structure. Second, I will address the
principle of ontology: that is, conceptions of Being and the divine ability to
communicate or act within history, and the notion of “God” in the God-human
relation structure. Third, I will address the principle of history: that is, the locus
where the dynamic between God and humans takes place, and the notion of
“relation” in the God-human relation structure.

The Principle of Epistemology
Introduction
This section will begin by highlighting the relation between subject and
object,57 the epistemological component, in theological reasoning. This analysis will

typically thought to be derived from at least one of two paths, we can gain
knowledge through our innate ideas or we can gain knowledge through our senses.
The former is rationalism and the latter empiricism.” See Tim Labron, Wittgenstein
and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 25.
It is important to note that I am not endorsing a distinction between
subjects and objects (also known as the “Cartesian theater”), an idea that can be
traced back to the philosophy of René Descartes (1596–1650), the father of modern
foundationalist epistemology. See Nancey Murphy and Brad J. Kallenberg, “AngloAmerican Postmodernity: A Theology of Communal Practice,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 27. Wittgenstein was also critical of the Cartesian theater,
since for him the idea of “thinking as a process in the head, in a completely enclosed
space, makes thinking something occult.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1974), section 64. Although the subject-object distinction is questioned by
some scholars due to its limitation in embracing the complexity of human cognition,
I will maintain the inevitable relation between subject and object, that is, in “order to
create meaning, Reason needs a subject and an object.” See Oliver Glanz,
“Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical Theological Methodology, Part
II: Canale on Reason,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 47, no. 2 (2009): 220. The
57
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provide a basis to evaluate the context in which biblical interpretation takes place.
To generate meaning, reason requires three main philosophical
presuppositions: the ontological (the concept of reality), the epistemological (the
concept of knowing), and the theological framework (the particular system that
provides unity and guarantees coherence).58 The epistemological framework—that
assumes to some extent a subject and an object—is present in any scientific or
theological quest for knowledge and meaning. The necessity of a subject and an
object provides the context in which reason occurs and defines the conditions for
interpretation to take place. Oliver Glanz writes:
In any philosophical endeavor, the interpreted subject-object relation is a
necessary fundamental of a detailed construction of a philosophical system. Thus
the basic framework of Reason is the subject-object relationship, and it is this
relationship that is the center of meaning.59
Concerning the subject-object relationship, Fernando L. Canale writes, “All
cognitive activities spring from the subject-object relationship which functions as the

question is how this relation takes place. The subject-object distinction as a way of
conceptualizing human knowledge must also be critiqued by the parameters set forth
by the text, that is, through the possibility that human cognition is not isolated from
life. A similar articulation of this idea is found in the work of Wittgenstein, who
understood that “clarity begins with an acknowledgement of the irreducibly social
character of human experience and the intrinsic relation of human experience to the
real world.” See Murphy and Kallenberg, “Anglo-American Postmodernity,” 35. Or,
in Wittgenstein’s own words: “What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could
say—forms of life.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E.
M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 226e.
58

See Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional,” 221.

59

Ibid.

27

foundational cognitive unit.”60
Throughout time, philosophers and theologians have argued over how the
subject-object relation functions in Reason and in the search for meaning.61 As
philosophy developed, the emphasis in epistemology shifted from object to subject.
This historical development was also related to general understanding of the concept
of Being.62
Any understanding of the subject-object relationship contains a
conceptualization of Being. At this stage, it is imperative to understand that thinkers
throughout history understood this essential concept as it relates to epistemology as a
hermeneutical choice. On this, Glanz writes:

Fernando L. Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology: The Role of Method in
Theological Accommodation (Berrien Springs, MI: LithoTech, 2005), 17.
60

When I write of Reason, I mean the framework through which one arrives
at meaning, as mentioned earlier: the ontological, epistemological, and theological
frameworks.
61

I do not imply Being as a broad conceptualization of the localization within
which reality takes place; rather, I side with Fernando Canale in understanding
Being as an overall quality shared by everything real. Also, Being in this study will be
conceived as a reality in human minds, while the concept of “being” will be
conceived as entities outside the human mind. Furthermore, Being is that which “coappears with all things as a basic characteristic of their being.” See Fernando L.
Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing Tradition (Berrien
Springs, MI: LithoTech, 2005), 38. According to Canale, an evaluation of how Being
is interpreted in history reveals two possible interpretations of Being:
temporal/historical Being and timeless Being. The concept of temporality and
timelessness will be recurrent in this study, since it is a philosophical principle that
influences all other frameworks that constitute Reason and consequently
interpretation. For a historical analysis of how Being is interpreted, see Canale,
Criticism of Theological Reason. For more details on Being, how it is interpreted, and its
influence on interpretation, see the following section dealing with the principle of
ontology.
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Because the concept of Being functions as the first and all-embracing concept by
which everything else is conditioned, it reveals the primordial, unconditional, or
hypothetical character of Reason. The concept of Being, functioning as Logos, is
not conditioned by any logic, since it is the ground for logic itself, but by choice
of the subject.63
The conceptualization of Being is a hermeneutical choice interpreters make due to
the hypothetical character of Reason, and this choice influences not only the
epistemological standpoint from which interpretation takes place, but the
interpretation of the God-human relation itself.
The interpretation of Being will be evaluated in the following section dealing
with the principle of ontology, but at this stage, some introductory notes must be
given to the reader. In the history of thought, Being, as noted earlier, has been
interpreted in two ways: temporal/historical and timeless. The subjective choice
between the two directly affects what the human subject perceives in its relationship
to a particular object. Because of this, attention will be paid to how the subject and
the object are understood from both the objectivist and subjectivist epistemological
standpoints.
The following evaluation of the epistemological principle, then, is doublepronged. It attempts to understand not only how significant philosophical shifts in
history grasped the relation between subject and object, but also how they chose the
concept of Being,64 the ground upon which Reason and interpretation take place.
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Glanz understands that the conceptualization of Being in Reason is that
which “the subject brings to the subject-object relationship and that predominantly
determines the means and end of the process of creating an image of the object.”
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The two major philosophical shifts in the interpretation of the subject-object
relation, along with its inevitable choice of the understanding of Being, will be
classified in this study as objectivist epistemology (encompassing the classical and
modern periods) and subjectivist epistemology (encompassing the modern and
postmodern periods).65 At the end of this analysis, I will draw out the possibility of a
hermeneutical epistemology as another shift in the understanding of epistemology.

Ibid. In other words, the subjective understanding and choice of Being is inevitably
carried into the interpretation of the dynamic between subject and object. Again, the
issue of Being will only be evaluated in this section as it relates to the principle of
epistemology. For a proper evaluation of the concept of Being and how it is
interpreted in history, see the next section on the principle of ontology.
This study will not follow the classical Hegelian structure of historical
developments. On the Hegelian arrangement of the history of thought, John
Goldingay writes: “G. W. F. Hegel suggested a three-stage model for understanding
the history of thought. . . . Current conventional wisdom implies a Hegelian
understanding of biblical interpretation. In the first millennium there was premodern
interpretation, the second millennium saw the development of modern
interpretation, and in the third there is postmodern interpretation.” See John A.
Goldingay, “Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern in Old Testament Study,” in
Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible, ed. James D. G. Dunn and J. W. Rogerson (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 13. For the objectives of this study, the Hegelian
classification, though present in biblical interpretation today, represents a
modernistic outlook on history that fails to embrace the complexity and continuation
of systems of thought throughout the historical periods. Although it may help in
identifying the macro-hermeneutical patterns present in the different periods, I will
resort to objectivist and subjectivist epistemology as the pattern through which to
understand the complexity of epistemological developments throughout history. This
is not an attempt to exhaust the epistemological issues within the different periods,
but allows for the continuation of perspectives without resorting to clear breaks in
thinking in the transitions from period to period.
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Objectivist Epistemology
The Subject in Objectivist Epistemology
The objectivist understanding of the subject-object relation has ancient
historical roots. From the birth of philosophy through the time of the classical
thinkers until the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the emphasis in the subjectobject relation was on the object. An evaluation of the interpretation of the subjectobject relation from its earliest to its later stages falls outside the scope of this study; I
will begin this assessment with the transition between classical and modern thinking,
since it best applies to the influential period where biblical interpretation took the
form it carries today. Also, some key features of the objectivist interpretation of the
subject-object relation emerged during this transition.
Heavily influenced by the Renaissance, the Enlightenment,66 and the initial
effects of rationalism, eighteenth-century thinkers left behind the pre-critical phase of
biblical interpretation to embrace a more critical approach to reality and
consequently to biblical interpretation. The epistemological significance of this
emphasis on human reason and rationality is that it presented a particular
understanding of the human mind that uncovers how the subject-object relation was
understood.

Gerhard F. Hasel observes that “the Enlightenment was characterized by a
new philosophical norm—rationalism. This meant that human reason was set up as
the final criterion and chief source and arbiter of what is to be accepted as true and
factual.” See Gerhard F. Hasel, Biblical Interpretation Today: An Analysis of Modern
Methods of Biblical Interpretation and Proposals for the Interpretation of the Bible as the Word
of God, Biblical Research Institute (Lincoln, NE: College View Printers, 1985), 9.
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The assumption in the seventeenth century was that “the subject passively
receives input from its objects,”67 and the mind of the subject was depicted, via the
work of John Locke,68 as a tabula rasa,69 that is, empty and awaiting the influence of
the object to reach a possible immaculate subjective reception of its communicated
content. In this epistemological conception, besides the clear distinction between
subject and object,70 the lines of intelligibility71 communicated by the object are
immersed into the mind of a passive subject. The epistemological movement that
characterizes this period interprets the subject-object relation in its distinction as the
content is communicated from the object to the subject. This basic premise led to the
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Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 763.
68

Tabula rasa is “the theory that the mind at birth is a tabula rasa (blank
writing tablet) awaiting ideas from experience.” Ibid., 763.
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As in the beginning of this section, the distinction of subject from object
and its effects in modernity can be traced to Descartes, who understood that “the
body is always a hindrance to the mind in its thinking.” J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff,
and D. Murdoch, trans., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3:336. This anthropological perspective leads
some to see that the “core Judaeo-Christian view of the soul is quite at odds with the
views of Plato and Descartes.” See Rebecca D. Pentz, “Veatch and Brain Death: A
Plea for the Soul,” Journal of Clinical Ethics 5, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 132. In other
words, the distinction of subject from object is marked by a Platonic understanding
of the body-soul distinction.
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The role of the object does not bypass the communication of intelligible
content to the subject, something that can also be called transobjectivity. On this
Glanz writes, “Transobjectivity means two things: on the one hand, that the object
exists in ontic independence from the subject, and, on the other hand, that the object
is open in the sense that it does not hide, but communicates its properties within the
structure of Reason.” See Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional,” 221.
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birth of the “notion of scientific objectivity as excluding all contributions from the
cognitive subject.”72
Theologians in the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century reflected
the epistemological paradigm outlined above in their hermeneutic. Gerhard Maier
puts together the general mindset of the time in the following manner: “F. C. Baur
wanted to ‘apprehend’ the state of affairs given to us in the Bible in its ‘pure
objectiveness.’ Similarly W. Wrede wished to work ‘as objectively… as possible.’”73
This mindset, again, follows the tenets set forth by Descartes’ philosophical reflection
on the “lone individual as ‘thinking subject,’ abstracted from the world.”74
The idea of an abstracted thinking subject created several problems for
interpretation that will be seen in subsequent sections of this study. Among these
problems is a limited perspective of the self in interpretation, since “the classical
mind was paramountly concerned with the interpretation of reality and not with the
patterns of its own functioning.”75 Objectivist epistemology, then, was shaped by an

Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology, 19. Also, as a foretaste of the
influence of such principles upon biblical interpretation, a theme that will be
developed in the next chapter, the passive role of the subject seen in classical and
modern interpretations of the subject-object relation has “never been entirely
overcome among practitioners of historical-critical methods.” See Ben F. Meyer,
“The Challenges of Text and Reader to the Historical-Critical Method,” in The Bible
and Its Readers, ed. Wim Beuken, Sean Freyne, and Anton Weiler (London: SCM,
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overemphasis on the active object in the formation of Reason and consequently in
interpretation. This resulted in the heightening of the mental capacities of the
individual in interpretation and a mindset that asserted that any interpretative
activity must be accomplished through pure objectivity. This distancing of the
individual from the object in interpretation, prevalent throughout modernity, is
perhaps one of the most destructive epistemological features when applied to biblical
interpretation—due not only to its Platonic dependence, but more importantly, to its
incoherence with the apparent biblical movement of proximity to the word for
understanding to take place rather than distancing.
In the mid- to late eighteenth century, the epistemological mindset began to
show signs of a transition from empiricism to idealism, from object to subject. This
conception can be seen to some extent in the work of Immanuel Kant.76 Ronald H.
Nash summarizes Kant’s contribution to epistemology in the following way:
Philosophers prior to Kant (or so Kant claimed) had assumed that human
knowledge is possible only as the mind is adapted to the world. Kant reversed
this order. Instead of the mind adapting to the supposed objects of its knowledge,
all objects are instead adapted to the knowing mind.77
Glanz adds: “The Cartesian paradigm and the influence of Kant changed the
direction of the flow of meaning by grounding the interpretation of the

For more on Kant’s contribution to epistemology see Immanuel Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1990);
Paul Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992); Julián Marias, History of Philosophy (New York: Dover,
1967), 189–223.
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dimensionality of Reason in the epistemological framework.”78 In late modernity,
then, more attention was given to the subject in interpretation. This emphasis
provided the context for the appearance of the next epistemological emphasis in
history: subjectivist epistemology.
Yet, before turning to this second stage in the historical development of
epistemology, it is important to turn to how the object, or conception of Being, was
interpreted during the objectivist period.

The Object in Objectivist Epistemology
So far, the role of the subject in the objectivist understanding of the subjectobject relationship has been uncovered. Now I turn to how thinkers in the objectivist
period interpreted the function of the object in the subject-object relationship: that is,
how thinkers chose to interpret Being.
From classical times through the Enlightenment, the overall interpretation of
Being was through a timeless conception. The definition of this timeless conception
and its implications for biblical interpretation will be fully given in the next section,
so for now I introduce this concept only tentatively. It suffices to point out that the
“impetus for defining eternity as timelessness is not found in any dynamic of
scripture’s logic,”79 but, rather, seems to have “been stirred by a concern to articulate
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in terms classically schooled converts would find congenial.”80 In sum, “Christianity
took root in an intellectual world in which Plato’s belief in the unchangeable nature
of truth and Aristotle’s in an unmovable mover provided the terms of systematic
understanding.”81
Although, as seen above, the conception of Being as timeless is criticized by
contemporary thinkers, it prevailed during the classical and modern periods alike,
demonstrating how scholarly thought was heavily dependent on a Platonic
understanding of reality.82 This macro-hermeneutical or philosophical choice of
Being as timeless affected the epistemological structure of the objectivist perspective,
since the “absolute truth” that the rational subject arrives at in interpretation “stands
on the belief that our knowledge springs from timeless, changeless realities.”83 Even
though the late modern period brought about the beginning of a change in the
approach to knowledge, the timeless understanding of Being, or of the object in the
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Stanley J. Grenz writes on the development of Greek thinking during the
Renaissance: “Renaissance thinkers were humanists in that they adhered to the
human values presented in the classical writings. In addition, the return to the
classics included a rejection of the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages in favor of
Platonism and even mysticism.” In Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 58.
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subject-object relationship, was still shaped by Platonic conceptions.84
Glanz correctly points out that even though much changed in the transition
between pre-modern times and modernity, “Being was still interpreted as timeless.”85
Such a conception did not allow modernistic thinkers to depart from a
foundationalist perspective of knowledge; truth was still determined by verifiable
universal propositions, while Being was still interpreted as a timeless reality.
Both classical and modern perspectives of epistemology, or objectivist
epistemology, assumed “the existence of an ‘absolute universal truth’ independent
from the subject’s contribution.”86 This conception, at the ontological level, would
radically change in the next epistemological shift.
Subjectivist Epistemology
The Subject in Subjectivist Epistemology
A major shift in the historical development of the interpretation of the subjectobject dynamic came in late modernity, or what other scholars prefer to call
postmodernity.87 Knowing that a “precise understanding of postmodernity is

Canale writes: “Plato devised the timeless ontology on which absolute truth
of classical and modern times was constructed.” Ibid. Although a proper analysis of
timeless Being will be given in the next section, one can already notice the influential
character of such a conception upon the foundation of knowledge. In both classical
and modern times, Being was interpreted through such a timeless conception.
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notoriously difficult to pin down”88 and “those who attempt to define or analyze the
concept of postmodernity do so at their own peril,”89 at this stage, and for the
purposes of this study, I will focus on how contemporary thinkers in this postmodern
condition understand the role of the subject and object in the subject-object
relationship.90
The historical and philosophical understanding of the subject-object
relationship in the subjectivist period is marked by an attempt to overcome the
classical-modern objectivist framework. Although it is difficult to draw out every
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single element that led up to this subjectivist mindset, it is imperative to focus yet
again on the late modern period. Here I briefly turn to the influence of German
Idealism on the epistemological developments that led to the subjectivist turn.91
The nineteenth century “marked one of the richest and most exciting
explosions of philosophical energy and talent, perhaps even comparable to the
generation that gave birth to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.”92 Whereas classical
epistemology in the pre-modern and modern periods emphasized the active object,
German Idealism emphasized the influence of the active subject, who “in turn is
supposed to create its own object of thought.”93 The objectivism present in classical
thinking began to be overcome by the subjective emphasis in the epistemological
developments in German Idealism. The mind of the subject was no longer passive in

For more on what is known as the “classical period” of philosophical
thought in Germany, see Karl Ameriks, ed., The Cambridge Companion to German
Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Frederick C. Beiser,
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Springer, 2008); Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and
Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). The “ideal” in German
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are not so in fact . . . . The positive interpretation of ‘idealism,’ in contrast, involves
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interpretation, but was understood to create the necessary conditions for meaning to
take place: a notion that can be traced to where this study left off in the previous
section—Immanuel Kant.
This emphasis on the subject is one of the significant characteristics that mark
the shift from the objectivist to the subjectivist interpretation of the subject-object
relation. Naturally, this conception brought about an array of issues that had been
overlooked by its predecessors.
As seen above, the roots for a paradigmatic shift in the interpretation of
Reason formed in the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century. The twentieth
century saw significant criticism of the idealistic emphasis on the subject in
interpretation, as well as the classical emphasis on the object. Stanley Grenz focuses
on the active participation of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger in this
period, affirming that it was Heidegger who argued that “Descartes and Kant
directed all modern philosophy down an illegitimate and destructive path.”94
This destructive path was characterized by a misconception in regard to the
active subject in interpretation, since, for Heidegger, “the human being is not
primarily a thinking self, a subject that engages in cognitive acts; rather, we are above
all else beings-in-the-world, enmeshed in social networks.”95
Some of the epistemological implications of understanding the subject not as
“thinking self” but as “being-in-the-world” are outlined by Canale as he writes that
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in “postmodern times, knowledge and truth have become relative to the historical
and cultural conditions of the cognitive subject,”96 replacing the “‘epistemological
foundationalism’ of classical and modern times”97 with the relativeness of truth in
“historically and culturally conditioned lives.”98
While the Enlightenment project and the work of Kant attempted to bring the
absoluteness of truth to the epistemological dimension of the thinking subject while
maintaining a timeless conception of Being, postmodern thinkers understood that
this project was bound for failure, since a thinking subject is part of an interpretative
community that is conditioned by history, time, and language. At the same time, the
idea that the active subject in his/her historically, culturally conditioned life
determines the content of reason lays the groundwork for the possibility of cognitive
relativism. The epistemological shift from object to subject, in postmodern times,
allows for meaning to be communicated from subject (within a historical and cultural
context) to object.
As mentioned in passing before, another level that marks this shift is a
sensitive attention to language. Vanhoozer not only sees this linguistic turn as one of
the most important shifts from modernity to postmodernity, but affirms that the
postmodern mind understands that “not only do we have a nonlinguistic access to
the way things are, but the way we speak and think is conditioned by the particular
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language in which we dwell.”99 Thus the conception of the active subject in
interpretation undergoes a major shift within the postmodern condition: modern
objectivity is not only overcome, but replaced by an emphasis on the subject’s
historical, temporal, and linguistic context.
Finally, by “the end of the twentieth century, philosophy finally came to
realize the failure of the Kantian transcendentalism and scientific methodology as
sources of absolute truth.”100 Yet the postmodern understanding of the thinking
subject in the subject-object relationship as part of a hermeneutical, historical,
linguistic, and changing context also stems from a foundational change in the
philosophical understanding of the object, or Being. To this issue I now turn.

The Object in Subjectivist Epistemology
As mentioned earlier, the epistemological conception of the dynamic between
subject and object carries an a priori choice of how Being is interpreted. Such a
hermeneutical choice directly affects not only one’s elaboration of the functionality
of the subject-object relationship, but more importantly, how a particular person can
arrive at knowledge and meaning. The question to be answered at this stage is, how
does the subjectivist period that encompasses the postmodern condition or turn
interpret Being? As pointed out earlier, the interpretation of Being as timeless during
the objectivist period was left unchanged.
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It is at this ontological level that the postmodern condition creates the
possibility of a different epistemological direction, though it is still not fully arrived
at. The postmodern turn, or modernity reaching its full consequences, marks the
possibility of a reinterpretation of Being from a timeless and changeless
understanding to a historical and temporal one. The realization that the subject was
now conceived as a historical or social individual in history opened the path for the
same conclusion to be reached at the level of Being. Canale writes:
Postmodernity replaced absolute reason with historical hermeneutical reason in
epistemology; and timeless, changeless reality with temporal, changing reality in
ontology. . . . The epistemological postmodern shift from classical absolute
reason to hermeneutical reason springs from the ontological shift from a timeless
to a temporal ontology.101
Although a change to temporal ontology took place at the level of the historical
subject, the same change on the level of the object, or Being, has not yet been arrived
at. Even so, this change does create the possibility that the subject is no longer able to
apprehend timeless truths, only historical truths situated in time.
This initial paradigm shift—from the object to the hermeneutical/historical
subject—created the necessary conditions for some theologians to depart from the
modern project in essential elements that relate to theology and consequently to
interpretation. Vanhoozer outlines three of the main postulates in modernity that
were rejected in the transition to late modernity or postmodernity: “(1) that reason is
absolute and universal (2) that individuals are autonomous, able to transcend their
place in history, class, and culture (3) that universal principles and procedures are
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objective whereas preferences are subjective.”102
The last point is significant to the concerns of this section, since it shows what
remains to be overcome: the idea that there is still some timeless objective truth to be
arrived at subjectively apart from “preferences.” So, while the postmodern turn
brought a temporal ontological change to the level of the subject, it has not made the
same conclusion reach the level of Being.
It is here that Canale anticipates the possibility of the full conclusion of the
modern project or the postmodern turn:
When the subject-object relationship is understood as working in the temporal
dimensionality of knowledge, the interpretation of what essence and objectivity
mean in themselves is bound to differ from the classical timeless interpretation of
them.103
While the postmodern turn made significant changes in the realm of the thinking
subject, the full implications of these changes are yet to be implemented in the
sciences and theology.104 Postmodernity opened the possibility that both subject and
object could be seen on the same ontological platform, that is, historical or temporal
Being. While objectivist epistemology created a clear break between subject and object
through a timeless conception of Being, postmodernity opens the way to
understanding subject and object in relation to each other, interacting in the same
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historical and temporal flow. However, this has not yet been accomplished.
Summary
This section outlined the context in which interpretation takes place: namely,
the question of how humanity arrives at knowledge, meaning, and that which is real.
In focus was the epistemological dynamic of the subject-object relationship as a way
to see the historical developments in answer to this question.
The first period addressed was objectivist epistemology and its emphasis on
the role of the object in interpretation as the subject took on a passive role. During this
period, Being was interpreted as timeless and dependent upon a Platonic ontology.
The second period addressed was subjectivist epistemology, characterized by
a change of emphasis from the object to the subject. While the subject was active in
interpretation, this change brought a significant passivity to the object. By
understanding the subject differently and breaking from the timeless categories that
reigned throughout history, postmodernity introduced the temporal and historical
dimension of reality to the level of the subject. However, postmodernity has not as
yet integrated this discovery into the understanding of Being.
Now that the notion of “human” in the God-human relationship has been
examined via epistemology, I turn to the second part of that relationship: the notion
of “God.”

The Principle of Ontology
Introduction
This section will assess the second component in the God-human relationship
45

structure, namely, the principle of ontology.105 First, I will introduce how the
ontological principle, operating in the presuppositional frameworks of biblical
scholars and theologians as a presupposition, influences the general flow of biblical
interpretation along with its results. Second, I will move into the issue of how these
assumptions shape the scholarly understanding of God and how God acts in the
biblical text in particular,106 since this issue is aligned with the interests of this study:
the actions of God in relation to humanity, and humanity’s ability to know and grasp
revelation in the context of history. Throughout this analysis, I will also provide
preliminary examples that reflect the influence of the principle of ontology at the
level of scholarly assumptions and their effect on biblical interpretation.

The question of Being is at the foundation of theological thinking. Apart
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The Conception of Being: Timelessness and
Temporality in Interpretation
Introduction
In the analysis of the principle of epistemology, I pointed out that Being was
interpreted as timeless in philosophical and theological thought even during the
development from classical to late modern or postmodern thinking. Because the
concept of Being as timeless is foundational for the development of theological
thinking in general and biblical interpretation in particular, it is necessary to dedicate
space to address it properly.
The notion of Being as timeless was first articulated in philosophical circles,107
yet “this view has affected theology throughout history and is still pervasive
today.”108 Although Christian tradition maintains a timeless view of God, several
thinkers have seen the problematic effect of this view on biblical interpretation.
Among them is Oscar Culmann, who writes:
How much the thinking of our days roots in Hellenism, and how little Biblical
Christianity, becomes clear to us when we confirm the fact that far and wide the
Christian Church and Christian theology distinguish time and eternity in the
Platonic-Greek manner.109
Norman Gulley correctly points out that “the view that God is timeless
does not come from Scripture, but from philosophy.” In Norman R. Gulley,
Systematic Theology: Prolegomena, Vol. 1 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Press, 2003), 4.
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Culmann not only recognizes the Greek origin of the timeless conception of Being,
but also the mixture of Greek and biblical ideas within Christian tradition and
theology. Culmann adds that “to primitive Christianity, as to Judaism, the Greek
manner of distinguishing between time and eternity is quite foreign.”110 Grenz111 also
reacts to the proximity between theology and philosophy as he writes that “the
wedding of philosophy and theology in what has become the traditional and
accepted manner is no longer possible (if it ever was).”112 He calls for “the demise of
onto-theology.”113
At this stage, I will focus on the question of Being itself in order for the reader
to understand “what it is” before I can explore the question of “what it does.” After
this clarification, I will continue to trace the issue of the relation between theology
and philosophy, especially as it relates to biblical interpretation, and the issue of
onto-theology itself. To the issue of Being I now turn.

Being as Timeless in Interpretation
Scholars acknowledge Parmenides (540–470 BC) as the “first philosopher to
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view all reality under the common aspect of Being.”114 In Plato’s evaluation of
Parmenides,115 beyond the understanding that Being is immutable, there are two
basic characteristics of Being that shape its conception and that remain a significant
part of philosophical and theological discussions throughout the centuries. First, in
accordance with other philosophers of the pre-Socratic era, he drew a clear
distinction between the appearance of things and the reality of things. That is, what
is “perceived by the senses is not actually the case.”116 Secondly, Being had no birth
or beginning, it has no end, and it is not subject to change.117
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Parmenides arrived at this second characteristic of Being in his logical
conclusion regarding the concept of time. Grenz, for instance, understands that the
logic in the argument of Parmenides led him to reject “any temporal or spatial
distinction in ‘what is,’ and consequently, replaced the concept of time with the
‘eternal now.’”118 By stating that Being (the concept of what “is”) is changeless,
Parmenides discarded any temporal elements to its interpretation. That is, anything
that represented sequence, time, etc., was incompatible with changeless Being.
Since that time, different philosophers have advanced the discussion of Being
as timeless through history. Among these was Plato (427–347 BC),119 one of the
foundational proponents of timeless Being in philosophical history. As seen
previously, Plato developed the two basic characteristics of how Being is understood
timelessly. On the first characteristic, the distinction between what is and what
appears, Plato wrote that “the world as perceived by the senses is changing
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of Texts, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 251.
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constantly.”120 The appearance of things to the senses is inherently tied to change,
and thus must be distinguished from the changeless nature of Being. This idea leads
to the second characteristic: the timeless character of Being. In short, “Plato ascribed
logical priority to the forms and elevated the realm of being above the world of
becoming.”121 What results is the theological idea that “God is eternal and His
creation is temporal.”122
Even though these Greek philosophical accounts of Being were greatly
influential in the development of philosophical thinking, it was the Christian church
that inherited and expanded their insights. Grenz writes that “insofar as Christian
theologians carried forward the trajectory of ontological reflection bequeathed to
them by their Greek philosophical forebears, the fortunes of Being came to be tied to
their speculations.”123 It is because of this fusion of Greek thinking with Christian
theology in its earliest stages that the issue becomes relevant to biblical
interpretation.
Yet what is the influence of a timeless conception of Being upon one’s
outlook on reality, and consequently, upon biblical interpretation? To address this
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question, one must keep in mind the two main characteristics of a timeless
conception of Being: the issue of appearance versus reality and the elevation of Being
to a timeless realm above a world marked by change.
Much can be said about the impact of the issue of appearance versus reality,
seen in the Platonic developments of Being, in hermeneutics. Bridging the Platonic
understanding of Being to hermeneutics, Manfred Oeming understands that “in
accordance with the Platonic teaching that things are something other than what
they appear to be, the undignified actions of the god as well as contradictions within
the text are re-interpreted as ethical truths and natural laws.”124 In other words, what
Oeming attempts to convey here is an idea that flows from this Platonic
interpretation of Being and directly affects biblical interpretation—that a timeless
understanding of Being allows the interpreter to bypass the literal meaning of the
historical biblical text. The idea that the appearance of things is to be distinguished
from the reality of things effectively lays the foundation for the following attitude:
“Good exegetes must never limit themselves to the vague and superficial literal
meaning of the text; the exegete must free herself from such lowly errors and ascend
to the true spiritual meaning of the work.”125
This conception provided the context for the appearance and lifespan of
allegorical interpretations of Scripture, and consequently, to the modern disregard
for, or suspicion of, a literal reading of the biblical text. These characteristics
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commonly seen even in contemporary hermeneutics, then, have roots in a Platonic
conception of Being that creates a dichotomy between appearance and reality.126 The
Platonic timeless interpretation of Being leads to this hermeneutical principle: things
as they appear in history are not things as they are.
This principle—that things as they appear in history are not things as they
are—has appeared in many forms throughout the history of philosophy and
theology. As noted earlier, even though the location of truth and knowledge shifted
from the object in objectivist epistemology to the subject in subjectivist epistemology,
the timeless conception of Being as a macro-hermeneutical presupposition remained
intact.
The assumption of Being as timeless at the level of ontology naturally
influenced the level of epistemology, of humanity being able to grasp reality
altogether. David Hume (1711–1776), for instance, understood that interpreters
“cannot have knowledge about the transcendent.”127 Ronald H. Nash traces the
influence of a timeless conception of Being upon biblical interpretation. Nash
correctly observes that while Hume had an epistemological gap preventing human
subjects from knowing transcendent, timeless things, Kant had his own epistemic
barrier to reality: “Kant’s system had the effect of erecting a wall between the world
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as it appears to us and the world as it really is.”128
Every philosophical and theological system has attempted to come to terms
with the problem of appearance and reality, or what Kant called the phenomenal
world (that which “appears”) and the noumenal world (that which “is”).129 This
problem affects not only the readers of the biblical text (as to what they can
comprehend about the divine through the text), but also the parameters of what is
real or possible in the depictions of the biblical text (how the biblical characters
comprehended the divine). Because of the ontological assumption of a timeless
Being, the resolution to this problem became increasingly complex.130
Now I turn to the second Parmenidean-Platonic characteristic of timeless
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Being: the elevation of what is real above the temporal world marked by change.
Oliver Glanz writes on its implications in the realm of epistemology:
When Being is defined as timeless, the ontological framework consequently
conceives ultimate reality as timeless. Timelessness further implies that Being
exists independently from the cognitive subject. This means that the
interpretation of Being as timeless automatically creates a gap between being and
Being, as they do not share the same time frame. This gap, albeit in different
ways, exists both in the Platonic and Kantian line of thinking.131
In order for the reader to have a better grasp of what is presented here, I will review
the basic understanding of Being.
The concept of Being is the broadest concept or idea that human minds can
reach.132 Being is the broadest conception of what is real. The ontology of something
is, in short, the description of how that something “is” or “exists.” This difference
between Being (as the broadest conception of reality human minds can fathom) and
all things real (beings) is crucial for the subsequent analysis of how theologians and
exegetes approach the text.
From the time of Plato through the time of Hume and Kant, the same
conception of Being as timeless remains. Following the insight of Glanz, what
happens when Being is interpreted as timeless is a break between that which is, or
reality (Being), and the entities immersed in it (beings). The first consequence of
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upholding a timeless view of Being in interpretation is, therefore, that everything in
the physical world of change and time will naturally be understood as an analogy to
a timeless reality determined a priori. It is this break between the subject and the object
in the structure of reason, maintained in the work of both Plato and Kant by a
timeless interpretation of Being, that leads some biblical interpreters knowingly or
unknowingly to see the objective realities of the biblical text as analogies of that
which is ultimately real in a timeless sense.
In sum, as it pertains to biblical interpretation, the choice of a timeless
conception of Being implies that what is depicted in the text is analogical speech in
time about a timeless reality beyond time, history, or the world. I will revisit this
crucial issue below when I address how a timeless conception of Being influences the
understanding of God and God-acts in the interpretation of the text. However, before
I continue to examine the implications of a timeless conception of Being upon
biblical interpretation, I will briefly turn to an alternative conception of Being:
namely, Being as a temporal reality.

Being as Temporal in Interpretation
So far, I have attempted to outline the scope and influence of the conception
of Being as timeless throughout the history of philosophy and theology. As I turn to
the alternate interpretation of Being as temporal,133 I will focus on two main

Richard Rice, when speaking of the traditional, classical view of God,
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representatives of this position: first, the proponents of what is known as open
theism, or the open view of God,134 and second, Fernando Canale.
In the words of Richard Rice, the open view of God is a “striking
alternative”135 to the traditional, classical, timeless view of God. Breaking the
Platonic conception of a dualistic world split into a sphere of God/ideas and a
sphere of space and time, the open view of God claims that “God interacts with His
creatures”136 in history—that is, in the changeable historical flow of events, and not

Support for a New Perspective,” in The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the
Traditional Understanding of God, ed. Clark Pinnock et al. (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity, 1994), 11. This is how Rice introduces his alternate conception of Being
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humanity. He concludes by saying that the traditional view of God leads his
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For an introduction to the open view of God, see Clark H. Pinnock, Most
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from beyond the world. In classical and modern times, God, ideas, and truth were
considered inaccessible to humanity. Open theists break from their predecessors at an
ontological level as they deal with the doctrine of God, but not as they deal with the
conception of Being itself.
William Hasker, outlining the philosophical and theological foundations of
the open view, understands that “the doctrine of divine timelessness is not taught in
the Bible and does not reflect the way biblical writers understood God.”137 In
addition, Hasker writes that “there is simply no trace in Scripture of the elaborate
metaphysical and conceptual apparatus that is required to make sense of divine
timelessness.”138 In this sense, proponents of the open view depart from the
conception of Being as timeless theologically as they attempt to ground its alternative
within the lines of Scripture.
At the outset, then, the open view of God questions the central tenets of the
traditional, classical view of God. Its proponents ask the logical questions any
thinker would ask in attempting to merge a classical timeless ontology with the
biblical text. For instance, “If God is truly timeless, so that temporal determinations
of ‘before’ and ‘after’ do not apply to him, then how can God act in time, as the
Scriptures say that he does?”139 In other words, the proponents of the open view of
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God ask proper questions as they attempt to relate the biblical material to the
ontological assumptions with which it was interpreted for over two millennia.
Yet the critique given by the open view project does not relate to the macrohermeneutical principle of ontology they seem to overcome via the mesohermeneutical level of doctrine (from God as timeless to God as temporal). In
reality, the criticism is toward the doctrinal implications of such macrohermeneutical changes, especially as they relate to the doctrine of God’s
foreknowledge, providence, and human freedom.140
God’s knowledge is a crucial doctrinal issue for open-view thinkers. Clark
Pinnock, for instance, believes that the rejection of Being as timeless implies that
“God’s close engagement with time implies that God does not yet know all that will
eventually happen,”141 and “if the future does not yet exist, God may not yet know
all of it.”142 The conception of a God who does not know the future is an example of
a doctrinal position presented by open-view theologians as part of the temporal view
of God. In this sense, God’s time is univocal to human time: that is, God experiences
the sequence and limitations of time just as humanity does. Both God and humanity

Because this study focuses on the macro-hermeneutical or philosophical
issues that influence interpretation, doctrinal issues are out of its scope. But, since
there is an overlap between how such macro-hermeneutical conceptions affect
biblical interpretation and these doctrinal standpoints, I will provide a preliminary
evaluation of the issue.
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stand equally in the flow of time and history, and because the future is not an object
to be known (since it does not exist yet), neither God nor humans can foresee it.
Among the critics of open theism is Fernando Canale, who questions open
theists’ understanding of what they are discovering through biblical analysis of God’s
time while sustaining the conception of Being as temporal.143 Canale writes:
On the surface the controversy that the open view of God has generated revolves
around a small issue within the doctrine of divine providence. Yet, at the deeper
hermeneutical level, most open-view theologians have not yet perceived their
horizon shift from classical philosophical timelessness to biblical temporality.144
In short, Canale assesses that the work of open-view theologians revolves around
what they believe to be the doctrinal implications of the temporality of God, and not
around the importance of uncovering the full potential and philosophical
implications of the ontological shift from Being as timeless to Being as temporal.
At this stage, I will review some key characteristics of the open view as an
alternate ontological standpoint to the interpretation of Being. First, open-view
thinkers believe that a timeless ontology is incompatible with the biblical text, since
the Bible itself proposes a temporal conception of God. Second, open-view thinkers
draw the implications of this macro-hermeneutical shift at the level of doctrine, with
attention to the doctrine of God (foreknowledge, providence, etc.). And finally,
open-view thinkers interpret divine time univocally as it relates to human time: that

Canale attempts to overcome the traditional timeless ontology present in
Christian theology through a temporal view of God and reality without resorting to
the open view of God. For more on his work as it relates to open theism, see Canale,
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is, they see divine and human time as one and the same. The point here is that
although open-view thinkers focus on the doctrinal outcome of a possible change at
the macro-hermeneutical level of the interpretation of Being, they make no attempt
to develop the philosophical underpinnings of such an outcome.
A second alternate position that embraces the possibility of divine temporality
grounded on a conception of Being as temporal is found in the work of Fernando
Canale. Canale agrees with open-view thinkers that “the timeless horizon has it
origin in philosophical speculation and the temporal-historical horizon has its origin
in biblical revelation.”145 Yet, for Canale, the biblical portrayal of Being as temporal
should lead evangelical theology deeper than the doctrinal stances present in openview theology related to the doctrine of God and human freedom. Canale
understands that a change at the macro-hermeneutical level of the interpretation of
Being should affect “the entire range of Christian theology.”146
This assertion implies that Canale assesses the problem of timeless Being and
God’s time from a different angle than do open-view theologians. For Canale, the
uncovering of Being as temporal stems from a macro-hermeneutical (philosophical)
level rather than a meso-hermeneutical (theological/doctrinal) or micro-
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hermeneutical (exegetical) one. His focus is on the philosophical macrohermeneutical structure that inherently influences doctrinal and textual issues. In
fact, according to Canale, it is the focus on meso- and micro-hermeneutical issues
that brings inevitable disagreements between classical theists and open theists. For
Canale, “the micro and meso hermeneutical level where the controversy between
classical and open theism takes place is conditioned by the deeper and foundational
macro-hermeneutical level.”147
So far, one could say that Canale agrees with open-view thinkers that the
Bible does not endorse a timeless conception of God. Yet, in regard to the
philosophical background of this doctrinal standpoint, Canale breaks with them and
asserts that the development of such a shift should begin at the macro-hermeneutical
level, and only then influence meso- and micro-hermeneutical issues. But how does
Canale sustain a temporal conception of Being while avoiding the mesohermeneutical commitments of open theism that are widely criticized—namely,
issues concerning the limitation of God’s knowledge, power, and human freedom?
Canale’s assessment of the biblical text on the question of divine time takes on
a broader scope. Canale writes, “We should exercise care not to conceive that God is
limited by time as his creatures are. . . . God’s time is not to be conceived as being
identical to created time (univocal), or as totally different from it (equivocal), but as
analogical to our time.”148 According to Canale, Scripture does not view God as
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experiencing timelessness: rather, it presents a God who “experiences the fullness of
time, while we experience it only partially.”149 In other words, God is not bound to a
timeless reality, but “can experience the temporal succession of future-present-past
both in the deepness of his divinity and at the limited level of his creation.”150
In sum, both open-view theologians and Fernando Canale provide an
alternate interpretation of Being. While open-view thinkers do not focus on the
philosophical underpinnings of their doctrinal position, especially as it relates to the
significance of Being as temporal, Canale’s A Criticism of Theological Reason provides
the philosophical basis for his doctrinal positions. The difference between these
approaches, apart from attention to the philosophical interpretation of Being as a
basis for doctrinal construction, is the understanding of divine time. While open-view
thinkers understand divine time as univocal to human time, Canale views divine
time as analogical to human time while carrying univocal and equivocal
components.151
These perspectives directly affect thinkers’ approach to the biblical text as well
as their interpretations of the dynamic between God and humanity. The edifice of
Christian theology has been built on the concept of a timeless God separate from the
created world. At the same time, scholars from different backgrounds observe that
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this perspective is incompatible with biblical depictions of God’s relationship to
humanity.
This brief diversion from analysis of the influence of Being as timeless upon
interpretation brings the analysis back to where it left off—the relationship of
philosophy and theology and its implications for biblical interpretation.

Onto-Theology in Interpretation
Now that some preliminary implications of how timeless and temporal
conceptions of Being influence interpretation have been laid out, I will turn briefly to
the concept of onto-theology and how some scholars, because of the issues raised
above, attempt to depart from the proximity between classical philosophy and
Christian theology.152
On the origin and implications of onto-theology for the theological method,
Canale writes:
Dependence on Greek ontology brought about two paradigmatic changes at the
macro-hermeneutical level. The conviction that neo-Platonism properly described
the nature of reality led Christian theologians to adopt its views on God’s being
and human nature for theological use. Thus the “onto-theo-logical” movement as
the basis of the constitution of Christian tradition began. The notions that God’s
being and the human soul are not temporal but timeless realities became
hermeneutical guides in the construction of Christian theology. They played a
decisive macro-hermeneutical role in the interpretation of Scripture (micro
hermeneutics) and the construction of Christian doctrines ([meso] hermeneutics).
For more on onto-theology and its implications for philosophy and
theology, see Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern
Christian Faith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001); Jeffrey W. Robbins,
Between Faith and Thought: An Essay on the Ontotheological Condition (Charlottesville,
VA: University of Virginia Press, 2003); and, as mentioned earlier, Grenz, Named
God.
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They also led in the interpretation, formulation, and application of the
theological method.153
In short, reliance upon an a priori conception of timeless Being leads to an “ontological” or even “onto-theo-logical” development in interpretation, where the
“theological” element is interpreted by the “ontological” conceptions that precede it.
That is, the biblical portrayal of God and His acts, the “theological component,” is
interpreted and understood in light of a timeless conception of Being, the
“ontological component.”
A few biblical scholars have noticed these problems and added insight to the
discussion from a biblical point of view. Among them is Jacques B. Doukhan.
Doukhan asserts that for the Hebrew mindset, Western conditions of thought are not
primary, and it is the theological component, the knowledge of God and His acts,
that precedes the ontological component. Doukhan writes: “Hebrew thought does
not construct the truth as a philosophical system; rather it is essentially the response
to an event. The fact that the Hebrew Bible starts with the event of Creation points to
that movement.”154
For Doukhan and others,155 then, biblical interpretation should be founded on
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Jacques B. Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians: A Textbook for the Study of
Biblical Hebrew in Relation to Hebrew Thinking (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1993), 192–93.
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Apart from the examples already given in the introduction to this study is
G. Ernest Wright, who observes the effects of the systematic control of propositional
theology over the text, and concludes that such control is “more Hellenic than
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the parameters set forth by the text. It is not onto-logical or even onto-theo-logical,
since for both of those approaches the conception of timeless Being is established
prior to the interpretation of God and His acts in the biblical text. If the
manifestation of God through His acts as recorded in Scripture is primary in the
structure of reason, then what is implied in the structure of reason is a possible theoonto-logical orientation.157 In other words, theo-ontology implies the precedence and
ground of everything in the revelation of God within Scripture. Divine revelation in
Scripture provides the foundation and the content to interpret Being, influencing the
framework of reason.
Thus far, the evaluation of ontology in biblical interpretation has pointed out
the influential character of a timeless conception of Being. Being as timeless creates a
dichotomy between Being or things as they are (essence/reality) and beings or things
as they appear (matter/appearance), a conception that for some is incompatible with
the depictions of God and His acts in the biblical text.
Now, I turn to the problem of how a timeless conception of Being can directly
affect the conception of God and God’s actions as recorded in the biblical text.

Hebraic.” See G. Ernest Wright, God Who Acts, Studies in Biblical Theology 8
(London: SCM, 1964), 11.
Yet even the theo-onto-logical designation can carry unverified
assumptions that have the potential to be irreconcilable to the biblical text. Again,
this is the complexity of the task at hand. Perhaps new terminology must be
developed in order to express the biblical correspondent to these designations. Even
so, the movement from onto-theology to theo-ontology was heralded by Fernando
Canale years ago. See, for instance, Canale, Critique of Theological Reason, 388–409.
Others such as Stanley Grenz have also used the term “theo-ontology,” but used
tradition to define the theological component. See Grenz, Named God.
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God/God-Acts in Interpretation
Introduction
So far, I have outlined the influence of timeless and temporal conceptions of
Being upon interpretation at the level of assumptions. This section will concentrate
on the influence of the timeless conception of Being upon the interpretation of the
biblical text, with a special focus on God and God’s actions as depicted by the
biblical text.158 At this stage, I will address only the timeless conception of Being,
since it is the one that permeates the majority of contemporary theological and
exegetical interpretation.
At the outset, it is important to review the characteristics of a timeless
conception of Being delineated previously. First, a timeless conception of Being
creates a dichotomy between “beings,” that is, things as they appear (phenomenal
world), and Being, that is, things as they are (noumenal world). Second, and
consequently, a timeless conception of Being raises ultimate reality above the
phenomenal world marked by change and time.
The dichotomy of appearance versus reality is made visible in interpretation
through an approach to the text that assumes a break between “being” including

The idea of a God who acts is not limited to the Hebrew Bible. James A.
Wiseman correctly observes that “in all of the major theistic traditions, God is firmly
believed to be a God who acts.” In James A. Wiseman, Theology and Modern Science:
Quest for Coherence (New York: Continuum, 2002), 113. Further study would be
necessary to outline possible parallels between how God acts in each religious
community or theistic tradition and how the biblical text presents the dynamic; such
analysis is out of the scope of this study.
158

67

texts and “Being” implying reality. In other words, the philosophical dichotomy
between being and Being is appropriated in interpretation by an analogical approach.
While reality is timeless, the text is temporal. When timeless reality becomes one
side of the analogy, the relation between the subject in the world and the object as
timeless inevitably renders the analogy unintelligible, since subject and object are not
on the same platform of intelligibility. The attempt of those who sustain Being as
timeless is to interpret things in the world and in texts (beings) through ultimate,
timeless reality (Being).
For example, the text of Exod 3 presents God speaking from a burning bush.
While the majority of scholars would not contest that this is what the text says, their
ontological macro-hermeneutical assumptions prevent them from concluding that the
reality depicted in the text occurred as it is narrated within the flow of historical
reality. Once the conception of Being is interpreted as timeless, all entities in the
world (things as they appear) will be understood analogically in relation to reality
(things as they are). And when one assumes a timeless conception of Being, things as
they are in the world are not as they are in reality.
This analogical relation between a temporal being (subject) and timeless Being
(object) I will call in this study unintelligible analogy. Unintelligible analogy implies (1)
that the broadest conception of reality in human minds, Being, determines the flow
of interpretation by describing what is real, and (2) that ultimately, with a timeless
interpretation of Being, one cannot know “what is” in the text through the text
alone, but must resort to external ontological inferences. Thus, a timeless
interpretation of Being can distort what the text attempts to say in regard to the God-
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human relation, especially if the macro-hermeneutical standpoint of the biblical
author is incompatible with an interpretation of Being as timeless. Within the text,
Being as timeless creates a possible unintelligible analogy between things as they are
and things as they appear, since the text is written within the flow of time and
history.
At this stage, it is necessary to further articulate the analogical relation
between text (being) and reality (Being), and the possibility that an unintelligible
analogy may influence interpretation through a timeless conception of Being.
Langdon Gilkey and the travail of Biblical interpretation
In order to uncover the overall significance of a timeless understanding of
Being as it applies to the text through the interpretation of God and God’s acts as
recorded in the biblical text, I will revisit a criticism of the state of biblical theology
heretofore mentioned in passing: Langdon B. Gilkey’s renowned article
“Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language.”159
Gilkey begins his essay by positing what he believes to be not only the

Much of this section will be devoted to Gilkey’s evaluation of biblical
theology. I give his analysis a central role in this section, in this chapter, and behind
the rhetoric of this study as a whole, since, in my understanding, biblical scholars
have not overcome the problem Gilkey outlines in this essay. Dan O. Via is at least
one other scholar who sees Gilkey’s problem as unanswered: “If the act of God is a
theological interpretation of history . . . Where does revelation occur? Langdon
Gilkey raised this issue in 1961, and we are still dealing with it.” In Dan O. Via, The
Revelation of God and/as Human Reception: In the New Testament (Harrisburg, PA:
Trinity Press International, 1997), 28. For more on the effects of Gilkey’s criticism in
Old Testament theology, see Kaiser, Old Testament Theology, 1–4. This study builds
upon Gilkey’s criticism in attempting to harmonize text and assumptions, since it is
at their intersection that the interpretation of the biblical text is greatly affected.
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problem, but also “the source of the difficulties and ambiguities which exist in
current biblical theology.”160 As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the
problem Gilkey notices in contemporary theology is that it “is half liberal and
modern, on the one hand, and half biblical and orthodox, on the other, i.e., its
worldview or cosmology is modern, while its theological language is biblical and
orthodox.”161 According to Gilkey, what triggers this dichotomy is what he calls the
“scientific interpretation of observable events,”162 an outlook that leads to the notion
of a “causal continuum of space-time experience”163 that inherently negates the
possibility of supernatural events (like those depicted in the biblical text).
The criticism that Gilkey sets forth here is directly tied to the issue at hand—
the influence of the principle of ontology upon interpretation. One way of looking at
his criticism of the bipolar approach to the text—liberal/modern in cosmology, and
biblical/orthodox in language—can be based on the dichotomy between phenomenal
and noumenal, between things as they appear and things as they are. The scientificmodernistic mindset that inevitably operates within a timeless interpretation of Being
cannot endorse supernatural elements in the world, or, consequently, in the biblical
text.
Gilkey correctly outlines the results of holding to such assumptions in
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interpretation and to the “validity one assigns to biblical narratives and so to the way
one understands their meaning”164 as he writes:
Suddenly a vast panoply of divine deeds and events recorded in Scripture are no
longer regarded as having actually happened. Not only, for example, do the six
days of creation, the historical fall in Eden, and the flood seem to us historically
untrue, but even more the majority of divine deeds in the biblical history of the
Hebrew people become what we choose to call symbols rather than plain old
historical facts. To mention only a few: Abraham’s unexpected child; the many
divine visitations; the words and directions to the patriarchs; the plagues visited
on the Egyptians; the pillar of fire; the parting of the seas; the verbal deliverance
of covenantal law on Sinai; the strategic and logistic help in the conquest; the
audible voice heard by the prophets; and so on—all these “acts” vanish from the
plane of historical reality and enter the neverland of “religious interpretation” by
the Hebrew people.165
According to Gilkey, this denial of the factual historicity of the divine acts recorded
in the biblical text shifted the theological language from univocal (literal) to
analogical (proportional meaning).166 The choice of approaching the text with a
scientific mindset implicitly carries the interpretation of Being as timeless, and in this
way, the analogical meaning in theological language was established upon the
ontological break between subject and object. In other words, assuming a timeless
conception of Being and a dichotomy between beings and Being results in
unintelligible analogy.167
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Such a conclusion is also seen in more scientific approaches to biblical
interpretation, such as the views of scientist-theologian Arthur Peacocke. He writes:
“God’s own Being is distinct from anything we can possibly know in the world, then
God’s nature is ineffable and will always be inaccessible to us, so that we have only
the resources of analogy to depict how God might influence events.” See Arthur
167
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A. Berkeley Mickelsen correctly assesses the implications of an unintelligible
analogical approach to the biblical text when he comments on Gilkey’s conclusions:
Those who use biblical language analogically rather than univocally are often not
very clear about what they are doing. If they do not know what one term of the
analogy means, what God really did or say, then the analogy is unintelligible. It
is not analogical language but rather equivocal language (different unrelated
meanings)!168
A timeless conception of Being leads into a dichotomy in one’s outlook on reality,
between things as they appear and things as they are, and this presupposition leads
interpreters of Scripture to understand the text in analogy to an ultimate timeless
reality that by definition they cannot know. Mickelsen correctly points out that such
an approach runs the risk of being not only unclear, but unintelligible when one does
not grasp at least one side of the analogy.169

Peacocke, “The Sound of Sheer Silence: How Does God Communicate with
Humanity?” in Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed.
Robert John Russel (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 1999),
235. The inconsistency in logic here is seen in Peacocke’s move from correctly
describing the unknowable nature of God to applying the principles mentioned
above to God’s influence upon events. He equates nature (timeless) with the issue of
divine action in the world.
A. Berkeley Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1963), 60.
168

Alan J. Torrance summarizes the theological situation of the past and
present as he writes: “Theology has traditionally rejected univocal predication
(which leads to anthropomorphism) and equivocal predication (which implies
agnosticism) in favor of analogy as a means of referring to God.” See Alan J.
Torrance, “Analogy,” in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed. Kevin
J. Vanhoozer et al. (London: SPCK, 2005), 39. So, the risk here seems to be a failed
analogical understanding of the text that leads to an equivocal approach to its
content and anthropomorphism. Torrance adds: “If we assume that the word ‘love’
is used univocally of humans and also God, we seem to risk the charge of
anthropomorphic projection—treating God as if ‘he’ were simply another human
169
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What results, then, from a timeless conception of Being is actually an
equivocal understanding of the text: one in which timeless content or truth that
cannot be understood due to its timeless nature is deposited within the historical
wrapping of the text. In other words, holding to a timeless conception of Being leads
to an analogical approach to the text that renders the reality of the text, with its
supernatural events and divine speeches, unintelligible. In the end, what remains is
an equivocal reading of the text as it pertains to supernatural events and anything
that contradicts timeless ontology or scientific reasoning.
I agree with Mickelsen’s assessment that what Gilkey does in his article is put

creature.” Ibid., 39. The analogical understanding espoused by Torrance and the
minds behind the theological interpretation of Scripture has its roots in the thinking
of Thomas Aquinas. Torrance himself traces the analogical approach to Scripture to
him: “In Western thought, this theory has been associated primarily with the thought
of Thomas Aquinas as interpreted by Cardinal Cajetan.” Ibid. This, of course,
supports the understanding that the analogical approach to Scripture is grounded on
classical ontology, and consequently, on a timeless conception of Being.
Furthermore, it is crucial to point out that neither Aquinas nor Augustine “knew
Hebrew.” See John C. Collins, The God of Miracles: An Exegetical Examination of God’s
Action in the World (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2000), 65. Thus far the term analogy has
been treated in two different spheres: the first ontological, in Canale’s assessment of
divine temporality, and the second epistemological, in relation to the influence of
timeless Being upon the formation and interpretation of the text. These are not to be
merged together. Canale does not hold a timeless view of Being, so he understands
that the “text itself” can provide a window into reality, since it is not in distinction to
the historical dimension of the subject. In this manner, he sees that when one
interprets Being as historical, the natural analogical relationship between God,
world, and man can be understood by uncovering the point of view of the biblical
author concerning what God has revealed (this would be an “intelligible” analogy,
contrasting with the “unintelligible” analogy of modernity and postmodernity). Even
so, one of the problems in reaching a clear biblical understanding of Being is
developing terminology that encompasses the biblical reality without the
preconceptions that the common philosophical terms carry.
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“forth a fervent plea for clear thinking,”170 since ambiguity in theological language
“is a credit to no one.”171 Yet there is a deeper conclusion in Gilkey’s essay still to be
addressed. Gilkey ends his article by stating that “biblical theology must take
cosmology and ontology more seriously,”172 and adds: “A contemporary
understanding of ancient Scriptures depends as much on a careful analysis of our
present presuppositions as it does on being learned in the religion and faith of the
past.”173
These points summarize the intention of this study to focus on both the
ontological assumptions within the presuppositional framework of interpreters and
the necessity to expose those assumptions as they relate to the biblical text. Yet the
question at this stage is, how do interpreters deal with such ontological standpoints
in biblical interpretation? How do they harmonize timeless Being with the dichotomy
of things as they appear and things as they are?
To address these questions, I will analyze the work of two representative
scholars from different time periods who attempted to bridge the gap between
appearance and reality.
Demythologizing, remythologizing, and God-acts
Throughout history, biblical interpretation has been directly affected by a
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timeless conception of Being that leads to the possibility of unintelligible analogy.
Among the thinkers who have attempted to bring intelligibility between things as
they are and things as they appear in the biblical text is Rudolf Bultmann (1884–
1976).174
Bultmann correctly pointed out that “no exegesis is without
presuppositions,”175 yet he was not known for harmonizing the biblical portrayal of
reality with the assumptions of the interpreter. Bultmann’s late work operated from
an existentialist perspective because “from this perspective he sees what is relevant to
the needs of modern man.”176 This reliance upon existential philosophy led
Bultmann to the project for which he became primarily known—the
demythologizing of Scripture.
For Bultmann, mythology in its broadest sense was “anything in the Bible
which is contradictory to a modern scientific world-view.”177 This perspective led

For more on Rudolf Bultmann’s work, see Bultmann and Ogden, New
Testament and Mythology; Roger Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing: Philosophy
and Historiography in the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (Leiden: Brill, 1974); Paul
Ricoeur, “Preface to Bultmann,” in Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays
in Hermeneutics (London: Continuum, 2004), 377–96; Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 166–
84.
174

175

Bultmann and Ogden, New Testament and Mythology, 145.

176

Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible, 66.

Ibid., 68. This premise is still prevalent today within biblical interpretation.
Some see Ernst Troeltsch as one of the key players in this regard, since Troeltsch
“proposed three principles, and these became axiomatic in the New Quest. First, he
insisted on the principle of doubt—that is, that all statements of an historical nature
are open to doubt and require corroborative evidence if they are to be accepted. The
second was the principle of analogy—that courses of events in the ancient world
followed the same internal logic as events in the modern world. . . . Third, Troeltsch
177

75

Bultmann to conclude that “the world-picture of the New Testament is a mythical
world picture.”178 Operating from a dichotomized view of appearance and reality—a
perspective resulting from a timeless conception of Being—Bultmann considered the
things of this world (appearances) to be appropriately interpreted by the scientific
method. For Bultmann, the scientific method was how one arrived at some
intelligibility within the unintelligible analogy between an interpreter in the flow of
history and time and an object that is conceived as timeless. In other words,
Bultmann assumed the Platonic cosmological dichotomy, and dealt with its paradox
by resorting to science and existentialism179 in order to arrive at the meaning of the
biblical text.
In his project of demythologizing Scripture, Bultmann was faced with the
question of whether “the New Testament proclamation has truth that is independent

(following the physical laws devised by Isaac Newton) posited the principle of
correlation, by which he understood that every event in the natural world is the result
of a natural cause.” In Paul J. Achtemeier, Joel B. Green, and Marianne Meye
Thompson, Introducing the New Testament: Its Literature and Theology (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 59.
178
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Along with scientific methodology, as mentioned previously, Bultmann
was influenced by existential philosophy. Notice how Mickelsen comments on the
presuppositions that Bultmann brought to his demythologizing project: “Bultmann
saw clearly that the interpreter must surrender any pretense of neutrality and come to
the text fully recognizing his own attitude and the framework of thought in which he
operates. The earlier Bultmann had as his own framework the tradition of the
Church and the Church’s faith. But the Bultmann of twenty-five or thirty years later
talks about ‘pre-understanding.’ The current framework for his ‘pre-understanding’ is
existentialist philosophy. . . . Because he thinks that from this perspective he sees
what is relevant to the needs of modern man.” Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible, 66.
179
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of the mythical world picture.”180 If the biblical text had truth beyond the historicalmythical “wrapping,” the task of theology would be to “demythologize the Christian
proclamation.”181 Denying the reality of the mythical world-picture of the New
Testament (and the Old Testament), including heaven, hell, angels, and divine
speech and acts, was the object of this demythologizing effort. For Bultmann, if the
world-picture of the Bible was maintained, this would lead to the sacrifice of one’s
own intellect.182 In Bultmann’s words:
Any satisfaction of the demand [of maintaining the biblical world picture without
criticism] would be a forced sacrificium intellectus, and any of us who would make
it would be peculiarly split and untruthful. For we would affirm for our faith or
religion a world picture that our life otherwise denied. Criticism of the New
Testament is simply a given with modern thinking as it has come to us through
our history.183
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The tendency within biblical scholarship was to assume a scientific
perspective that, following Troetsch’s influence, understood the world in causal
terms. Concerning this presupposition, Mickelsen writes that such “assumption is
only a presupposition that [the interpreter’s] experience is the only possible
experience and represents the only experience of any other person or groups of
persons who lived on this planet. The scholar who assumes this has made his
empirical experience and that of his contemporaries the sole criterion of what is
possible.” In Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible, 67. Gilkey understands that this
tendency is still prevalent; he writes that the “causal nexus in space and time which
Enlightenment science and philosophy introduced into the Western mind . . . is also
assumed by modern theologians and scholars; since they participate in the modern
world of science both intellectually and existentially, they can scarcely do anything
else.” In Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology,” 195.
182

Ibid., 3–4. This suspicion toward the depictions of the biblical text, also
known as methodological doubt, is another indication of a reliance on scientific
methodology to determine the epistemological and ontological framework of
Reason. While the scholar who does not submit to it sacrifices his intellect, the
implementation of the principle in biblical interpretation causes another death—the
death of God. Ted Peters writes that the “principle of doubt has become the cutting
183
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Here one is confronted with the same problem that Gilkey encountered in his
evaluation of the “travail” in biblical theology.
In the background of Bultmann’s project is the dichotomy between things as
they appear and things as they are. Bultmann’s interest is arriving at the truthful
aspects of the Gospel proclamation, and it is science and existential philosophy that
sift truth from myth in the biblical text, bringing the demythologizing project to its
full completion—a biblical text and faith devoid of divine actions or speeches.184 The

edge of modern critical thinking The hermeneuts of suspicion, in short, accuse
religious people of having a false consciousness, of projecting their own quite
mundane self-interests onto God and heaven, where they do not belong. This critical
consciousness accounts for the so-called death of God.” Ted Peters, God—The
World’s Future: Systematic Theology for a New Era, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress,
2000), 14. This Cartesian principle is still quite influential in biblical interpretation
today. Along with a conception of timeless Being that leads to unintelligibility in
interpretation, some observe that the implementation of the principle of doubt in
biblical interpretation leads to “a mind emptied of rationality and order.” Leon O.
Hyson, Through Faith to Understanding: Wesleyan Essays on Vital Christianity
(Lexington, KY: Emeth, 2005), 32. Apart from the scientific use of the principle of
doubt that leads to suspicion toward the text, I cannot ignore that “Husserl’s call to
return ‘to the things themselves’ amounts to a bracketing of the real, to a return to
the things as they appear to consciousness, the things as phenomena, as they are
perceived by consciousness” and that “such a view is bound up with a principle of
doubt towards the reality of things.” See Carole Bourne-Taylor and Ariene
Mildenberg, eds., Phenomenology, Modernism, and Beyond (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010),
25. In this sense, apart from its scientific implementation in interpretation, the
principle of doubt might still be useful when applied to the human subject, as this
study proposes.
The influence of science upon the interpretation of Scripture is not first
observed in the works of Bultmann, of course. Mark. C. Gignilliat correctly notes
that the work of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) is where this assumption was first
openly implemented. Spinoza assumed that “the Bible is a product of human history
and evolution and is to be read in the light of its natural history.” In Gignilliat, Brief
History, 15.
184

78

possibility of the biblical text itself presenting the content in which to interpret Being
on a historical-temporal basis in order to render the analogy intelligible is
inconceivable to Bultmann.
A second scholar who has attempted to deal with the gap between things as
they are and appear, sustained by a timeless conception of Being, is Kevin J.
Vanhoozer. Vanhoozer’s Remythologizing Theology185 can be seen as a contemporary
attempt to overcome Bultmann’s project; it deals with the same ontological and
interpretative issues.186
Vanhoozer begins his book by introducing the text of 2 Pet 1:16 to establish a
clear distinction between the gospel and myth.187 Vanhoozer departs from the notion
of the gospel as “myth” (seen in the work of Bultmann) and tries to rescue the idea
that the biblical content is “mythos,” via Paul Ricoeur’s work.188 For Vanhoozer,

Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and
Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
185

In the beginning of his book, Vanhoozer wrestles with the implications of a
timeless ontology and its effect upon biblical interpretation as he writes that from
“the standpoint of remythologizing theology, the danger in affirming God’s
timelessness is that it tends to dedramatize or demythosize the biblical accounts of
God’s dialogical action.” Thus, Vanhoozer attempts to “suggest a possible way
forward through the conceptual thickets pertaining to the acts of the eternal God in
human time.” Ibid., 75. This is exactly the issue at hand: how to bring intelligibility
into unintelligible analogy? How does an interpreter in the flow of history and time
grasp the “eternal truth” within a text that is also conditioned by history and time—
not to mention the textual depictions of how God acts and speaks themselves?
186
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Vanhoozer writes: “The present work develops Ricoeur’s suggestion in a
communicative direction: the mythos of Jesus Christ renders intelligible the field of
triune communicative praxis.” Ibid., 5.
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“Mythos is Aristotle’s term for dramatic plot: a unified course of action that includes
a beginning, middle, and end.”189 Vanhoozer appropriates Aristotle’s term mythos to
refer to the intelligible dramatic framework of the gospel (and God’s actions through
Jesus), in place of Bultmann’s notion of myth.
Vanhoozer addresses similar issues to Bultmann, relating to two distinct
points that readers by now will recognize. First, he understands that in a postKantian philosophical environment, it is natural for Bultmann to understand that
“God is neither an object that can be known nor a being that can be experienced in
space-time.”190 Second, Vanhoozer understands that the project of demythologizing
“is best viewed as a strategy for translating biblical statements about God into
existential statements about human beings.”191
In this, Vanhoozer has identified some of the ontological elements presented
thus far: the influence of a timeless interpretation of Being upon epistemology, what
is knowable about God, and its inevitable effect upon the biblical text and
interpretation. Yet what is the solution to the problem, according to Vanhoozer?
How can one understand biblical language that includes supernatural divine acts and
speeches while assuming the contemporary scientific mindset? Here, Vanhoozer
departs from Bultmann’s project and proposes his “remythologizing” project.
Vanhoozer writes:

189

Ibid.

190

Ibid., 14.

191

Ibid., 15.

80

Remythologizing conceives the God-world relation in primarily communicative
rather than causal terms. Better: it scrutinizes language about causality in order to
bring out a communicative sense to which the church has not sufficiently
attended. The category of communication applies analogically to God’s relation
to the natural world but comes into its own in God’s relation to humanity whose
paradigm is the God-man, Jesus Christ.192
Here, for the first time, Vanhoozer outlines his understanding of the framework
within which God relates to the world and consequently to humanity. According to
Vanhoozer, this framework is conceived not in causal terms, but in communicative
terms. So, even though Vanhoozer attempts to bring intelligibility into the analogical
conception of reality through the exchange of myth for mythos, he is still tied to its
ontological roots. To determine a priori that the text places any causal activity in
secondary terms as he emphasizes the communicative activity implies that Being is
interpreted as timeless, and that the realities of the text cannot be grasped as they
read—with divine action in the world. In other words, Vanhoozer attempts to bring
intelligibility to an unintelligible analogical framework sustained by a timeless
ontology via divine communication.
Following the work of William Alston,193 Vanhoozer advocates the idea that
“we may ascribe action to God in a literal or partial univocal manner, for there is a

For a full perspective of Vanhoozer’s demythologizing project, see
Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 26–30. For the purposes of this study, I will
highlight only the points that deal with the topic of the God-human relation.
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William Alston, “Divine and Human Action,” in Divine & Human Action:
Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas Morris (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1988).
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common core to the concepts of human and divine agency.”194 If God acts in only a
partial univocal manner, this relation cannot accurately be termed “partially
univocal,” but analogical. In this, Vanhoozer is correct, since God does not act only
univocally to humanity (as seen in the discussion of divine time). The question is
whether the analogy he proposes will be sustained by a timeless ontology (without
divine action as depicted by the text), thus becoming unintelligible analogy, or by a
temporal ontology (with the possibility of divine action as depicted by the text),
where it is possible to make sense of the analogy, since subject and object relate within
the same ontological framework.
Vanhoozer answers the question while articulating his understanding of
divine speech in Scripture. First he resorts to arguments that will make an
unintelligible analogical reading of Scripture logical and intelligible. He understands
that in trying to make sense of audible divine speech in the text, there is “no need to
consider the movement of vocal chords a necessary component of speech,”195 since
God “does not have vocal chords.”196 Vanhoozer then arrives at his conclusion:
God may be able to bring about sound, or communicative action, through other,
194
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Ibid. Vanhoozer goes on to add: “So the way in which God speaks will not
be exactly parallel to human speaking. . . . It is therefore legitimate to say ‘God
(literally) speaks (because he performs communicative acts via words, which is what
‘speaking’ ordinarily means) even though ‘speaks’ is not being used univocally with
regard to God and human beings (because the mode of God’s speaking may be
extraordinary). The creator-creature distinction serves as a standing reminder not to
apply terms univocally to God, but it presents no obstacle to affirming that God
acts.” Ibid., 210–11.
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secondary means. Perhaps it would be preferable, then, to predicate “being an
agent” and “being a speaker” of God analogically. There is a true but only
partial, appropriate but only approximate correspondence between divine and
human speaking.197
While it is important to sustain the distinction between Creator and creature, one
cannot negate the textual depiction of what took place. In denying the univocal
import of divine and human speech, Vanhoozer dismisses what the text is saying in
regards to Divine speech. Thus, Vanhoozer nuances the idea of Divine speech in
terms of other means of communication, since it is not possible to affirm that a
sound was heard when God spoke.198
For Vanhoozer, then, what is literal in the text is the idea that God does act or
speak. Here Vanhoozer keeps that which is in his reach (meaning what is allowed by
a timeless presupposition of Being) to maintain the biblical language and depiction of
what is taking place, yet still nuancing its meaning for the sake of relevance to the
modern mindset.199 He attempts to maintain the idea that God did speak, while
articulating a modern understanding of its possibility in the background of a timeless
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ontology: God spoke, but not in an audible manner. The dichotomy between
appearance and reality in Vanhoozer’s remythologizing project is left unchallenged
on macro-hermeneutical grounds.
Vanhoozer accommodates his understanding of divine acts and speeches in
the interpretation of the biblical text through a method that is now receiving close
attention in biblical studies—speech-act theory.200 While Bultmann resorted to
science and existential philosophy to sift through the appearance and the reality
depicted in the biblical text, Vanhoozer resorts to modern linguistics, i.e., speech-act
theory.201 It is important to note that I side with Vanhoozer on his basic premise that
the “fundamental issue in the doctrine of Scripture concerns the manner of God’s

Vanhoozer addresses speech-act theory in more detail in his book First
Theology. For more on the birth and development of the method, see Richard S.
Briggs, “Speech-Act Theory,” in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed.
Kevin J. Vanhoozer et al. (London: SPCK, 2005), 763–66; John Searle, Speech Acts:
An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1969); and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim
that God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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Bultmann’s guiding principle is grounded in a macro-hermeneutical
framework, that is, in a scientific worldview. For Vanhoozer and other theologians,
the guiding principle is found in a micro-hermeneutical framework that applies to
exegetical work. The problem with the latter is that it is inevitably subjective. The
manner in which one uses speech-act theory determines the outcome of the analysis.
Speech-act theory is not exempt from macro-hermeneutical principles acting as
presuppositions, and used in the wrong manner, it can be a new way of working
under the rule of JEDP (source criticism) and other critical approaches to the text.
For Vanhoozer, speech-act theory is equated to the manner in which God is present
in the world. He writes, “The principal mode in which God is ‘with’ his people is
through speech-acts.” See Vanhoozer, First Theology, 149. Vanhoozer’s thesis of
divine speech acts would also work better under a different ontology. To speak of a
God who interacts with humanity through speech-acts while holding to a timeless
conception of God and reality is, to say the least, counterproductive.
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involvement in the words of Scripture and thus the manner of God’s activity in the
world.”202 So, to clarify how Vanhoozer moves his understanding of God’s relation
to the world and humanity into the interpretation of Scripture, it is important to
demonstrate how that takes place in speech-act theory.
In short, speech-act theory attempts to make a distinction between that which
is said (locutionary act) and the significance/meaning of the saying (illocutionary
act). Jeannine K. Brown writes, “Speech-act theory distinguishes a saying (locution)
from the force of that saying or what it does (illocution) and the response of a hearer
(perlocution) to the locution and its illocution.”203 Even so, speech-act theory runs
the risk of not solving the dilemma of the intelligibility of the textual analogy
between things as they appear in the text and the reality behind the appearance. This
is because the interpretation of the “meaning” of a divine saying, or “illocution,” will
always be, to a great extent, under the control of the interpreter. It is up to the
interpreter to decide, under the influence of macro-hermeneutical assumptions
established a priori, what the univocal saying of Scripture means (locution) and
accomplishes (illocution); the guiding pre-understanding that stems from a timeless
ontology is that it cannot mean what it says.204
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Here I arrive again at the original philosophical problem of the appearance
against the reality. The dichotomy created through a timeless conception of Being
that leads the interpreter to understand the text through unintelligible analogy is
appropriated by speech-act theory through locutions, illocutions, etc. As mentioned
earlier, this method is free of macro-hermeneutical verifications, and in turn, can
become another form of source criticism (JEDP) at the level of literary criticism (or
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Vanhoozer is the one who comes closest to the possibility that the biblical
accounts concerning God’s actions, including but not limited to speech-acts, are not
timeless. This is evident when he writes that “God’s eternity is the form of his own
life and hence the medium of his own being in communicative act” and “as such it is
not timeless.”205 Yet Vanhoozer, like the open-view thinkers (but in a different
manner), does not apply this discovery to the level of Being itself. By sustaining a
timeless ontology, he cannot escape unintelligible analogy. For Vanhoozer, in the
end, “time is not the contradiction but as it were the finite analogy of eternity.”206
Consequently, because we can only know one side of the analogy, God’s actions
become inevitably unintelligible. In the end, Vanhoozer recognizes that “Langdon
Gilkey criticized the biblical theology movement for being only half orthodox and
half modern. . . . I have precisely the same problem.”207
Both Bultmann and Vanhoozer attempt to maintain the language of the text,
but struggle to express the reality of which the text speaks. For Bultmann, it is
science and existential philosophy that sift through what is relevant and truthful in
the text, but for Vanhoozer it is the idea of God as a communicative agent in the

even communicative criticism). In speech-act theory, speech-acts are partly univocal,
in that all speech-acts have locution/illocution/perlocution. Yet the issue here is not
whether speech-act theory takes into account univocal elements in the text, but
whether the bridge between the locution and illocution is equipped to unpack the
reality expressed in the text itself.
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context of speech-act theory. While Bultmann denies the univocal depiction of the
reality implied in the text, Vanhoozer attempts to clarify what it means or
accomplishes. Even so, for both, the ontological foundations that shape their
approach to the text assume a timeless conception of Being creating a dichotomy
between appearance (text) and reality (the reality the text points to).
From these representative examples, one can perceive that both liberal and
conservative scholars who assume a timeless ontology are caught in the same
paradox—the paradox of dealing with unintelligible analogy. At the same time, the
assumptions that shape their approach to the text are left unchallenged on their
macro-hermeneutical, ontological grounds: Being continues to be interpreted as
timeless.
Summary
This section outlined how ontological premises influence the interpretation
not only of the text, but also of the interpretation of God and God-acts. Again, these
conceptions uncover the macro-hermeneutical principles at work within the
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars and theologians as they touch on
the notion of how God relates to humanity. First, I provided an introduction to the
concept of timelessness and how it carries two basic assumptions that influence
interpretation: the dichotomy between things as they appear and things as they are,
and the understanding of Being as timeless. I also briefly outlined the two main
alternatives to a timeless conception of Being, namely the open view and the work of
Fernando Canale, along with their similarities and differences.
Second, I attempted to demonstrate how these basic ontological assumptions
87

are incorporated and addressed in biblical interpretation. Knowing that a timeless
ontology creates a dichotomy between appearance and reality, both liberal and
conservative scholars who assume such an ontology face the difficulty of attempting
to grasp an unintelligible analogy. I used the examples of Bultmann and Vanhoozer
to sketch in broad strokes how scholars wrestle with this dichotomy in interpretation.
For Bultmann, the divine acts as they appear in the text are dismissed through a
scientific and existential approach, while for Vanhoozer, the divine acts and speeches
are explained within the parameters of speech-act theory.
The assumption of timeless Being, then, directly affects not only
interpretation, but how scholars perceive the meaning of a text that points to how
God relates to humanity through both act and speech.208

The Principle of History
Introduction
So far, this study has focused on the first two components of the macrohermeneutical notion of how God relates to humanity: the principle of epistemology
(humanity’s ability to know) and the principle of ontology (God and God-acts). This
section will examine the third and final component in the God-human relationship
structure: the principle of the nature of history. This principle, present in the
presuppositional frameworks of biblical interpreters, relates to the locus or context in

Nicholas T. Saunders is right in affirming that “of all the challenges science
has raised for theology, perhaps the most fundamental is that it has brought into
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which God relates to humanity, according to the biblical text. Whether scholars
validate or deny such a possibility, they do so under a particular conception of the
nature of history established a priori. To this principle I now turn.209
The nature of history has been the object of struggle and debate in Old
Testament interpretation and theology since its inception,210 and remains “the key
defining feature of modern-era readings of biblical and other texts.”211 Because the
term history will be frequently used throughout this study, some definitions are in
order.212 The term history will be understood in this study following the general

question the doctrine of divine action.” See Nicholas T. Saunders, “Does God Cheat
at Dice? Divine Action and Quantum Possibilities,” Zygon 35 (2000): 518.
Because the nature of history is central to the evaluation of the historicalcritical and grammatical methods in the next chapter, this section will provide only
an introduction to the issues so that they might be fully explored then.
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Theology, 1930–1990, ed. Ben C. Ollenburger, Elmer A. Martens, and Gerhard F.
Hasel (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1992), 3–19. On the interpretative
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definition given by the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, due to its scope. Huizinga’s
definition encompasses both the contemplative and literal forms history can take. He
writes: “History is the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to
itself of the past.”213
With this definition of history in mind, it is imperative to nuance at least two
basic ways in which the term is used. The first, history as historiography, relates to
the written record of the past; the second, history as historical process, relates to
what actually happened to people, their actions and suffering.214 While
historiography is the product of reflection upon a historical process that has passed,
the historical process itself is beyond the grasp of any historian. This reality
inevitably allows historiography to be influenced, to some extent, by the perspectives
and biases of historians.
The original division between historical-critical approaches to the text and the
biblical theology movement, as two disciplines, revolved around the limits of what

to Biblical Criticisms and Their Application, ed. Stephen R. Haynes and Steven L.
McKenzie (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 11. This reality is also
expressed by Craig Bartholomew as he writes that “history has been, and continues
to be, a hotly contested area in biblical studies, and theologians and biblical scholars
express a diversity of views on these issues.” See Craig G. Bartholomew et al., eds.,
“Behind” the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan,
2003), 2.
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Oxford University Press, 1936), 9, quoted in J. J. Finkelstein, “Mesopotamian
Historiography,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107, no. 6,
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historians were able to do. Notice how Ben C. Ollenburger addresses the issue as he
writes on the debates between Walter Eichrodt and Otto Eissfeldt concerning the
division between historical and theological approaches to the text. Ollenburger
asserts that Eissfeldt was in favor of a distinction between the disciplines, since for
him Old Testament theology could not be a historical inquiry “because it is
concerned with what is timelessly or abidingly true.”215
As for Eichrodt’s response, he understood that “historical investigation can
get to the essence of Old Testament religion.”216 But in order for the historian to
reach this goal, Eichrodt had to change the understanding of “essence” from
“timeless truth” to “the deepest meaning of its religious thought world that historical
investigation can recover.”217
As outlined previously, the understanding that the biblical text as a historical
document is only a wrapping218 for the essence or truth results from a timeless
conception of reality. This reality formed the background of the original debates and
discussions concerning the roles of historical and theological approaches to the
biblical text. Regardless of the views of Eissfeldt or Eichrodt, the roles of historical

For more, see David Bebbington, Patterns in History: A Christian Perspective of
Historical Thought (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2000), 1.
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analysis and theology were already established on a timeless ontological platform.
Apart from the influence of the ontological principle upon the task of the
historian in biblical interpretation, the historian was also conditioned by scientific
principles, as briefly mentioned thus far. Cristoph O. Schroeder observes that “the
historical method analyzes historical texts and traditions according to the principles
of critique, analogy, and correlation.”219
Van Austin Harvey traces the threefold framework that conditions the work
of the historian back to Ernst Troeltsch.220 Concerning the meaning and implications
of these principles, Harvey writes:
[Troeltsch] argued that critical historical inquiry rests on three interrelated
principles: (1) the principle of criticism, by which he meant that our judgments
about the past cannot simply be classified as true or false but must be seen as
claiming only a greater or lesser degree of probability and as always open to
revision; (2) the principle of analogy, by which he meant that we are able to make
judgments of probability only if we presuppose that our own present experience is
not radically dissimilar to the experience of past persons; and (3) the principle of
correlation, by which he meant that the phenomena of man’s historical change
can take place at any one point in the historical nexus without effecting a change
in all that immediately surrounds it. Historical explanation, therefore, necessarily
takes the form of understanding an event in terms of its antecedents and
consequences, and no event can be isolated from its historically conditioned time
and space.221
Harvey also adds that Troeltsch himself “understood that the principles outlined
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above were “incompatible with traditional Christian belief and, therefore, that
anyone who based his historical inquiries upon them should necessarily arrive at
results which an orthodox Christian would consider negative and skeptical.”222
As far as these conceptions—the notion of timeless truth and historical text,
along with the scientific principles that condition the work of the historian—relate to
the God-human relation, the “biblical notion of divine agency cannot be part of a
critical conception of history.”223 So, when dealing with these questions, the
possibility of harmonizing the assumptions of the biblical interpreter with those of
the text might, to some extent, render useless the common critical and even
theological approaches to the text. This possibility arises from the fact that both
theological and critical approaches are established upon philosophical conceptions
that could be contrary to the textual portrayal of God’s relation to humans in the
context of history. And it is this possibility that calls for a re-evaluation of the nature
and function of the discipline of biblical theology altogether, especially as it relates to
exegesis.
So far, I have attempted to outline in broad strokes how the principle of the
nature of history is not exempt from macro-hermeneutical commitments. J. Maxwell
Miller is correct in pointing out that the “historian’s own presuppositions, ideology,
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Schroeder, History, Justice, 19. For more on the impact of the scientific
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and attitudes inevitably influence his or her research and reporting,”224 and that “it is
not an overstatement to say that any book reveals as much about its author as it does
about the period of time treated.”225
Knowing that assumptions about the nature of history influence the
historian’s evaluation of a particular portion of history, and consequently the biblical
text itself, it is in the interests of this study to further assess these assumptions and
evaluate their impact on biblical interpretation.
This section, then, will be divided into two main parts. The first will provide a
brief overview of how the nature of history has been understood by scholars from the
eighteenth century to contemporary times. The second will provide a few examples
of how presuppositions regarding the nature of history appear in biblical
interpretation.
From Text to History
The roots of scholarly interest in the historical background of the biblical text
in the context of the interpretation of Scripture—an interest that still influences
interpretation today226—can be traced to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Findings in the field of archaeology, along with the effects of rationalism and the
Enlightenment project, led biblical interpretation in the late seventeenth century to be
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heavily influenced by modern historical approaches to the point that “revelation
became for many a predicate to history.”227
This fissure in the pre-critical approach to Scripture led the world depicted in
the Bible “to look increasingly less like the world one actually sees in the Bible and
increasingly more like the world of the modern historian.”228 By the eighteenth
century, the “question of the use of history for religion was still one of the most
pressing problems.”229

Ibid., 291. For more on the background of historical primacy over the text,
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Yet the modernistic historical approach to the text introduced in this period
implied more than only attention to the relation of text and modern history, with its
consequent effects upon biblical interpretation.230 At the foundation of the
modernistic historical approach to the text was a monumental change in the
perception of reality, truth, and consequently the meaning of the biblical text.231 Was

approach attempted to defend or at least reinterpret religious worship “in the light of
a revised religious consciousness.” Ibid.
It is important to keep in mind that these transitions in hermeneutical
thinking were not exempt from radical changes at a theological and philosophical
level. In fact, these radical changes facilitated a change in hermeneutics. Timothy J.
Furry writes that “philosophical and theological issues matter in the writing of
history, since they are part of its inevitable representational structure.” See Timothy
J. Furry, Allegorizing History: The Venerable Bede, Figural Exegesis, and Historical Theory
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013), 2.
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By meaning here, I imply the sense intended by the author as
communicated through the text. For those who favor a noncritical approach, the
sense of the text begins with a serious consideration of the text itself along with its
historical presentation. For those who favor a more critical approach, the sense of the
text is largely influenced by extrabiblical material, since the biblical material is
considered an unreliable source for historical accuracy. In other words, for the
critical mindset, the words and literary devices do not carry a full perspective of the
sense of the text: it is only through historical reconstructions of the background of the
text/author that the meaning, or sense, can be clearly seen. On the relation of truth
and meaning, it is important to note that this period was marked by an outburst of
possibilities. The question that must be answered at the outset is: are truth and
meaning identical in Scripture? Through the work of Spinoza and others, the gap
between these notions was created and increasingly widened. While the meaning of
the text included a moral/ethical dimension, for Spinoza, that did not mean it should
be considered truth (since only philosophy and reason were able to discuss matters of
truth). He felt that the text was as important as this ethical sense, and could be
discarded once the sense was discovered. This distinction in the work of Spinoza can
be easily seen as he writes that “the sphere of reason is, as we have said, truth and
wisdom; the sphere of theology is piety and obedience.” Benedict Spinoza, A
Theological-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York:
Dover, 1951), 194. This same distinction was later picked up by Kant via his
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the meaning of a biblical text to be found by a critical or a non-critical assessment of
the text and the history it portrayed?
Once the modernistic, historical-critical approach became synonymous with
biblical interpretation during this period, the meaning of the words of Scripture
began to be “understood in terms of the world of external events”232 and not the other
way around. The reality Scripture described (with supernatural events and actions)
was tied to the reality which modern history approved of (with no supernatural
events and actions), and consequently, the key to uncover the true meaning and
significance of the text could only be found through historical criticism. With the
assumption that only modern historical reconstructions provided a window into
reality,233 the verification of truth in the biblical text came not from a serious
consideration of the historical point of view of the text, as in pre-critical times, but
from the critical reconstructions of the modern historian.
Probing this departure from pre-critical to critical interpretation and its
foundational changes to hermeneutics, Hans W. Frei observes that although the

distinction between form and content, things as they are and things as they appear—
a notion addressed previously in the section dealing with ontology.
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Augustine’s distinction between “words” (verba) and “things” (res) informs
much of the hermeneutical discussion around the biblical text. For him, the words
(verba) of the biblical text “are the means by which one enters into the spiritual
realities of the world of things (res).” Ibid., 76. Although this distinction between
text/words and reality/things is still foundational for historical approaches to
Scripture, Sailhamer understands that “Augustine’s view, to be sure, is not that of the
Protestant Reformers (Sola Scriptura)” and at the same time, is not “the view of
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biblical narratives were written as realistic stories, “the meaning of the stories was
finally something different from the stories or depictions themselves.”234 The
departure from this pre-critical stage where “history demonstrated the veracity of the
Christian message”235 to a modernistic approach where the veracity of the Christian
message was attested with the aid of historical analysis can be seen as a “definite
change”236 by 1760.237
From History as Geschichte to History as Wissenschaft
While the influence of these principles expanded throughout the eighteenth
century, at the turn of the twentieth century, modern historical reconstructions
resulting from scientific presuppositions became the main source of the discovery of
what was conceived as truth. Iain W. Provan writes that by “the end of the 1880s,
this history-as-science had replaced philosophy as the discipline to which many
educated people in Europe and elsewhere in the Western world turned as the key
that would unlock the mysteries of human life.”238

biblical authors.” Ibid., 77. I will revisit this distinction in the next chapter when
dealing with how interpretative traditions arrive at the meaning of a biblical text.
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Until then, though, following scientific principles, the historical approach had
not received scientific attention and to some extent was considered merely another
form of art. Before the nineteenth century, the purpose of history was “to delight the
reader and to teach morals through examples.”239 In other words, before the
nineteenth century, the process of history writing “was not taken seriously by the
hard sciences.”240
During this period, two ways of approaching history emerged: the already old
idea of history as Geschichte, carrying a sense of storytelling, a subjective report; and a
new idea of history as Historie, carrying the scientific spirit of the possibility of the
historian arriving at truth through the rigorous application of the scientific method.
After the nineteenth century, the historical approach became the means to
arrive at truth (including historical truth or Historie), as a science. Raúl Kerbs
explores this transition from history to history as science:
In the times of modernity there was no other model of objectivity distinct from
that of the natural sciences and more adequate to history. But history knew that,
in order to be science, it should fulfill the requisites of objectivity. This way had
to adopt the idea of objectivity of the natural sciences together with the timeless
interpretation of reality and reason that came with it. Therefore, the timeless
categories of reason (foundationally the cause and effect relation applied to space
and time, that is, to nature) provided the mark to determine what is real and what
is not real in history. That is why miracles and all other supernatural causalities
were discarded by historical methodology.241
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The new connotation of history as science, or history as Wissenschaft, incorporated
within historical research several philosophical commitments that inevitably
influenced not only the function of historical approaches to the biblical text, but also
their results.
While the first half of the twentieth century enjoyed the possibility that
history-as-science could provide a window into past truth (the historical processes
themselves), the second half was marked by a “decrease in enthusiasm for the
distinction between Historie and Geschichte among theologians and biblical
scholars.”242 In that period, “greater interest was shown to historiography,”243 that is,
to the “way perception of facts are shaped by prior judgments.”244
From History as Wissenschaft to History as Historiography
As mentioned previously, the concept of the nature of history underwent
significant changes along with the capability and limitations of the historian. The
twentieth century left behind the notion or possibility of history as Wissenschaft and
became sensitive to the biases of the historian in the process of historical

Richard N. Soulen and R. Kendall Soulen, Handbook of Biblical Criticism,
3rd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 80.
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reconstruction.245
Dan O. Via, using the work of Hayden White, writes on the three categories
that were attached to the concept of “the historical” before this transition. Via writes:
“Historical theory [had] conventionally distinguished (1) past reality; (2)
historiography, the historian’s written discourse about his past object; and (3)
philosophy of history, the study of possible relations between the object and the
discourse.”246 To speak of history, then, implied addressing three distinct categories
that can be summarized under the terms event (what actually happened), narration
(the historian’s historiographical report of the event), and truth (the correspondence
between event and narration). According to Via, traditional historiography
understands that historical truth is found in this last category, in the “correspondence
between the lived story and the told story.”247
At least two problems can be identified in the idea that historical truth is
found in the correspondence between event (what actually happened) and narration
(the historiographical report). The first deals with the fact that the historian has no
access to the event. History is written, “not found.”248 So, no correspondence
between event and narration can be established, since the historian only has access to

These changes at the level of history followed the changes in the
philosophical perspective of epistemology, that is, in this period more attention was
given to the subject in the formation of knowledge.
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historical documents (which are not exempt from bias), not events. A second
problem relates to the role of the historian. Because the historian has no access to the
events, the truthfulness and effectiveness of historiography relies on the historian’s
ability to handle evidence in a “judicious way.”249 In other words, access to events
resides in the ability of the historian to be, to some extent, unbiased, yet history itself
proves this to be an impossibility.
These problems led biblical interpreters to uncover historical events via one of
three hermeneutical approaches. The first, reconstructionism, upholds the premise
that “the more carefully we write history, the closer we will get to what actually
happened.”250 The second, constructionism, “refers to the approaches to history that
invoke general laws.”251 The third, deconstructionism, is seen in postmodern
approaches, which “stress the fact that history writing is always an example of
literary production, with all the attendant complexities that brings.”252 That is,
history writing carries an agenda, resulting in an “ideologically compromised”253
historiography.
As the last point indicates, the focus on the subject has brought to light
significant issues that stem from the epistemological turn to the subject addressed
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previously in this study. The trend in present historiographical assessments is that
historians bring into historiography a wide range of presuppositions that influence
their historical reconstructions. But because the postmodern approach is not in itself
a break from modernity, Provan indicates that the modernistic mindset is still active:
History is still widely perceived, in spite of the postmodern turn and the
convictions of many historians themselves, as comprising ‘facts’—facts that can
be scientifically established and woven together to produce ‘the past’, which can
then be used as a canonical rule against which to measure particular stories about
the past and to pronounce them uncertain or false.254
In sum, in the contemporary setting of the understanding of history, two
competing models remain. The first maintains the old Enlightenment goal of
objectivity and seeks to reconstruct the past by scientifically discovering facts and
distinguishing them from fables. The second follows the postmodern turn and
understands history as written by individuals who have a hermeneutical background
and framework that influences their writing. Since historical events are not an object
to be attained, historical reconstructions in the latter view are focused on the
uncovering of the hermeneutical background of the historian.
In each model, the subject, or historian, in charge of historical reconstructions
evaluates texts, documents, and artifacts on the basis of a macro-hermeneutical
structure that establishes conceptions of God, humans, and history a priori. Each
position mentioned above is not only influenced by such conceptions, but becomes
the repository of the principles that create the framework for historical

Iain W. Provan, “Knowing and Believing: Faith in the Past,” in “Behind”
the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation, ed. Craig G. Bartholomew et al. (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003), 229.
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reconstructions.
I now turn to two remaining questions. How do these conceptions concerning
the nature of history affect biblical interpretation? How do theologians appropriate
these assumptions into their work?
History, Presuppositions, and Biblical Interpretation
Presuppositions concerning the nature of history had a greater influence upon
biblical interpretation at the turn of the eighteenth century. Again, this was a period
when the pre-critical “face value” reading of the text to understand history was
abandoned for a more rational approach to history based on scientific principles. Von
Rad correctly assesses the situation of the concept of history in this period:
These two pictures of Israel’s history lie before us—that of modern critical
scholarship and that which the faith of Israel constructed—and for the present,
we must reconcile ourselves to both of them . . . The one is rational and
‘objective’ . . . The other . . . is confessional . . . The fact that these two views of
Israel’s history are so divergent is one of the most serious burdens imposed upon
Biblical scholarship.255
The problem Von Rad identifies here requires some explanation.
Biblical interpretation, in the transition from pre-critical to critical times, was
confronted with two alternatives: first, the possibility that the biblical depiction of the
life and story of its characters, that is, biblical historiography, was accurate and true
as it related to the historical process of its characters; second, the possibility that
modernistic historiography, which critically evaluated the biblical text (along with its

G. Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. I (Edinburgh, Scotland: Oliver &
Boyd, 1973), quoted in “Behind” the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation, ed. Craig
G. Bartholomew et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003), 5.
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depictions of the historical process of the biblical characters), was the only rational
approach to interpretation and the true sense of the biblical text.256
The hermeneutical pendulum tended to swing toward the latter side: the
modernistic historiographical conceptions of the events. This led Gilkey to correctly
summarize the situation in theological circles as follows: “The Bible is a book of the
acts Hebrews believed God might have done and the words he might have said had
he done them and said them—but of course we recognize he did not.”257
In order for biblical interpretation to remain a scientific discipline, the
distinction between history as Historie (modernistic reconstructions) and history as
Geschichte (how the biblical writers retold history or Hebrew faith) has to be
maintained, along with the macro-hermeneutical conditions that create the
distinction.
Summary
This section attempted to trace the origins of the macro-hermeneutical
presuppositions relating to the principle of the nature of history, along with their
influence upon biblical interpretation and the book of Exodus.

The second point, seen in the historical-critical approach to the text,
introduced the idea of “retrojection” into interpretation, that is, “anachronistically
attributing present ideas, attitudes, or practices to earlier times,” making the biblical
text along with its history a vessel in which to carry an earlier message. See Millar
Burrows, “Ancient Israel,” in The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East, ed. Robert C.
Dentan and Roland H. Bainton (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955), 107.
The way these principles affected the development of the historical-critical and
grammatical interpretative methods will be discussed further in the next chapter.
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I began by tracing how historians approached history at the turn of the
eighteenth century by leaving behind the pre-critical approach to the text and
embracing a scientific approach along with its macro-hermeneutical commitments.
This made it possible for history to be seen as Wissenschaft. Yet in the twentieth
century these conceptions were left behind, to some extent, due to the turn to the
subject, to the way in which the historian was not exempt from biases and
assumptions. This period brought forth the approach known as historiography, an
approach not exempt from macro-hermeneutical influences.
Second, I attempted to trace the implications of scientific presuppositions
concerning the nature of history for biblical interpretation in general and the book of
Exodus in particular. From this analysis, I was able to outline how the distinction
between fact and faith is still prevalent in the interpretation of Exodus: the macrohermeneutical influences of the scientific approach to the text are still prevalent. This
reality widens the gap between the assumptions of the interpreter and those of the
biblical writer/audience.

Summary
This chapter attempted to identify the macro-hermeneutical principles that act
as presuppositional frameworks for biblical scholars as they relate to the notion of the
God-human relationship.
The first section outlined the macro-hermeneutical principle of epistemology,
that is, the notion of “human” in the God-human relationship structure. I attempted
to demonstrate how the understanding of the human ability to know developed over
the centuries, how such conceptions affect how the biblical text is perceived by the
106

interpreter who reads the text for knowledge, and how that mirrors the
understanding of how biblical characters could arrive at knowledge.
The second section outlined the macro-hermeneutical principle of ontology,
that is, the notion of “God” in the God-human relationship structure. In this
evaluation, I attempted to show how the interpretation of Being affects how
interpreters perceive God and his actions in the text. I also used the work of
Bultmann and Vanhoozer to show how biblical scholars deal with the dilemma of
unintelligible analogy, created by a timeless understanding of Being, between things
as they are and things as they appear.
The third section outlined the macro-hermeneutical principle of the nature of
history, that is, the notion of “relationship” in the God-human relationship structure.
Since God’s interaction with humanity takes place in Scripture within the flow of
history, this section examined how historians have approached the biblical text in
search of history and truth. The analysis showed that the presuppositions established
by modernity and science have dominated the practice of biblical interpretation,
leading the historiography of the text to be perceived as accounts of faith.
In the next chapter, I will evaluate how the macro-hermeneutical or
philosophical presuppositions above are present within two main interpretative
traditions: the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods.
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CHAPTER 3
THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION IN
INTERPRETATIVE TRADITIONS

Introduction
This chapter will attempt to identify the presence, influence, and roots of the
philosophical notion of how God relates to humans in two of the most influential
interpretative traditions in the study of the book of Exodus: the historicalgrammatical and historical-critical methods.258
I will begin by evaluating the historical-grammatical method with a focus on
how the method interprets the God-human relation, that is, how it carries within its

This study will not evaluate these approaches to the text as they stand and
function today; it is focused on the philosophical presuppositions in these traditions.
In order to assess the presence and influence of these presuppositions, this study will
evaluate only the period when both approaches formally appeared—at the turn of the
eighteenth century. The formative period of these interpretative approaches provides
an appropriate context to identify the presuppositions that influence their use and
application. These two interpretative traditions are chosen as representative
examples of the influence of presuppositions in methodology. This evaluation calls
for more in-depth analysis of other methodological approaches to the text that will
not be addressed here, including the more idealistic approaches such as readeroriented criticism, etc. For more on contemporary approaches to the book of
Exodus, see Dozeman, Methods for Exodus; Scott M. Langston, Exodus through the
Centuries (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006); Tremper Longman, How to Read Exodus
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009).
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framework conceptions of ontology, epistemology,259 and history. Then, I will
evaluate the historical-critical method with a focus on the same philosophical
presuppositions.
The idea here is that, regardless of the subjective awareness of presuppositions
regarding the God-human relation in shaping the approach and outcome of one’s
interpretation, the choice of a particular interpretative method carries within itself, by
default, an interpretation of the God-human relation.260 With this general idea in

Since both the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods at the
turn of the eighteenth century operated under the direct influence of the
epistemological ideas of Descartes, a separate analysis of the epistemological
component in both approaches is unnecessary. Even so, a brief review of Cartesian
epistemology is in order so the reader will not have to go back to the previous
chapter for answers. Descartes is referred to as the father of modern philosophy,
since his method consisted of introducing the principle of doubt into all activities of
the mind or thinking, creating a gap between the interpreter and the external world.
Rejecting the reliability of the senses, Descartes “whittled his way down to the
mind,” the one thing that could secure a reliable foundation for rationality. See
Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, 25. This led him to the expression he is known for:
“I think, therefore I am,” or cogito ergo sum, that is, the reliability and precedence of
rationality over existence. These ideas are key to what this study calls “objectivist
epistemology,” where the human mind (as a tabula rasa) is able to grasp reality as a
whole through reason, without resorting to the “questionable” influence of the
senses. These ideas at the epistemological level would lead theologians and exegetes
to evaluate text and reality under this rational outlook. One of the first implications
of such an outlook for biblical interpretation (apart from the abused principle of
doubt) is rejection of the supernatural elements in the biblical text, along with the
idea that authority resides in the mental capabilities of the interpreter and not in any
inherited tradition or text. At the same time, these epistemological concepts are
inherently tied to ontological commitments. Descartes rejects the reliability of the
senses of the body because they are inherently part of the material world. So, to
assume such an epistemological standpoint, to some extent, is already to sustain the
cosmological/anthropological dichotomy tied to a timeless ontology.
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Oeming writes that “each method of biblical interpretation is necessarily
dependent on specific philosophical predilections.” This chapter attempts to assess
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mind, I turn to the evaluation of the historical-grammatical method.

The Historical-Grammatical Method
Introduction
To pinpoint the precise origin of the historical-grammatical method is a
complex task.261 However, the influences that led to the formation of the grammatical
approach to the biblical text can be traced as far as the school of Antioch,262 as well
as to rabbinic interpretation.263 Even so, John H. Sailhamer264 points to Johann

Scholars like Richard M. Davidson see the origins of the method during
the time of the Reformation in the sixteenth century; he writes that the “biblical
principles of interpretation recovered by the Reformers, coupled with the advances in
textual and historical-grammatical analysis of the Renaissance (Erasmus and others),
led to a robust Protestant hermeneutic that has carried until now and has become
known as the historical-grammatical-literary-theological approach or (for short) the
grammatico-historical method or historical-biblical method.” See Richard M.
Davidson, “Biblical Interpretation,” in Handbook of Seventh-Day Adventist Theology,
Commentary Series 12 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 90. Hans W.
Frei also sees the emphasis on grammar and the literal historicity of the text as
beginning around the same time frame. He writes about Luther’s rejection of the
multiplex approach to the text set forth by his predecessors: “Luther’s simplification
meant drastic relief, affirming as it did that the literal or, as he preferred to call it, the
grammatical or historical sense is the truest sense.” See Frei, Eclipse of Biblical
Narrative, 19; cf. Martin Luther, “Auf das überchristlich, übergeistlich ind
überkünstlich Buch Bock Emsers zu Leipzig Antwort,” Werke, 650–52. Another
example would be Louis Berkkhof, Principles of Biblical Interpretation: Sacred
Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1950), 27.
261
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August Ernesti as the one who best articulated what is today known as the historicalgrammatical method.265 For Sailhamer, “Ernesti’s view remains the definitive
statement of the grammatical-historical approach.”266 Yet, surprisingly, the manner
in which the historical-grammatical approach was understood and applied by biblical
interpreters changed with time, looking less and less like that which Ernesti
envisioned.267 Before I address these changes, it is necessary to focus on Ernesti’s
vision for, and articulation of, the historical-grammatical method. This evaluation of

Jeremy Cohan, and David Sorkin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 305–
12. Polliack affirms that the only precursor to the grammatical or linguisticcontextual approach of Karaite hermeneutics is found in the “vaguely attested”
rabbinic interpretative orientation known as peshat. Ibid., 306.
I am greatly indebted to the work of John H. Sailhamer in this section. His
thorough analysis of the work of Johann August Ernesti and its historical
developments is of utmost importance to biblical interpretation. I summarize some of
his findings here and outline some implications within the lines of what this chapter
proposes to accomplish. Since Ernesti wrote in Latin, I rely on Sailhamer’s
evaluation of Ernesti’s material and on my own readings of Moses Stuart’s
translation of Ernesti’s work: J. A. Ernesti and Moses Stuart, Elementary Principles of
Interpretation, 4th ed. (New York: Dayton & Saxton, 1842). From my own reading of
Ernesti’s work, I believe Sailhamer has done a magnificent job in articulating
Ernesti’s main ideas and the issues that have risen because of mistranslations of his
work from the original Latin.
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Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 105. Other scholars also see Ernesti as
the one who established the hermeneutical parameters for what is currently known as
the historical-grammatical method. Robert Jumonville also understands that Ernesti
is “regarded as founder of the grammatical-historical school of hermeneutics.” See
Robert Moore-Jumonville, Hermeneutics of Historical Distance: Mapping the Terrain of
American Biblical Criticism, 1880–1914 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
2002), 104.
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Among these changes is the development of Ernesti’s approach to the
historical-critical method itself. See Sailhamer, “Johann August Ernesti: The Role of
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Ernesti will inevitably address the notion of history, a conception that is central to
the formative periods of the method.
The Principle of History
From History to Text
Johann Ernesti (1707–1781), “one of the dominating figures of his time,”268
studied at Wittenberg and Leipzig and began teaching theology in Leipzig in 1759.
Sailhamer and others see Ernesti as the father of a conservative and even evangelical
approach to the text, yet along with Johann Salomo Semler,269 Ernesti is considered
one of the founders of the historical-critical method, due to two main premises in his
work on biblical hermeneutics:
Firstly, Ernesti made clear the necessity of studying the Old and New Testaments
not as a homogeneous whole but as distinct bodies of literature. Secondly, he
applied to the New Testament the philological-historical method that had been
developed in the interpretation of classical texts.270

History in Biblical Interpretation,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 44, no.
2 (June 2011): 194.
M. A. Knoll, “Ernesti, Johann August,” in Historical Handbook of Major
Biblical Interpreters, ed. Donald K. Mckim (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998),
316.
268

Both Semler and Ernesti are also listed as the influences behind the
thinking of Johann Philipp Gabler. See Magne Sæbø, On the Way to the Canon:
Creative Tradition History in the Old Testament (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press,
1998), 311–12.
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David R. Law, The Historical-Critical Method: A Guide for the Perplexed (New
York: Continuum, 2012), 42. In Ernesti’s words, “the Scriptures are to be
investigated by the same rules as other books.” See Ernesti, Elementary Principles of
Interpretation, 27.
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The difficulty some scholars have in pinpointing the actual role and thinking
of Ernesti is due to the fact that although Ernesti held to some of the rising historicalcritical premises of his time,271 he failed “to follow these insights to their logical
conclusion and, affirming the doctrine of inerrancy continued to hold a conservative
view of Scripture.”272 Thus Ernesti is influential in a paradoxical way. On the one
hand, he popularized the historical-critical mindset of his time in his grammatical
approach to the text,273 but on the other hand, he upheld a conservative posture of
inerrancy.
Even so, because Ernesti is considered the main articulator of what is today
known as the historical-grammatical method, it is important to briefly highlight some
important aspects of his approach and trace some of the roots of his ideas.274 The

The roots of his premises are also numerous, yet some recognize that the
philosophy of Christian Wolff played a significant role in his moderate rationalistic
approach to the text. Knoll writes that Ernesti inherited “from Wolff a rational view
of the universe in which revelation as a distinct source of knowledge apart from
reason had a well-defined place.” See Knoll, “Ernesti, Johann August,” 316. Others
see the influence of Schleiermacher in Ernesti’s thinking; see Cornelia Richter,
“Friedrich Schleiermacher: Symbol Theory, Hermeneutics, and Forms of Religious
Communication,” in Schleiermacher, the Study of Religion, and the Future of Theology: A
Transatlantic Dialogue, ed. Brent W. Sockness and Wilhelm Gräb (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 2010), 384. Moses Stuart sees the heavy influence of Samuel F. N. Morus’s
Hermeneutica in the work of Ernesti; on this, see the preface written by Stuart in
Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, iii-iv.
271
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Law, Historical-Critical Method, 42.

Ernesti’s rationalistic approach to interpretation can be seen when he
discusses the need for methodological steps in interpretation so that interpreters
might not “be left to depend on chance rather than reason.” See Ernesti, Elementary
Principles of Interpretation, 16.
273

This study does not provide an exhaustive account of the development of
the historical-grammatical method; I intend to use the seventeenth and eighteenth
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question here is: how did Ernesti understand and articulate the historicalgrammatical approach?
In Ernesti’s writings, the meaning of the historical and the grammatical in his
method was tied to the parameters set forth by the text: that is, the grammatical and
the historical were not two different steps in interpretation, but one and the same.275
This he termed the “usus loquendi.”276 In regard to the “historical” element in the
“grammatical historical” approach, Ernesti “meant simply the ‘grammatical’
meaning of the words of Scripture,” that is, that to understand the meaning of
history “meant ‘reading’ the historical narratives.”277
Historical implied that the narratives found in the biblical text were
trustworthy depictions of real historical events, and to have access to those events
one must read what is in the text. As for grammatical, it simply implied careful
attention to the grammatical, syntactical, and literary components of the Hebrew,
Greek, and Aramaic texts of the Bible. To understand history, one needs to
understand grammar.

centuries as a window on the method in order to raise questions, concerns, and
possible problems for further reflection.
For Ernesti, “the act of interpretation implies two things; viz., (1) A right
perception of the meaning of the words. (2) A proper explanation of that meaning.”
See Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, 14.
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Daniel O’Leary, “Environmentalism, Hermeneutics, and Canadian
Imperialism in Agnes Deans Cameron’s The New North,” in The Elusive Land: Women
and the Canadian Environment, ed. Melody Hessing, Rebecca Raglon, and Catriona
Mortimer-Sandilands (Vancouver: UBC, 2005), 19.
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From Text to History
It did not take long before scholars misunderstood Ernesti’s articulation of
these concepts; “the phrase ‘grammatical-historical method’ went from being a
description of the primarily textual procedure of studying written narratives to an
almost exclusive search for the meaning of the historical events (realia) lying behind
those narratives.”278 This shift indicates the essential difference between Ernesti’s
vision of the historical-grammatical method and the historical-critical methodologies:
namely, the acceptance or rejection of criticism based on historical depictions of the
Bible as an access to meaning.
What triggered this misunderstanding, according to Sailhamer, was the
English translation of Ernesti’s Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti279 by Moses
Stuart.280 While for Ernesti the meaning of the text rested within the text itself,
independent of critical external historical verifications (apart from the philological

Ibid., 105. Ernesti is categorical in assigning the meaning of the text to the
boundaries set forth by the words and not to outside notions. He writes: “The
meaning, which according to grammatical principles should be assigned to any word
of Scripture, is not to be rejected then on account of reasons derived from things or
previously conceived opinions; for in this way interpretation would become
uncertain.” See Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, 30. This is a positive
feature of Ernesti’s approach to the text, and it goes against the critical approach to
the text in the sense that it is the text which determines the validity of the previously
conceived notions of the interpreter. On this Ernesti writes: “In the Scriptures, if any
sentiment does not agree with our opinions, we must call to mind the imbecility of
human reason and human faculties; we must seek for conciliation, and not attempt a
correction of the passage without good authority.” Ibid.
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historicity of the words themselves), Stuart “advocated the use of history to uncover
the meaning of biblical events,”281 not realizing that this “was not the intent in
Ernesti’s work.”282 In other words, Stuart missed the authorial intent of Ernesti’s
grammatical method in his translation, especially in regard to how Ernesti
understood the interrelation between history and text in the search for meaning.
Following this translation of Ernesti’s work, other biblical scholars
maintained the distance between the grammatical and the historical initiated by
Stuart. While Ernesti understood the historical and the grammatical to be one,283
scholars applied the method as a two-step process: the first “historical,” using the
historical tools to uncover the historical background of the text where true historical
facts resided, and the second “grammatical,” the intended spiritual/religious
meaning of the text.
Among these scholars was Karl August Keil, who, according to Sailhamer,
originated the hyphenated form grammatical-historical in his German translation of
Ernesti’s Latin original.284 With this simple change the method began to imply “a
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In addition, for Ernesti, even the tropical or figurative sense of a possible
word has a “grammatical” meaning. See Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation,
37.
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Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 108. Sailhamer also notes that the
change from one to two hermeneutical procedures in the historical-grammatical
method is already indicated by the translations of Ernesti’s work. Sailhamer writes:
“In earlier hermeneutical works, the two terms ‘grammatical’ and ‘historical’ were
commonly connected by the Latin conjunction sive, meaning something like our
word ‘namely.’ It was ‘the grammatical, namely, the historical’ sense of Scripture
284
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historical, along with a grammatical, interpretation,”285 that is, a softened version of
what later came to be known as the historical-critical method, where meaning was
not only restricted to the text itself, but was derived to a large extent from the
historical-critical evaluations and reconstructions of the interpreter.
While the historical-critical approach to the text uncovered the veracity and
consequently the meaning of the text from critical reconstructions, the historicalgrammatical method, as modified by Ernesti’s translators, placed a partial yet
significant importance on these historical-critical backgrounds. To arrive at the final
meaning of a text, the interpreter had to look at both history (through modern
historical-critical tools) and text (through critical grammatical tools).286
What is interesting in this small historical development is that from its
conception, the historical-grammatical method was utilized as a way for scholars to
advocate different sets of assumptions. It comes as no surprise, then, that today the
method is still being shaped and modified to suit the philosophical commitments of

that was sought after. When later biblical scholars such as Karl August Keil
connected the two terms with a dash or an et, it suggested the two terms no longer
meant the same thing. It was now ‘the grammatical and historical’ method.” See
Sailhamer, “Johann August Ernesti,” 195.
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Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 108.

Again, this reliance on the history behind the text and the text itself was
already envisioned by Baruch Spinoza. Spinoza writes: “The interpretation of nature
consists in the examination of the history of nature, and from there deducing
definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural
interpretation proceeds by the examination of Scripture, and inferring the intention
of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its fundamental principles.” See
Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, 99. This established the
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each interpreter using it.
While Ernesti believed that “the meaning of things ought to be derived solely
from the words,”287 Keil saw the meaning as “not in the words of the author, but in
his mind.” It was for this reason that Keil considered “the investigation of the sense
of words to be a historical task.”288 The interpreter was to critically reconstruct the
historical setting where the text was written in order to arrive at the true, factual
meaning of the text, because this was as close as one could get to the mind of the
author. In other words, to arrive at the authorial intention (what was in the mind of
the author), the interpreter had to critically reconstruct the text. This reconstruction
was done in the context of a suspicion toward the historical setting depicted by the
biblical writer. What the biblical author actually wrote in relation to history would
take on a secondary role under this critical assessment.
As noted so far, Ernesti’s intention with the historical-grammatical method
was to find the reality and meaning of the text within a somewhat uncritical
approach to the text itself.289 Hans Frei draws out three implications of this literal,

foundation for the positivistic approach to the text, since the approach of the scientist
and that of the theologian were quite similar.
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Ernesti understood that an interpreter must have the capability of
discerning between words and things, and that to arrive at the sense of the task or the
thing to which it refers, one must have “an accurate knowledge of languages” and
“an acquaintance with the principles of interpretation”: in other words, the sense of
the text is found within the text, not outside it. See Ernesti, Elementary Principles of
Interpretation, 16.
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realistic, and semi-pre-critical290 interpretation of the text: first, if a story was to be
read literally (as Ernesti envisioned), the story “referred to and described actual
historical occurrences”291; second, “if the real historical world described by the
several biblical stories is a single world of one temporal sequence, there must in
principle be one cumulative story to depict it,”292 that is, “without loss to its own
literal meaning or specific temporal reference, an earlier story (or occurrence) was a
figure of a later one”293; and third, because the world of the text was unified as one
single story, “it must in principle embrace the experience of any present age and
reader.”294
Now that the general tenets of Ernesti’s vision for the method in its historical
context have been laid out, the question is: according to Ernesti’s historicalgrammatical method, how does an interpreter arrive at the meaning of the text?

Historical-Grammatical Structure of Meaning
At the outset, it is important to establish the basic dimensions of meaning

Semi-pre-critical in the sense that while Ernesti understood the value of
critical grammatical tools to uncover the meaning of the text within the text itself, his
assumptions regarding the textual depictions were quite conservative. In some sense,
the historiography provided by the biblical authors had preeminence over modern
historiography, because Ernesti believed that the historical process recorded in
Scripture was true.
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present in interpretation in order to analyze Ernesti’s approach to the text. Kevin J.
Vanhoozer correctly notes that the production of a text involves at least three
dimensions: “Interpreters testify to what acts an author performed in inscribing just
these words (content) in just this way (form) on just this occasion (context).”295 He
concludes that the “meaning of a text pertains to all the things the author was doing
in attending to his or her words.”296 With this in mind, how does the historicalgrammatical methodology relate to content, form, and context?
So far, I have attempted to demonstrate how Ernesti understood that to arrive
at the meaning of the text, one must not necessarily subjugate it in favor of
extrabiblical critical categories. Ernesti’s emphasis on the importance of the text to
arrive at meaning derived from his understanding that the exegetical approach to
Scripture needed to be “identical to the newly developed philological approach taken

Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader,
and the Morality of Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), 5. The
historical developments in biblical hermeneutics are marked by changes in emphasis
on these three areas, and more specifically in this study, on the interpretation of
“context.” I chose Vanhoozer at this stage since I am analyzing in broad strokes the
basic elements present in the interpretation of a text. For a more detailed analysis of
text and meaning, see Oliver Glanz, Understanding Participant-Reference Shifts, 57–76.
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Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 5. If one was to add another dimension to
Vanhoozer’s basic scheme it would be that of the reader, that is, the possibility of the
reader being involved in the generation of meaning in the text. Even so, because this
particular study is aimed at the historical-grammatical method, I will keep this fourth
dimension out of the evaluation of the method, especially because the historicalgrammatical method gives no role to the reader in the generation of meaning apart
from the methodological steps to find the meaning within the text itself. This way, I
will limit myself to the definition of meaning set forth by Vanhoozer as centered on
everything “the author was doing to his or her words,” even though I believe such
definition lacks the crucial dimension of the reader.
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in the study of other ancient literature.”297 Ernesti’s approach was not based on any
inner reasoning within the text, but on the philological approaches of his time. What
informed his understanding that “the text can have no other meaning than its
grammatical, or historical, sense”298 found in the individual words was his reliance
upon this philological background. This is why some see the grammatical and
historical approaches to the text as foundational for the critical method, since both
understand that any method for biblical interpretation should follow the same
parameters found in the interpretation of any other book.299
Yet Ernesti’s emphasis on two of the three dimensions of meaning, namely
content and form, creates the necessity of understanding how Ernesti viewed the
function of language. In order to establish some parameters to analyze one’s
philosophy of language, especially in the context of Scripture, I resort to the
philosophy of language found in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.300 Wittgenstein’s
work can be divided into two main periods: his early work,301 based on foundational
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Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 117.
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See Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics; Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher,
Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969),
38.
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For an introductory perspective on the writings of Wittgenstein see Hans
D. Sluga and David G. Stern, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Probably the best analysis of Wittgenstein’s
work in the context of Scripture and theology is found in Labron, Wittgenstein’s
Religious Point of View, and Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology.
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See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
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theories of language that viewed the sense of language as attached to ideal Forms
and explained by foundational categories; and his later work,302 based on a more
pragmatic and functional approach that viewed the sense of language as attached to
its use and practice. While the former was more Platonic in nature, with words
pointing to pre-established realities, the latter was more Hebraic, in the sense that to
understand language one does not need to learn the reality to which it points, but to
understand how language functions within its context.303
Ernesti for his part understood that “the reason for a word’s meaning is not
arrived at logically.” This implies that to arrive at the meaning of a word, one needs
to see “how it functions in that language.”304 In this sense, Ernesti’s understanding of
language comes close to Wittgenstein’s functional understanding of language,305
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See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.

On the Hebraic sense of Wittgenstein’s later work, Wittgenstein himself
writing to M. O’C. Drury asserts: “Your religious ideas have always seemed to me
more Greek than biblical. Whereas my thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic.”
In M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” in Recollections of Wittgenstein,
ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 79. The Hebraic sense is
found in Wittgenstein’s later work and asserted as such because his later work,
following the general tendencies of biblical writings, seems to “attach meaning to the
historical and contemporary applications of language—the forms of life—in contrast
to positing additional elements or foundational theories beyond normative
practices.” In Labron, Wittgenstein’s Religious Point of View, 5.
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Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 117. Ernesti when speaking about the
meaning of words writes: “How can the meaning in each case be found? From the
general manner of speaking, i. e. from the common usage.” In Ernesti, Elementary
Principles of Interpretation, 21.
304

The main difference is that while Wittgenstein does not believe scientific
positivism of any sort can influence the understanding of what language is, Ernesti
will follow a rigorous philological approach to uncover the meaning of the words:
that is, a scientific approach. Also, while Wittgenstein focuses on modern languages,
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which is closer to the Hebrew way of writing than the Greek.
Ernesti’s historical-grammatical approach, then, arrives at the meaning of the
text by emphasizing the first two elements of the scheme of meaning—content and
form. It attends to context to better understand the nature and history of the
text/language, but not in the sense that history is the reality to which the textual
meaning points. As mentioned earlier, in the historical-grammatical methodology
envisioned by Ernesti, there is no role given to the reader apart from the
methodological steps to reach a proper understanding of what was written, what
Ernesti calls the subtilitas explicandi.306
The implications of a semi-pre-critical understanding of the text present in
Ernesti’s intention for the historical-grammatical method, along with how the
approach uncovers the meaning of the text, prepare the ground for the evaluation of
the second macro-hermeneutical premise: ontology.
So far, in the analysis of the premises that relate to the issues surrounding the
term history in the historical-grammatical method, I have pointed out that the usage

Ernesti is working in biblical interpretation, where there is no way to understand the
usage of words without a basic grasp of the ancient languages. Even so, the similarity
between Ernesti and Wittgenstein is evident when Ernesti speaks of the sense of
words as follows: “The sense of words depends on the usus loquendi. This must be the
case, because the sense of words is conventional and regulated wholly by usage.
Usage then being understood, the sense of words is of course understood.” Ernesti,
Elementary Principles of Interpretation, 25.
306
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of the method is divided between two camps307: those who follow Ernesti and his
original vision (the grammatical and historical are one interpretative action), and
those who follow the translations of his work (the grammatical and historical are two
different interpretative actions). This dual understanding of the method in the
historical sphere will be repeated in the ontological sphere.
It is also important to note that both those who follow the translations of
Ernesti’s work (two-step) and those who follow Ernesti (one-step) are looking for the
true historical meaning of the text. In this they agree. The difference is seen in
whether this meaning is found in critical reconstructions of the events surrounding
the formation of the text, or in what the text itself says about the historical process it
describes. The historical critics of the time understood that the bridge to meaning
required careful historical-critical reconstruction of the life setting (sitz in Leben) of the
author, along with close attention to the sources that shaped the formation of the
text. On the other hand, Ernesti understood that philology alone was the bridge to
meaning,308 that is, the historical meaning of the text was found within the text

For a sample of those who understand the grammatical-historical method
differently than Ernesti (emphasizing the two-step application), see Hank Voss,
“From ‘Grammatical-Historical Exegesis’ to ‘Theological Exegesis’: Five Essential
Practices,” Evangelical Review of Theology 37, no. 2 (April 2013): 145; Milton Spenser
Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics: A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1974), 203–4.
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Sailhamer also argues that Ernesti relied on his philological enterprise
because of his Lutheran background, which relied on the verbal inspiration of the
text (see Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 112–14), a meso-hermeneutical notion
not lacking macro-hermeneutical commitments. Canale himself departs from a strict
model of verbal inspiration in his work: “Both verbal and thought inspiration
depends on those of classical philosophy, presuppositions we have dismissed and
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itself.309
The Principle of Ontology
Now that the presuppositions that relate to history have been laid out, this
section turns to two ontological issues that emerged from the evaluation of the
historical premises of the historical-grammatical method. The issues that remain to
be addressed are the issue of time in pre-critical figuration and typology and the issue
of the dichotomy between words (verba) and things (res) in order to find the meaning
(sensus) of the text.

replaced with biblical ones.” See Fernando L. Canale, The Cognitive Principle of
Christian Theology: A Hermeneutical Study of the Revelation and Inspiration of the Bible
(Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithotec, 2005), 404. Even so, it is
important to keep in mind that some argue that a full-blown notion of verbal
inspiration and consequently the notion of inerrancy only appeared later in the
Lutheran tradition; for Peter Leithart, only by the seventeenth century had “the
Reformation doctrine of Scripture . . . been refined into a strong doctrine of
inerrancy.” See Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 7.
To summarize this difference in another light, while the historical-critical
method focuses on the world of the author, historical grammarians focus on the
world of the text; see Oeming, Contemporary Biblical Hermeneutics. One must realize
that “What is the intention of the author within his own world?” is a question
historical critics have been trying to answer for over two hundred years. Canale (as
well as SDAs), in emphasizing the significance of history, cannot ignore the
historical context in which God revealed himself to the biblical authors and how they
appropriated this revelation in their historical contexts (including culture, language,
customs, etc.). This certainly is not an endorsement of the historical-critical
methodology and all its current ramifications. But this is a reminder that an emphasis
on time/history at the ontological level creates several questions that must be dealt
with at a hermeneutical level. The temptation here is to avoid and neglect these
questions by hiding them “under the rug” of the more conservative historicalgrammatical method without a basic knowledge of what the method sets forth to do.
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Figuration, Typology, and Time
As noted above, one of the primary features of pre-critical interpretation,
which forms the background of the historical-grammatical method,310 is figuration or
typology. Since the grammatical-historical method originally assumed a realistic
reading of the text—that is, narratives that literally pointed to real past historical
events and processes—one of the primary consequences of such reading was an
emphasis on the unity of Scripture.311 Scripture told one single story, with older
events serving as types/figures for newer events.
At the same time, it was because of figuration and typology that the reader
could be immersed in the reality of the world of the text. Hans Frei writes that
figuration “was at once a literary and historical procedure, an interpretation of stories
and their meanings by weaving them together into a common narrative referring to a
single history and its patterns of meaning.”312 Yet behind the possibility of this
weaving of stories into one single narrative is the element of time.

Figural or typological interpretation that stemmed from a literal or
grammatical approach to the Bible was also central to the hermeneutic of the
Reformation. Frei writes: “The affirmation that the literal or grammatical sense is the
Bible’s true sense became programmatic for the traditions of Lutheran and
Calvinistic interpretation.” See Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 37. This is yet
another reason why some tie the premises of the historical-grammatical method to
the hermeneutic of the Reformation, and rightly so. Both the Reformers and Frei
resort to a literal realistic reading of the text leading to a unified narrative that opens
itself to the reader.
310

This is why the critical approach to the text, with its dissection of the text
and its unity, virtually destroyed any possible realistic reading of Scripture. By
appealing to several traditions and dividing the text along with its narrative, the unity
of the story was compromised and the text no longer carried a unified narrative.
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Frei points out not only the importance of unity for a figural understanding of
the text, but also the importance of time. He writes: “If figural or typological
interpretation was to be successful, it required a delicate balance between the
temporally separated occasions, a firm connection with literal or realistic procedure,
and a clear rooting in the order of temporal sequence.”313
Yet while Frei emphasizes the importance of the sequence of past history for
figural interpretation, Erich Auerbach, examining the development of the
interpretation of Scripture in the Middle Ages, clarifies that in that particular period,
time was secondary to the eternal/timeless divine plan.314 He writes that figural
interpretation “is not regarded as primarily a chronological or causal development
but as a oneness within the divine plan, of which all occurrences are parts and
reflections.”315 In this sense, because God was understood to be omnitemporal316 or
timeless, the element of time, or the “horizontal, that is the temporal and causal,
connection of occurrences is dissolved.”317
From this, one notices two possibilities for understanding figural or
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Since Frei quotes Auerbach in his study, it seems that even Frei did not see
the difference of emphasis in what Auerbach writes and its implications for
understanding the pre-critical mindset.
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typological interpretation in pre-critical times. The first follows a temporal historical
dynamic where events are incomplete, since they point to future events highlighting
the importance of the “historical now.” The second follows a timeless dynamic
where current events are already fulfilled in their timeless connection to future
events, highlighting the importance of the eternal divine plan over the present
“historical now.” Again, one is caught between two camps with different
assumptions.
Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the ontological direction of precritical figural interpretation, by the late eighteenth century the canonical unity
supported by the approach was overcome by historical criticism and its divisive
nature. While in pre-critical times the literal explicative nature of the text was
identical with historical reference, in the hermeneutical developments of the
eighteenth century, they were broken apart.318
Even so, Ernesti’s original intention for the historical-grammatical method
implicitly emphasized the role of time and history for the unity of the text and God’s
action in the world according to the reality depicted by the biblical authors, as
frequently seen in the work of Fernando Canale.319 Auerbach’s evaluation of realism
in Scripture provides insight into the context of the classical ontology of medieval
times, a philosophical outlook that often blurs what seems to be the ontological
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Much, if not all, of the work of Fernando L. Canale flows from this basic
assumption: that the ontological premises of the biblical authors are radically
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perspective implicit in the work of the biblical authors: that is, of time, history, and
divinity acting and working within it.
In sum, one of the key characteristics of a pre-critical understanding of the
text, a characteristic also seen in Ernesti’s vision of the historical-grammatical
method, is figuration and typology. Yet in order for the story of Scripture to be
considered as a whole, it must be unified by the element of time and progression. As
seen above, even in this question, scholars are divided between those who
understand figuration and typology in a temporal chronological sense and those who
understand it as a divine timeless plan.
Verba, Res, Sensus: The Text and Truth
Besides the notions of figuration, typology, and time, a second point that
must receive attention at this stage is the significance of the interrelation of words
(verba), things (res), and sense (sensus) in hermeneutics, which can be traced as far
back as Augustine’s De Doctrina Cristiana.320 This also recalls several other notions

different from the premises that shaped Christian theology. For more on his basic
understanding of these issues, see Canale, Criticism of Theological Reason.
For a thorough analysis of Augustine’s hermeneutic and its relation to
critical methodology, see Augustine A. Gilmore, “Augustine and the Critical
Method,” Harvard Theological Review 39, no. 2 (April 1946): 141–63. This section
does not intend to provide a thorough investigation of Augustine’s hermeneutic for
several reasons; among them is the fact that because his material on hermeneutics is
so extensive, “study of his techniques can lead us into intellectual quagmire.” See
Frederick Van Fleteren and Joseph C. Schnaubelt, Augustine: Biblical Exegete (New
York: Peter Lang, 2001), 2. At this stage I will focus primarily on Augustine’s
dichotomy between words and things, since it might help the reader grasp how the
historical-critical and grammatical methodologies understand the flow of meaning in
the text.
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introduced earlier, since “all of Augustine’s endeavors in metaphysics, epistemology,
and exegesis coincide with a relentless effort to define the functions and limits of
human language.”321 This brief evaluation might help to clarify the dual approach to
meaning (from history to text, or text to history) found in the historical-critical
(which will be evaluated subsequently) and historical-grammatical approaches to the
text, especially the changes made to the historical-grammatical approach.
For Augustine, “all doctrine concerns either things or signs.”322 The word
thing means “that which is part of the real (res) world referred to in the Bible but lying
outside the Bible itself,” that is, “a piece of the outside world identified specifically
by a specific word (verbum).”323 The words of Scripture play the role of a sign
pointing to a different reality.324 The question that arises is: what is the nature of a
“thing” that signs point to?
Some argue that this dichotomy between words and things stems from
Augustine’s conception of God and time. Among them is Eugene Vance, who
correctly depicts Augustine’s view that “even though God created the temporal

Eugene Vance, Mervelous Signals: Poetics and Sign Theory in the Middle Ages
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 34.
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“Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum” in Augustine, De Doctrina
Christiana, 1.2.
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This basic idea influences his own understanding of the “real meaning” of
a particular text. See Van Fleteren, Augustine: Biblical Exegete, 10. Van Fleteren
pinpoints at least four spheres in which Augustine articulates these meanings:
historical, aetiological, analogical, and allegorical, all carrying a perspective that the
text is a sign, pointing to different things.
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world, God remains eternally present to himself as pure Being beyond time.”325 So,
to some extent, for Augustine, the final purpose of the words of Scripture is to
connect the reader with that reality or thing (res) “outside” the world.326 In other
words, “the words (verba) of Scripture are what takes us into the world of things (res),
the real world. . . . where we comprehend (and contemplate) eternal spiritual
realities.”327 In the end, the words are only a means, a husk,328 pointing forward to, or
wrapping, the eternal content found in the text.
Historical critics at the turn of the eighteenth century questioned the
plausibility of the premise of eternal truth existing within the text. For them, the
“thing” (res) or reality to which the text pointed ceased to be this eternal revealed
truth in the text (in pre-critical times), and became the historical process behind the
formation of the text. Revelation took place in an event in the past. The text only
testified to this event, but did not contain revelation.329 The text continued to be a
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In relation to Augustine’s hermeneutic, Vance writes: “Augustine believed
that the meaning of Scripture is strictly autonomous—independent of the temporal,
verbal signs by which it is expressed, and such temporal meaning must be grasped by
the reader in a direct process of illumination from within.” See Vance, Mervelous
Signals, 41.
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Canale traces this subjective reality to the influence of Schleiermacher
upon the formulation of the historical-critical methodology, affirming that the
“historical-critical methodology of exegesis necessarily implies the encounter theory
of revelation, and the artistic view of inspiration.” See Canale, Cognitive Principle,
169.
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vessel through which truth was communicated, but the truth was behind the text, not
in it. In other words, truth was seen as grounded in the subjective experience of the
author and in its effect upon the readers, who fit themselves within the same
reconstructed storyline.
As for historical grammarians, they attempted to maintain the eternal content
of the text (via Augustine), while at the same time sustaining the fact that the text
was only a wrapping covering the eternal content. The reality (res) of which the
words were signs was found within the text, making the words mere signs to be
disposed of once the meaning was reached.330
Interestingly, in both approaches to the text, the Platonic dichotomy between
words and things seen in Augustine’s work (an understanding that can be traced
through Spinoza to Kant) remains intact at an ontological level. Both historical
critics and historical grammarians exercise their differences under this Augustinian,
and consequently Platonic, umbrella. The risk of a naive use of the historicalgrammatical method is just this: that the interpreter ends up unconsciously resorting
to a hermeneutical framework that flows from Platonic ontology.331

Thus, on both the historical and ontological levels, the importance of the
text for historical critics is partial: at the historical level the biblical authors used the
text and its historiographical import to convey an earlier message, and at the
ontological level the text is only a vessel carrying an ethical religious message
relevant at the time of its composition. Again, the dichotomy between things as they
appear and as they are looms in the background.
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This evaluation might vary if the interpreter does not resort to classical
ontology when using the historical-grammatical methodology. Even so, because of
the volatile nature of the method, its use renders problematic results. Ángel M.
Rodriguez has pointed out the problematic implications of a modified version of the
331

132

In sum, the distinction between words and things that has shaped
hermeneutical discussions for centuries—a distinction prevalent in the historicalcritical and historical-grammatical approaches—is fundamentally tied to ontological
commitments. Although the two approaches to the text differ in practical priorities,
the macro-hermeneutical structure remains the same.
Based on this brief evaluation of the formative periods of the historicalgrammatical method, it is possible to draw out the implication that the volatile
nature of the method allows it to be applied in any way a particular interpreter wants
under the umbrella of Platonic categories. Although the method assumes specific
conceptions of history and ontology, the interpreter can still shape how the method
functions based on the application of particular presuppositions concerning the
relation of text, history, and truth.
The historical-grammatical method can function in a variety of ways under
varied philosophical conditions that create varied interpretations. As for the
historical-critical method, scholars understand that its “methodology cannot be
claimed as a neutral discipline.”332 This is only one of the reasons why a proper
evaluation of the macro-hermeneutical premises of the historical-critical approach is

historical-critical method. See Ángel M. Rodriguez, “The Use of the Modified
Version of the Historical-Critical Approach by Adventist Scholars,” in Understanding
Scripture: An Adventist Approach, ed. George W. Reid, Biblical Research Institute
Studies 1 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2006), 339–51. Perhaps the same
should be said of the historical-grammatical method and any of its modified versions.
Eugene F. Klug, foreword to The End of the Historical-Critical Method, by
Gerhard Maier (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1977), 8.
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imperative. To this evaluation I now turn.

Historical Criticism
Introduction
The historical-critical method was and still is the “dominant approach in the
academic study of the Bible,”333 including both the “Hebrew Bible and New
Testament.”334 Dozeman writes that “most scholarship in the United States, and an
even larger majority of work done in Europe still falls comfortably under the
historical-critical banner.” In addition, “the method has been used almost exclusively
by the overwhelming majority of biblical scholars, both Catholic and Protestant.”335
The method crosses denominational lines; Keegan understands that even
“fundamentalists have recognized the validity and power of this method and have
used it to the extent that its results could be harmonized with their religious
concerns.”336 The historical-critical method is overwhelmingly accepted by biblical
scholars across geographical and denominational spectrums, but before it can be
evaluated, it must be defined.
As with the grammatical method, to properly define the historical-critical

John Barton, “Historical-Critical Approaches,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed. John Barton (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 9.
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method is a complex task.337 Historical-critical method “is a term sometimes used
erroneously as a synonym for the whole body of critical methodologies and
approaches related to the discipline of Biblical Criticism.”338 I intend not to fall into
this misconception in this study. Archie L. Nations notes that many believe “the
method is so well understood that it needs no definition,”339 asserting that in the end
historical criticism is “not a uniform method but rather a set of assumptions thought
to be operative in doing historical research.”340 Therefore, this section will focus not
on the varied facets of the historical-critical method itself, but on the formation of
what is known as “historical criticism” and the philosophical presuppositions or “set
of assumptions” the approach inherently carries within its structure.341 Historical

John Barton writes: “What is the historical-critical method? Unfortunately,
its definition is almost as controversial as its desirability.” See Barton, “HistoricalCritical Approaches,” 9. Ben F. Meyer, on the other hand, offers what he believes to
be a stable understanding and definition: “philologically learned, critical (as opposed
to ‘dogmatic’), and devoted to scientific (as opposed to ‘pre-critical’) interpretation
and history.” See Meyer, “Challenges of Text,” 3.
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Nations writes that these assumptions normally align with the following
tenets: “Criticism must be freed from dogmatic presuppositions, maintain a high
degree of objectivity, eschew ecclesiastical controls, and accept secular historians’
notions of historical homogeneity, of cause and effect relationships and of the
criticism of sources.” Ibid. Another author who speaks of the general assumptions
within biblical criticism is Ben F. Meyer. Meyer writes that the historical-critical
method “has now been in use for approximately 200 years” (claiming that two thirds
of this period followed the vision set forth by Baruch Spinoza) and that throughout
“this period its connotations have been relatively stable: philologically learned,
341
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criticism will be understood in this study not as a uniform method, but as this “set of
assumptions” implemented in the various practices within the historical-critical
method. With this definition in mind, the origin of these assumptions within biblical
criticism can be examined.
While the majority of scholars see the rise of historical criticism as best
perceived in the context of the Enlightenment and the turn of the eighteenth century,
Travis F. Frampton writes that “these commonly held notions are not completely
accurate.”342 Although no one can deny that the eighteenth century was central to the
appearance of the historical-critical approach to the text, Frampton attempts to
convey that other circumstances should also be taken into account.343 Frampton
asserts that “to understand the rise of modern critical approaches to biblical texts
properly, one must at least begin with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”344
Frampton understands that the Renaissance and later the Reformation were
key historical developments that led up to the historical-critical approach to the text.
Frampton writes:

critical (as opposed to ‘dogmatic’), and devoted to scientific (as opposed to ‘precritical’) interpretation and history.” See Meyer, “Challenges of Text,” 3.
Travis L. Frampton, Spinoza and the Rise of Historical Criticism of the Bible
(London: T&T Clark, 2006), 199.
342

I do not want to neglect this significant point, although assessing the
developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries falls outside the scope of
this study. A door is here left open for further studies, particularly regarding whether
the philosophical presuppositions present in the eighteenth century were also
operative in the previous centuries.
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The Renaissance contributed greatly to an increase of knowledge by a renewed
interest in the erudition of Greco-Roman classical authors, by developing ways of
carrying out text-critical analyses of manuscripts, and by scrutinizing received
traditions—all of which eroded many ancient and medieval myths. Yet it did not
challenge political and religious authorities to the extent the Reformation later
would. The manner in which the Reformers conjoined reason and the Bible,
setting the latter up as a new locus of authority, however, left Protestants in an
uncomfortable and compromising position.345
In other words, while the Renaissance paved the way for an emphasis on human
reason, the Reformation counterbalanced these advancements with an emphasis on
the authority of the text in the life of the individual. This dependence on the Bible as
authority, and on the authority of the confessional community of believers, would be
radically challenged at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While
this study focuses on that transition between the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, it will not neglect the context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
since some of the philosophical presuppositions within modern biblical criticism
have roots in these earlier periods.
As in the previous section, I will evaluate two representative thinkers who are
responsible for articulating the main philosophical presuppositions influential in
historical criticism today,346 namely, Baruch Spinoza and Julius Wellhausen.347 To
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Ben F. Meyer directly connects the work of Spinoza with the historicalcritical method, since for him “‘historical-critical’ work was largely aligned with the
tradition of interpretation and history set in motion by Benedict Spinoza.” See
Meyer, “Challenges of Text,” 3.
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The majority of books on hermeneutics or Old Testament interpretation
mention the work of Spinoza and Wellhausen. What the present analysis contributes
to this long and common discussion is its object—the macro-hermeneutical or
philosophical presuppositions (God-human relation) that these thinkers inserted into
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this evaluation I now turn.
Spinoza
Introduction
The work of Spinoza348 was foundational for the development of what is
today known as historical criticism. As Mark S. Gignilliat correctly points out, it is
“important to come to terms with Spinoza because his work sets a trajectory for the
modern-critical approach to Old Testament exegesis.”349 The particular work that is
most influential in biblical interpretation is Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
(henceforth TTP), a work that is not exclusively hermeneutical, but “examines the
relation between religion and political theory through interpretation of the scriptures

what is today known as historical criticism. So, the focus here will not be on the
particulars of their work (Spinoza’s philosophical conceptions as a whole or
Wellhausen’s detailed understanding of the sources that formed the biblical text and
their relation to the history of Israel), but on the presuppositions they held and
inserted into biblical criticism. In this sense, the present analysis will not be
exhaustive and inevitably will leave much information out. It is my hope that this
brief evaluation might convince the reader of the presence and influence of
philosophical presuppositions within biblical interpretation.
For more on Spinoza’s background and thinking, see W. N. A. Klever,
“Spinoza’s Life and Works,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13–60; James S. Preus, Spinoza and
the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001);
Richard Mason, The God of Spinoza: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997); E. M. Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Frampton, Rise of Historical
Criticism; and the book that sets forth Spinoza’s basic ideas regarding biblical
interpretation (already mentioned in passing), Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. From
now on all texts from the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus will be taken from the 1989
Gebhardt edition and not from the already surpassed translation by R. H. M. Elwes.
348
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and the history of the Hebrew nation.”350 This section is aimed at uncovering the
philosophical presuppositions that govern Spinoza’s hermeneutic in the TTP, since
these presuppositions are the platform upon which modern biblical criticism is built.
To further elaborate on the need for an analysis of the relation between
Spinoza’s philosophical presuppositions and his hermeneutic, I turn to Brad S.
Gregory, who writes: “The extent to which Spinoza’s philosophy provides the basis
for his interpretation of Scripture, especially chapters 1-6, has not been sufficiently
recognized.”351 Furthermore, Gregory asserts:
The TTP is rightly acknowledged as a pioneering work in the establishment of
modern Biblical exegesis, but it is permeated by a philosophy which, despite its
author’s claims to the contrary, plays a crucial role in the scriptural
interpretation.352
Along with his philosophy guiding biblical interpretation, scholars generally
recognize that the terminology Spinoza uses to articulate his ideas includes biblical

Don Garrett, introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don
Garrett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2. What Spinoza attempts
to secure in TTP is freedom. Freedom is his first principle, on which both religion
and peace in society rely. Spinoza writes: “I think I am undertaking no ungrateful or
unprofitable task in demonstrating that not only can this freedom be granted without
endangering piety and the peace of the commonwealth, but also that the peace of the
commonwealth and piety depend on this freedom. This then, is the main point
which I have sought to establish in this treatise.” Spinoza, Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus, 51–52.
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words, but carries extrabiblical conceptualizations.353 Gregory’s evaluation of the
influences behind Spinoza’s hermeneutic is aligned with the assessment of this study
in general, and this section in particular: that interpretative traditions carry within
themselves extrabiblical philosophical presuppositions (such as biblical terminology
with extrabiblical conceptualizations)354 that define the nature and scope of
methodology, and consequently, its results.
Although there is no doubt that Spinoza’s philosophy guided his biblical
interpretation, it is also important to note that many of the presuppositions to be
mentioned next did not first appear in Spinoza’s work. As observed earlier, the
developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cannot be neglected. So, at
this introductory stage, I would like to briefly highlight some significant ideas that
developed over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and provided the background
for Spinoza’s work. Gregory identifies at least three representative authors who
created the general direction in which Spinoza would later develop his ideas. What
follows is a summary of these authors and the main ideas that Spinoza would later
develop.

Concerning Spinoza’s definition of biblical terms, Gregory writes,
“Spinoza’s interpretation leans on such [naturalistic] definitions despite the fact that
they are not found in the Bible.” Ibid.
353

This was mentioned in the previous chapter relating to Gilkey’s criticism of
biblical interpretation being half conservative and half liberal. As one can notice, this
interpretative dilemma in modern times has ancient roots. The difference in Spinoza
is not that he was naïvely using biblical language to arrive at liberal conclusions: on
the contrary, “Spinoza employs many of the same terms prevalent in traditional
Jewish and Christian discourse . . . but he twists them and gives them new,
unorthodox meanings that are compatible with his own philosophy.” Ibid., 42–43.
354

140

First was the French millenarist Isaac La Peyrère (1596–1676), who wrote
Men Before Adam, of which the “main thesis, based on both scriptural and extrascriptural evidence, was that people had existed before Adam and hence the Biblical
account of Adam as the first man had to be modified.”355 La Peyrère was also known
for showing “numerous textual problems in the Pentateuch in addition to denying its
Mosaic authorship.”356
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) wrote Leviathan and
advocated that the authenticity of the books of Scripture, that is, the canon, “are
determined not by tradition, scholarship or an appeal to ‘the Spirit,’ but by the
sovereign’s [the state’s] command.”357 Along with this idea, Hobbes also criticized
the Mosaic authorship and, consequently, the general reliability of the Pentateuch.
The English Quaker Samuel Fisher (1606–1665), who wrote The Rustick’s
Alarm to the Rabbies, influenced Spinoza’s work on both epistemological and
historical levels. Gregory summarizes Fisher’s assumptions by affirming that his
“fundamental epistemological distinction is between the Word of God and Scripture,
an eternal, supernatural message of God on the one hand and on the other, a
physical copy of this Word written by certain human beings at a specific time and
place.”358
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Leithart adds another name to the list, that of the Dutch “amateur”
theologian Lodewik Meyer, who published Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres, a book
that would later be distributed alongside Spinoza’s Tractatus. Meyer held that “any
number of interpretations of a passage might thus be true and the test of their truth is
their consistency with philosophy, that is, with the clear and distinct deliverances
that arise from Cartesian method.”359 Leithart adds that “Meyer’s book is important
because in it he initiates a hermeneutical method that detaches the truth and
meaning of Scripture from its verbal expression.”360
In other words, the hermeneutical development between the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries was marked by the beginning of a detachment of truth and
meaning from the text itself to external categories,361 a detachment this study also
aligns with a timeless conception of reality.
All of the ideas listed above appear in the work of Spinoza in a highly
developed and articulated manner. This introduction only highlights the need to take
a closer look at how Spinoza developed his biblical interpretation in the context of
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These external categories vary. Even in the Reformation, the interpretation
of the text itself was guided by a tropological or personal/ethical orientation making
the text conform to “canons within the canon.” See Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 13–15.
Later on, these external categories that detached truth and meaning from the text,
and truth from meaning itself, included reason in the context of philosophy, science,
and historical investigation.
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the philosophical presuppositions that influenced his project.362 I will begin by
evaluating the principle of epistemology and ontology in Spinoza’s work, followed
by how Spinoza arrived at the meaning of the biblical text. To this evaluation I now
turn.

The Principle of Epistemology and Ontology
Spinoza’s philosophical presuppositions concerning reality depart from an

As the introduction of this study indicates, the focus of this project is on
intended philosophical presuppositions, rather than unintended presuppositions such
as experiences, assumptions, and emotions, which are also quite influential in
biblical interpretation. Even so, I would like to mention one significant unintended
presupposition that highlights why Spinoza approached Scripture and religion the
way he did: his frustration with incoherence in religion—a frustration that can still be
experienced in contemporary times. Spinoza writes: “Matters have long reached
such a pass that a Christian, Turk, Jew or heathen can generally be recognised as
such only by his physical appearance or dress, or by his attendance at a particular
place of worship, or by his profession of a particular belief and his allegiance to some
leader. But as for their way of life, it is the same for all. . . . The very temple became
a theater where, instead of Church teachers, orators held forth, none of the actuated
by the desire to instruct the people, but keen to attract admiration, to criticise their
adversaries before the public, and to preach only such novel and striking doctrine as
might gain the applause of the crowd.” Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 52.
This is just a glimpse at the internal frustrations Spinoza held toward religion and the
religious way of life. So, even before I venture into an analysis of Spinoza’s intended
philosophical presuppositions, it is important to remember that behind the ideas of a
man is a life full of complexity, a life that cannot be objectified and assigned to
particular categories. In addition, Spinoza himself attacked the “preachers” of his
time with an argument that is recurrent in this study: “I do not see that they
[religious preachers] have taught anything more than the speculations of
Aristotelians or Platonists, and they have made Scripture conform to these so as to
avoid appearing to be the followed of heathens. It was not enough for them to share
in the delusions of the Greeks: they have sought to represent the prophets as sharing
in the same delusions.” Ibid., 53. The question that is left open is: will Spinoza
succumb to this same critique? Will Spinoza, in the end, conform the biblical text to
Greek assumptions? Will the prophets speak Hebrew with the voice of Plato?
362
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epistemological standpoint.363 Because knowledge of reality can only be acquired
through reason, Spinoza creates a dichotomy between Scripture and philosophy:
while Scripture can lead the individual to piety, only philosophy can lead to truth.
This piety that Scripture proposes is a reasonable and acceptable form of religion, or
what Spinoza calls “purified religion.” Opposed to purified religion is “superstitious
religion,” that is, the religion set forth by the writings of Scripture itself (without the
aid of reason) and the prophets who upheld elements contrary to the validation of
reason, such as miracles,364 supernatural events, divine voices, etc. So, it is through

This study already alluded to Spinoza’s dependence upon Cartesian
epistemology and the human subject at the center of the acquisition of knowledge
through reason alone. That being said, two important yet corollary points must be
made here: (1) Spinoza rejects the possibility of Scripture containing guiding
principles. As it pertains to using Scripture to form our presuppositions in the study
of Scripture, Spinoza believes that the author left interpreters “deprived of the
foundations and principles of Scriptural knowledge.” See Spinoza, Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus, 161. The principles that guide Scriptural knowledge must come
from outside the text. (2) The responsibility to correct. Spinoza holds that because
the biblical authors did not leave us principles of any sort, his main task as an
interpreter is “to correct these faults and to remove common theological prejudices.”
Ibid. While this study values point number two, the necessity to challenge “common
theological prejudices,” it does not support point number one. Part of the problem in
biblical interpretation today (varied interpretations, disagreements, projection of
ideas foreign to the text into the text) stems from reliance upon extrabiblical sources.
In this sense, this study differs from Spinoza’s project.
363

Spinoza understands miracles as “that whose cause cannot be explained on
scientific principles known to us by the natural light of reason,” and considers those
who uphold the idea of miracles to be, in a sense, primitive, or what he calls
“common people.” Ibid., 127. What Spinoza does endorse is a natural theology
where Nature itself, by being eternal and immutable, communicates the very
attributes of God: eternal and immutable. It is this conception of miracles that
enables Spinoza to conclude: “There can be no doubt that all the events narrated in
Scripture occurred naturally; yet they are referred to God because, as we have
already shown, it is not the part of Scripture to explain events through their natural
causes; it only relates those events that strike the imagination . . . So if we find in
364
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the validation of reason that the supernatural elements pointing to a biblical reality
within the text are denied.
Interestingly, in separating Scripture from philosophy, Spinoza became a type
of Reformer,365 since for him the “understanding of Scripture and of matters spiritual
must be sought from Scripture alone,”366 and he adds that Scripture should not be
interpreted “from the sort of knowledge that derives from the natural light of
reason.”367 This is one of the first incoherences in the work of Spinoza. Spinoza
claims that Scripture should be understood via Scripture and not by philosophy, but
does not clarify that this choice stems from a philosophical standpoint. Spinoza also
maintains that Scripture should be understood through Scripture and not by reason,
and in this creates a second dichotomy between the words of the text and the word of
God.368 Spinoza reduces this word of God to one simple proposition: “to obey God

Scripture some things for which we can assign no cause and which seem to have
happened beyond—indeed, contrary to—Nature’s order, this should not perplex us.
We need have no hesitation in believing that what truly happened, happened
naturally.” Ibid., 133. This conception was inevitably carried into the historicalcritical approach to the text without contestation. Anyone who rejects it is
considered “sacrilegious.” Spinoza writes: “Whatever is contrary to Nature is
contrary to reason, and whatever is contrary to reason is absurd, and should
therefore be rejected.” Ibid., 134.
Leithart also sees the spirit of a Reformer within the work of Spinoza. See
Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 10–13.
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with all one’s heart by practising justice and charity.”369 So, in addition to detaching
truth from the meaning of the biblical text, Spinoza creates a second dichotomy
within the meaning of the biblical text itself, between the words of the text and the
word of God. On this, Leithart adds that in the work of Spinoza “the husk of history
and speculation can be stripped away to get to the mere kernel,”370 that is, “the letter
is nothing; the ethical spirit of Scripture is all.”371 In sum, the epistemological outlook
of Spinoza determined his understanding of reality, and consequently, of the relation
between truth, meaning, and text.
Assuming a Cartesian epistemological framework, Spinoza attempts to
determine what is and is not real within the text through reason, and this is how the
possibilities of the dynamic between God and man are established. At this stage it is
important to expand on how this epistemological outlook, which stems from a
timeless perception of Being,372 affects Spinoza’s understanding of the text.
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The effects of a timeless interpretation of Being permeate other areas in
Spinoza’s work, such as his view of God’s involvement in the world. Spinoza
indicates this with words such as “eternal decrees and eternal truth” as he writes:
“By God’s direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of Nature, or chain of
natural events; for I have said above, and have already shown elsewhere, that the
universal laws of Nature according to which all things happen and are determined
are nothing but God’s eternal decrees, which always involve eternal truth and
necessity.” See Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 89. Spinoza articulates the idea
of man within this Nature in a deterministic fashion, since for him “no one acts
except by the predetermined order of Nature—that is, from God’s eternal direction
and decree.” Ibid., 90. The possibility that a timeless conception of Being is at play in
372
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In the historical-grammatical method the text served as a vessel for the
authorial meaning within it, and the same dichotomy is maintained in the work of
Spinoza. The letter is subject to the eternal, universal content of the text—the ethical.
Thus, for Spinoza, both the rational person and the common person can attain
beatitudo, the former through philosophy, and the latter through purified religion (a
religion that recognizes the ethical component apart from the mythological world
picture), and as in the grammatical method, the text is left aside once this eternal
content is unveiled.
Now that the basic structure of Spinoza’s approach in the context of the
principles of epistemology and ontology has been laid out, I will address how
Spinoza arrives at the meaning of a particular text and what this meaning consists of.

Spinoza’s Structure of Meaning
The question to be addressed at this stage is: how does Spinoza arrive at the
meaning of a text? While Meyer and Ernesti considered truth and meaning to be
identical in the text, Spinoza departs from this notion and determines that the “Bible
cannot be relied on for truth [this is the role of philosophy], and the goal of biblical
interpretation is not to arrive at truth, but rather to arrive at the meaning of the
original text.”373 In order to arrive at the meaning of the text, Spinoza takes quite a
literalistic approach to the text, yet under the guidance of the light of reason. An

Spinoza’s understanding of the text is supported when its effects are also noticed in
the realm of cosmology and human freedom.
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example of this is in order:
Maimonides and some others take the view that this and all other instances of an
apparition of an angel—as to Manoah and to Abraham when he was about to
sacrifice his son—occurred in dreams, on the grounds that nobody could have
seen an angel with his eyes open. But this is mere rubbish. They are concerned to
extort from Scripture some Aristotelian nonsense and some fabrications of their
own; and this I regard as the height of absurdity. It was by images, unreal and
dependent only on the prophet’s imagination, that God revealed to Joseph his
future dominion.374
While Spinoza supports what the text says in itself,375 and even criticizes others for
introducing Greek concepts into biblical interpretation, he still infers much into what
the text is “attempting” to convey.376 On the one hand, he is looking for the face
value meaning of the text, but what sifts this meaning from error is what is in
harmony with reason, that is, an extrabiblical source. It is this reliance on Cartesian
reason that leads him to affirm that the visions of Joseph were unreal and dependent
on an imaginative posture of the prophet.377 Because of the primitive aspects of the
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On the literalistic approach, Spinoza uses expressions such as “the
indisputable meaning of Scripture” to convey what the text is explicitly saying. Ibid.,
62. Another example of this: “Scripture does clearly indicate that God has a form,
and that when Moses heard God speaking, it befell him to see God, but to behold
only his back parts.” Ibid., 63.
375

An example of this is in Spinoza’s remarks concerning what the text is able
to convey. Spinoza writes: “Nor can the belief in historical narratives, however
certain, give us knowledge of God, nor, consequently, of the love of God. For the
love of God arises from the knowledge of God, a knowledge deriving from general
axioms that are certain and self-evident, and so belief in historical narratives is by no
means essential to the attainment of our supreme good.” Ibid., 105.
376

Even if Spinoza allows for the possibility of the occurrence of revelation,
this revelation was only for the prophet and had no universal validity. Spinoza
makes this point in the context of the experience of Job. Spinoza writes: “These
arguments were accommodated to Job’s understanding and propounded to convoke
377
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prophetic mind (which relied more on imagination than intellect), God had to reveal
himself through images and words, things that for Spinoza are in his time
unnecessary because of the light of reason.
This last point highlights Spinoza’s basic understanding of the God-human
relation. Spinoza writes: “With the exception of Christ, God’s revelations were
received only with the aid of the imaginative faculty, to wit, with the aid of words
and images.”378 With this in mind, he adds that “it was not a more perfect mind that
was needed for the gift of prophecy, but a more lively imaginative faculty.”379 In this
sense, the need for words and images is disposed of once intellect is purified, that is,
when it understands the ethical imperative. Because for Spinoza “God can
communicate with man without mediation [words or images],”380 that is,
communicating “his essence to our minds without employment of corporeal
means,”381 what results is access to God and reality that bypasses the need for biblical
words. In other words, while the interpreter might reach the meaning of a particular
biblical text, this meaning originated from a mind led by imagination, not intellect.
And since Spinoza’s reason emphasizes the role of the intellect in the life of the
individual, the words of Scripture (and their meaning) are of secondary importance

him alone. They are not arguments of universal validity to convince all men.” Ibid.,
86.
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to truth, which is found in philosophy.
By disconnecting Scripture from philosophy, Spinoza, then, supports an
analysis of the text itself in order to understand its authorial meaning. Yet the
method in which this study of the text operates is not different from any other
scientific method. Spinoza writes:
I hold that the method of interpreting Scripture is no different from the method of
interpreting Nature, and is in fact in complete accord with it. For the method of
interpreting Nature consists essentially in composing a detailed study of Nature
from which, as being the source of our assured data, we can deduce the
definitions of things of Nature.382
While Spinoza asserts that the object of biblical interpretation is the text itself, and
the method to interpret it is a scientific method, he opens the possibility for another
source of information to be added to the interpretation of Scripture as an object:
namely, history.
Spinoza holds that no other principles or data can be allowed in interpretation
except “those that can be gathered only from Scripture itself and from a historical
study of Scripture.”383 From this, one can notice that what Spinoza does is determine
the content or data for analysis (biblical text and historical reconstructions), and
establish the method to analyze the data to arrive at the authorial meaning: the
scientific, positivistic method.
In sum,384 Spinoza’s general approach to the text in order to arrive at the
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What I am summarizing here is Spinoza’s general approach to the text.
More details could be explored here, such as Spinoza’s approach to biblical
384
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authorial meaning follows the following pattern:
(1) Spinoza determines what meaning is, before looking for meaning. Since
there is no truth in the text, what one finds in the text is the authorial meaning, a
meaning that cannot be intermixed with philosophy. For Spinoza there is no
connection between the meaning of the text and philosophy. By separating the two,
Spinoza sets biblical studies on a subordinate level to philosophy, and makes it
subject to the dissecting work of historians. This is so because once there is no truth
in the text, and no bridge between text and reality, what is left for biblical studies is
the study of historical backgrounds to understand the formation, context, and
meaning of the text. In other words, if there is truth in the text, this truth relates to
how it was formed, its meaning to the original audience, and possible “ethical”
lessons for the present.
(2) Spinoza determines the methodological approach to evaluate the data. For
Spinoza, the method for looking at the text itself is like any scientific method. It
theoretically bypasses any intentional inference from the interpreter in order to arrive
at the objective “plain” meaning of the text. Spinoza writes: “Knowledge of all these
things—that is, of all the contents of Scripture—must be sought from Scripture alone,
just as knowledge of Nature must be sought from Nature itself.”385 The only problem
here is that Spinoza’s reliance upon reason and philosophy makes him fail in his own

contradictions (Ibid., 146). But to explore these details would lead this section away
from its main purpose—of evaluating the philosophical presuppositions that
influence Spinoza’s approach to the text.
385
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project.386
(3) Spinoza determines the data to be analyzed by the scientific method. For
Spinoza, the data is both the text and historical reconstructions. Scripture gives the
interpreter the textual content, but it does not provide an accurate historical account
of what took place (since it is conceived by imagination and not intellect). Historical
reconstructions, then, fill in the empty gaps in order for the interpreter to have a
better grasp of what indeed took place.
At this stage, it is imperative to consider how Spinoza’s approach relates to
the three dimensions of meaning (seen in the analysis of the historical-grammatical
method): content, form, and context. For Spinoza, the emphasis in biblical
interpretation is on textual content (ethical) that he establishes a priori via the light of
reason.387 That is, the meaning of the text is established beforehand. Since the text is
insufficient to give a clear account of history, Spinoza adds the dimension of history
as data for understanding the authorial meaning; this way, the context becomes just

Spinoza writes: “It is not permissible for us to manipulate Scripture’s
meaning to accord with our reason’s dictates and our preconceived opinions; all
knowledge of the Bible is to be sought from the Bible alone.” Ibid., 144. Spinoza
does exactly the opposite: he not only determines the meaning to be sought in the
text beforehand, but also is heavily influenced by Cartesian philosophy with its
emphasis on reason. Both of these points directly influence his analysis of the “Bible
alone.”
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This differs from the grammatical-historical method in the sense that for
historical grammarians, the content was not external to the text, but found within it.
For Spinoza, the content is the ethical, and it can be found in the text, but is
established a priori via philosophy and reason.
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as significant as the content.388 In relation to form, Spinoza values textual depictions
(metaphors, etc.) in biblical interpretation, but only when they can support his main
idea in particular: that the meaning is ethical and the rest is discarded as works of
imagination. Although important, the form is irrelevant to lead an interpreter into
truth.389 In a sense, form is significant only when it provides insight into the
imaginative writing of the prophets, a writing that must be “baptized” into reason,
creating a new being—“purified religion.”
Spinoza’s approach to the text establishes more than a biblical method
proper,390 but a mindset, an approach to the text that creates a dichotomy between
truth and meaning and between the words of man and the words of God.
Philosophical truth and the word of God lead to an ethical, peaceful, intellectual
existence, while the meaning of a text written with the words of man must be studied
not in order to reach truth, but in order to understand the imaginative product of a
religion of the past.391

Gignilliat supports this, since he also understands that for Spinoza, “the
search for the text’s meaning becomes equated with the search for the text’s
ostensive historical referent, setting, and immediate attention.” See Gignilliat, Brief
History, 16.
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Spinoza emphasizes this same point: “The point at issue is merely the
meaning of the texts, not their truth.” Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 143.
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Spinoza does call his method “the true method of Scriptural
interpretation.” Ibid., 154.
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It is this assertion that sets historical criticism at the center of biblical study.
When discussing miracles, Spinoza expresses this same idea: “To interpret Scriptural
miracles and to understand from their accounts how they really took place, one must
know the belief of those who originally related them and left us written records of
them, and one must distinguish between these beliefs and what could have been
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Now that the basic presuppositions in the work of Spinoza are laid out, I will
address the principle of history. Spinoza created the context for historical critics to
take center stage in biblical studies. Spinoza utilizes history in interpretation not by
resorting to ANE literature, but by uncovering the internal inconsistencies within the
biblical text marked by temporal development.392 So, in order to see how these ideas
became implemented in biblical interpretation through the avenue of history, I will
resort to another representative author in the formation of historical criticism: Julius
Wellhausen.
Wellhausen
Introduction
Like the work of Spinoza, the work of Wellhausen (1844–1918)393 is not

presented to their senses.” Ibid., 135. The same principle can be applied to the
entirety of the OT: to understand the imaginative work of the prophets, as well as
their worldview, one must go to the historical setting around them. The reliability of
the text is thus exchanged with the reliability of history.
See particularly chapters 8–10 in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. From this
internal analysis (as opposed to external analysis based on ANE sources), Spinoza
concludes in relation to the Pentateuch that “it is clear beyond a shadow of doubt
that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses, but by someone who lived many
generations after Moses.” Ibid., 165.
392

For more on the life and work of Wellhausen, see John H. Hayes,
“Wellhausen as a Historian of Israel,” Semeia 25 (1982): 37–60; Ernest W.
Nicholson, The Pentateuch in the Twentieth Century: The Legacy of Julius Wellhausen
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1998); and Douglas A. Knight, foreword to Prolegomena to the
History of Israel, by Julius Wellhausen (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994), v–xvi.
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independent from previous influences and ideas.394 Even so, Wellhausen is
distinguished from his contemporaries by “his clarity and the broad scope of his
project, namely, a new conception of Israel’s history.”395 As mentioned earlier,
Spinoza prepared the context for the role of the historian to become central in
biblical interpretation.396 Spinoza’s rational approach created the necessity for
historical analysis to uncover what truly happened behind the unreliable biblical text
filled with contradictions and myth. The contribution of Wellhausen in this context
“was his use of literary or source criticism as a means to reconstruct Israel’s
history.”397 While Spinoza questioned the historical reliability of the text through an

Gignilliat correctly assesses that “Wellhausen was not the first to notice
sources in the Pentateuch,” since these ideas began to be developed “over a century
before Wellhausen with the work of Jean Astruc (1684–1766) and Richard Simon
(1638–1712).” Gignilliat adds: “Neither was Wellhausen the first to suggest that the
prophets of Israel came before the law of Moses. Graf suggested this seminal idea
and Wellhausen seized the notion when he first heard it.” In Gignilliat, Brief History,
57. For a critique of these basic assumptions see Gerhard Maier, The End of the
Historical-Critical Method, trans. Edwin W. Leverenz and Rudolph F. Norden (St.
Louis, MO: Concordia, 1977).
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Wellhausen himself recognizes the influence of Spinoza in his work. See
Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 6.
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Gignilliat, Brief History, 62. Even so, source criticism itself “originated well
before Wellhausen,” since as “early as 1711, the German pastor Henning Bernhard
Witter, noting the differences in style and content and an alternation between Divine
names in Genesis 1–3, posited separate pre-Mosaic sources to explain them.” See
Knight, “Foreword,” ix. The difference in the work of Wellhausen is his critique of
the already established JEDP sources and development of a new way to organize the
sources behind the formation of the text and consequently Israel’s history. Since this
study is not aimed at validating or disproving these source-critical concepts, this
introduction to the issue will suffice. For more on this particular topic see Umberto
Cassuto, The Documentary Hypothesis and the Composition of the Pentateuch (Jerusalem:
Shalem, 2008).
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internal evaluation of the text, Wellhausen approached the text with the same
rational import and with the goal to reconstruct the history of Israel: that is, to
reconstruct the historical process that led to the formation of the text.398
This section will briefly probe Wellhausen’s understanding of history in order
to uncover the basic assumptions and philosophical presuppositions (as they relate to
the principle of history) of his project.

The Principle of History
As mentioned earlier, Ernesti attempted to understand Israelite history
through the text itself as it is presented to the reader, and the historical-grammatical
method was established to understand history through the text. The first difference
between the historical-grammatical method and the work of Wellhausen does not
involve the uncovering of history through the text itself, since both Ernesti and
Wellhausen go to the text for information, but rather the influence of reason and
Cartesian doubt upon the evaluation of the text and the objective of that evaluation.
While Ernesti understood Israelite history through what the text says (the
grammatical is the historical), Wellhausen reconstructed Israelite history, following
Spinoza, through inconsistencies within the text (the grammatical
inconsistencies/variations point to the historical).399 In other words, “Wellhausen

Wellhausen’s thesis was related to “whether that law [the law of Moses] is
the starting-point for the history of ancient Israel, or not rather for that of Judaism.”
398

An example of this tendency in Wellhausen’s work, seen in his discussion
of the Mosaic law: “We have no express information as to the author and date of
composition, and to get even approximately at the truth we are shut up to the use of
399
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reconstructed the totality of Israel’s history by means of analyzing the strata of her
literary sources.”400 Commenting on the place of the formerly called Elohistic
document, Wellhausen writes that this section in the Pentateuch is “historical only in
form; the history serves merely as a framework on which to arrange the legislative
material, or a mask to disguise it.”401 In other words, the history the text depicts is, to
some extent, made up, and needs to be critically evaluated by reason.
With this general movement in mind, it is evident that the emphasis of
historical criticism through the work of Wellhausen is not on the textual meaning
itself (at least at first), but on the history behind the text (historical process) that
inevitably formed the text.402 Once the Israelite background is reconstructed, the
meaning of the text can be understood. The focus is on the sources that formed the
text. These are windows into not only the historical processes that formed the text,
but the meaning of the text itself.
The basic assumption behind Wellhausen’s project is the idea, already

such data as can be derived from an analysis of the contents, taken in conjunction
with what we may happen to known from other sources as to the course of Israel’s
history.” Ibid., 2.
Gignilliat, Brief History, 66. Wellhausen’s credibility, though, is almost
questioned when he writes: “I learned through Ritschl that Karl Heinrich Graf
placed the Law later than the prophets, and, almost without knowing his reasons for
the hypothesis, I was prepared to accept it.” See Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 3.
400
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Ibid., 7.

Knight agrees, since for him “Wellhausen did not conduct source criticism
for its own sake, nor merely to the end of understanding the literature. For him, the
value of such examinations resided in their historiographical usefulness.” See
Knight, “Foreword,” xi.
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anticipated in Spinoza’s work in relation to philosophical categories, that the biblical
text does not give the reader a proper historical account of the historical process
behind the formation of the text. On this, W. Robertson Smith writes in the preface
to Wellhausen’s major work Prolegomena to the History of Israel that the “Old
Testament does not furnish a history of Israel, though it supplies the materials from
which such a history can be reconstructed.”403
As it pertains to the text, the object of interest in the work of Wellhausen and
historians after him is the historical tendenz of the writer: that is, the writer’s context,
situation, life, and worldview. Once this is reconstructed from a critical evaluation of
the text searching for the possible sources that shaped its formation, the history of
Israel can be understood as well as the meaning of the text. Again, the idea here is
that truth and reality are not presented by the text or found within the text, but are
found, with the aid of internal textual pointers, in the formation of the text itself. As
for the nature of this “truth,” it is not moral, spiritual, or universal truth, but the
arrival of a clear picture of the historical process behind the text.
At work in this approach to the text are, at least, the following philosophical
presuppositions: (1) as it pertains to epistemology, the Cartesian principle of doubt
along with its reliance and dependence on human reason (what is presented in the
text cannot be accepted at face value); (2) as it pertains to ontology, a timeless
conception of Being that inevitably creates a dichotomy between text and reality, as

W. Robertson Smith, preface to Prolegomena to the History of Israel, by Julius
Wellhausen (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994), vii.
403
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well as the need for a historical-scientific evaluation of the text. In this sense, the
interpreted historical principle within the structure of historical criticism is inevitably
tied to specific philosophical commitments. It is not a neutral methodology: its
structure, implementation, and results flow from these pre-established concepts.
Although Wellhausen’s contribution affected the flow of biblical studies for
more than a century after him, the discipline has grown and developed several
different critical approaches and tasks. Knight is correct is assessing that exegesis “is
now unthinkable without form criticism, tradition criticism, and ‘new’ literary
criticism,”404 among other exegetical disciplines that have emerged since Wellhausen.
Even so, the task of this section was to evaluate how extrabiblical philosophical
presuppositions are present within the very fabric of historical criticism. In the end it
is not only a matter of the text having a “historical meaning,” but a historical
meaning without any philosophical weight, and consequently, no import to the
reality of the reader (apart from a moral/ethical dimension as advocated by Spinoza,
or literary aesthetic features uncovered by narratology and reader-oriented
approaches).405
Summary
The evaluation of the historical-grammatical method was divided into two
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For a more sensitive use of the historical-critical method (one that uses
Ernst Troetsch’s principles of criticism, analogy, and correlation, but adds the
element of “hearing” to foster dialogue and sensitivity), see Stuhlmacher, Historical
Criticism.
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main sections. The first dealt with the principle of history (as well as text and
meaning), and the second with the principle of ontology.
The first section pointed out how in the formative periods of the method, and
under the work of Ernesti, the grammatical method developed under an extrabiblical
approach, namely, philology. No role was given to the reader apart from the rigorous
application of the philological approach. This indicates that the mindset of the time
followed classical epistemology, where the subject is passive in the generation of
meaning. Although Ernesti understood the grammatical method as one interpretative
action, that is, the grammatical is the historical, interpreters after Ernesti understood
the method as two interpretative actions, a grammatical as well as a historical. What
this implies is that, over time, the influence of historical criticism grew and immersed
itself in a grammatical approach that was volatile enough to incorporate any
presupposition into its application.
The second section dealt with the principle of ontology in the context of some
features of the grammatical and pre-critical approach to the text, namely, figuration,
typology, and conceptions of time, as well as the question of the influence of
Augustine in the relation of text and truth. Because the words of the text (verba) were
signs pointing to a truth or reality within the text (res), in the end, the words
themselves were disposable. Regardless of how the grammatical method is used, this
interpretative context created by Platonic categories of reality remains.
The explicit use of philosophical presuppositions within historical criticism
began with the work of Spinoza. As mentioned earlier, what Spinoza established was
broader than an interpretative method proper: it was a set of a priori conditions
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under which the historical-critical method would function in the following centuries.
These conditions are as follows: (1) the primacy of reason (as primary source) over
the biblical text, ruling out by default any supernatural elements such as divine
voices, miracles, and theophanies, as well as any connection between textual
depictions of reality and reality itself406; (2) the dichotomy between Scripture (ethical
piety) and philosophy (truth); (3) the dichotomy between the words of man (subject
to imagination) and the word of God (conceived as the ethical content that passes the
validation of reason); (4) the general idea that the text and its history are a wrapping
around the ethical essence, or content.407
With these main ideas established, historical criticism had an open path
ahead. Through the years, scholars developed more ways to question the credibility
of the text as it relates both to philosophy and history. Julius Wellhausen appeared in
the nineteenth century, articulating well how these presuppositions directly affected
how a historian viewed and used the text.
Wellhausen and Spinoza advocate that the presuppositions given to the
reader by the text are false and must be corrected by reason through different means.
Yet what if the presuppositions of the writers of the Bible—in relation to both history

But, as mentioned earlier, with the exception of the “real voice of God”
sounding from Sinai. As for textual connections to reality, I mean the possibility of
the text presenting macro-hermeneutical principles that would engage common
philosophical notions. This study proposes that the text carries an inherent macrohermeneutical or philosophical perspective that might aid not only how the
interpreter views the reality or worldview of the biblical author/audience, but how
the interpreter understands the notions of God, humanity, history, etc.
406
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and philosophy—are correct? What would biblical interpretation look like if the
original historical-critical approach to the text was rejected? These questions build a
bridge to numerous possibilities hidden within the text. At this stage, it is time to
cross the bridge to the other side, to look at the text and see how it understands the
God-human relation, and to notice how extrabiblical assumptions influence the
interpretation of the text.

For other representative figures in biblical studies, such as Peter Enns and
James Barr, who make this same assumption, see Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 29–34.
407
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CHAPTER 4
THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF EXODUS

Introduction
Now that a general exposition of the philosophical presuppositions relating to
the God-human relationship within the presuppositional framework of thinkers and
methods has been presented, I will move to the effects of such presuppositions upon
the interpretation of the God-human relation in Exodus. This movement from self
and method to the biblical text is necessary if one is to attest the influence of
extrabiblical presuppositions in interpretation. In order to provide a basis for this
evaluation, I will focus on the text of Exodus by way of its literary structure. From
the literary structure of the book of Exodus, I will be able to perceive how the text
points to its own understanding of God’s relation to humanity as well as how
scholars understand and interpret these conceptions.
In order to accomplish these goals, this chapter will be divided into three
main sections. The first will provide a brief literature review of how biblical scholars
have interpreted the literary structure of Exodus; the second will provide a short
presentation of the macro-structure of the book of Exodus, introducing its main
themes and flow; and the third will outline how the extrabiblical conceptions of the
God-human relation noted so far affect the interpretation of the God-human relation
presented by Exodus.
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This final section will be organized in two parts. The first part consists of
textual notes addressing the issues that emerge from the text relating to the Godhuman relation by means of the literary structure of Exodus. The second part
consists of God-human relation notes, that is, notes on how scholars perceive and
interpret the issues the text raises concerning the God-human relation.

Review of Literature
As observed in previous chapters, the interpretation of the book of Exodus—
like any other book within the Torah—has been severely influenced by the
documentary hypothesis.408 Discussions relating to the literary structure of Exodus
normally form the backdrop for more detailed developments and theories concerning
the sources scholars assert to be present within the book. As Umberto Cassuto
correctly observes in his evaluation of the history of interpretation of Exodus, “the

From the publishing of Brevard S. Childs's The Book of Exodus to newer
commentaries such as Thomas B. Dozeman’s Exodus, the majority of studies on
Exodus follow the general tenets of the documentary hypothesis. Differences in
opinion are common, yet these take place within the parameters set forth by the
documentary hypothesis. For a brief review of how scholars understand the
composition of Exodus, see Duane A. Garrett, A Commentary on Exodus, Kregel
Exegetical Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Academic, 2014), 15–20. Garrett is
among the few who reject the documentary hypothesis as a framework to understand
the contents of Exodus, and concludes that “continually flogging the dead horse of
the documentary hypothesis is pointless.” Ibid., 20. For more on his position on the
documentary hypothesis, see Duane A. Garrett, Rethinking Genesis: The Source and
Authorship of the First Book of the Pentateuch (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1991). For at
least three others who question the authority of the documentary hypothesis as a
framework to understand the Torah, see Cassuto, Documentary Hypothesis; Isaac M.
Kikawada and Arthur Quinn, Before Abraham Was: The Unity of Genesis 1–11
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1985); and in the context of the book of Exodus, Douglas
K. Stewart, Exodus (Nashville, TN: B&H, 2006), 29–34.
408
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study of sources takes precedence over that of the book as we have it.”409 As a result
of this tendency—based on extrabiblical philosophical conceptions—investigation of
any intentional literary structure of the book as a whole is rarely entertained.
The general mindset within current biblical scholarship is that “the tasks of
the biblical critic are purely excavative and thus irrelevant to constructive
projects.”410 Even an analysis of the structure of the book is required to follow the
tutelage of the different sources scholars identify within the text.411 Thus, because the
text is made up of different sources possessing different worldviews,412 the possibility
of a unified conception of how God relates to humanity in the book as a whole along
with any proposal of a macro-structure of the book is overlooked by scholars in
general.413 As a result, any theological or philosophical proposal that considers the
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See, for instance, George W. Coats, Exodus 1–18, Forms of the Old
Testament Literature IIA (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 3–8.
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One of the primary sources in the development of the book of Exodus for
source-critical scholars is the Priestly or P source. For more on the particular
perspective of the world according to the P source, see Philip Peter Jenson, Graded
Holiness: A Key to the Priestly Conception of the World, JSOT Supplement Series 106
(Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1992).
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Hazony agrees with this assessment as he writes: “In light of this picture of
a corrupt and fragmented Bible, the idea that the biblical texts could be capable of
advancing a consistent view on any subject has come to seem far-fetched in the eyes
of many scholars.” Hazony, Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, 19. Because of the
traditional perspective of a fragmented text, “the ideas that find expression in the
Bible—the metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy, of the
biblical authors—have all too often eluded the interest of academic scholars of [the]
Bible.” Ibid., 19.
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book as a whole is considered not only naïve, but impossible.414
Due to the issues outlined above, scholars—whether they follow the sourcecritical orientation or not—generally organize the final form of the book either by its
evident geographical markers (e.g., Egypt—Wilderness or Egypt—Wilderness—
Sinai) or by theological subheadings (e.g., Redemption—Covenant/Law—
Tabernacle).415 From these two general choices, then, at least four ways to organize
the contents of Exodus can be perceived in the majority of the studies on Exodus: (1)
two-part or “bifid” structures; (2) three-part or “tripartite” structures; (3) four-part
structures; and finally (4) multi-part structures.416 Below are some representative

Traditionally, critical scholars understand that the book of Exodus carries
three distinct traditions: Yahwist (J), Elohist (E), and Priestly (P). For more on the
different sources assigned to Exodus, see Thomas B. Dozeman, Exodus, Eerdmans
Critical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 31–43. In recent years,
some of these conceptions have been challenged, since for some the source-critical
assessment of at least Exodus 19–24 has “proved less than satisfactory.” See T. D.
Alexander, “The Composition of the Sinai Narrative in Exodus XIX 1–XXIV 11,”
Vetus Testamentum 49, no. 1 (1999): 2. In this study, the authorship of the text is
secondary to the evaluation of the philosophical presuppositions found within the
text regarding the God-human relation. That being said, approaching the text as it is,
I will suspend the assumption that the text has several sources as well as the
assumption that it has a single author.
414

At least one problem that stems from these descriptive headings must be
highlighted here. While these literary structures of the book—that assume a
descriptive geographical or theological reduction—serve as an organizing scheme of
its contents, they do not provide any inner reasoning as to why the structure takes
that particular form in the text, nor do they present any textual support to show
authorial intentionality (even if this intentionality would come from a final redactor).
They are just descriptive schemes deprived of any depiction of authorial or editorial
intention that would give sense both to the scheme itself and to the book as a whole.
415

Multi-part structures are literary structures that organize the material of the
book into five or more sections. Brevard Childs’s commentary on Exodus, for
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examples of those who organize the book around these different structures.417
Two-Part Structures
a. Benno Jaco simply divides the book into a “first half” (Exod 1–19) and
“second half” (Exod 20–40).418
b. William H. Propp divides the book by the following theological themes:
“double revelations to Moses and Israel” (Exod 1–15) and “double covenant” (Exod
16–40).419 Peter Enns follows the same textual markers, but with a more geographical
justification for his structure: “departure from Egypt” (Exod 1–15) and “journey and
arrival at Sinai” (Exod 16–40).420
c. Carl F. Keil and Franz Delitzsch divide the book within the theological
scheme of “liberation” (Exod 1–15:21) and “adoption of Israel as the people of God”
(Exod 15:22–40).421 Thomas B. Dozeman follows the same textual division, but
under the two theological themes of “divine power” (Exod 1–15:21) and “divine

instance, presents an outline of twenty-four sections. See Brevard S. Childs, The Book
of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974).
I am deeply indebted to the research of Richard M. Davidson on the way
scholars perceive the literary structures of Exodus in this section.
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presence” (Exod 15:22–40).422 Willem H. Gispen also divides the book with the same
textual markers, and is among those who combine geographical descriptions with
theological themes in his bifid structure: “Departure from Egypt” (Exod 1–15:21)
and “Covenant” (Exod 15:22–40).423 Mark S. Smith follows the same textual
markers, but with geographical subheadings: “Egypt” (Exod 1–15:21) and “Sinai”
(Exod 15:22–40).424
d. Carol Meyers proposes at least two bifid structures to organize the material
of Exodus. The first is through the descriptive-theological themes of “slavery to
freedom” (Exod 1–15) and “Sinai experience” (Exod 16–40); the second, through the
geographical markers of “Midian-Jethro frame” (Exod 1–18) and “theophany at
Sinai” (Exod 19–40).425 Paul Wright shares the textual markers of Meyer’s second
scheme, following theological concepts such as “Israel’s redemption and
preservation” (Exod 1–18) and “Israel’s ratification of the covenant/law and
preparation for worship at Sinai (Exod 19–40).”426
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Three-Part Structures
a. Umberto Cassuto organizes the book around the following descriptive
scheme: “bondage and liberation” (Exod 1–17), “Torah and precepts” (Exod 18–24),
“tabernacle and services” (Exod 25–40).427
b. John Durham divides the book into three geographical points: “Egypt”
(Exod 1–13:16), “wilderness” (Exod 13:17–18:27), and “Sinai” (Exod 19:1–40).428
c. Walter C. Kaiser Jr. divides his tripartite structure into three theological
headings pointing to three main divine actions: “divine redemption” (Exod 1–18),
“divine morality” (Exod 19–24), and “divine worship” (Exod 25–40).429 Tremper
Longman follows the same textual markers and a similar theological descriptive
scheme: “God saves Israel from Egyptian bondage” (Exod 1–18), “God gives Israel
His law” (Exod 19–24), and “God commands Israel to build the tabernacle” (Exod
25–40).430
Four-Part Structures
a. Nahum Sarna simply divides the book into four parts: Exod 1–15:21;
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15:22–18; 19–24; and 25–40.431 David Dorsey also divides the book into four
sections, but in the following way: Exod 1–6:13; 6:14–13:16; 13:17–19:2; 19:3–40.432
b. R. Alan Cole provides a mixture of geographical and theologicaldescriptive in his reading of the literary structure of Exodus: “Egypt” (Exod 1–
11:10), “exodus to Sinai” (Exod 12–18), “covenant and law” (Exod 19–31), and
“rebellion and revival” (Exod 32–40).433
c. Gerald Janzen organizes the content of the book around four parts and two
main themes: covenant and presence. His structure is laid out in the following way:
“Oppression, redemption, covenant” (Exod 1–24); “Planning a place for presence”
(Exod 25–31); “Sin, redemption, covenant” (Exod 32–34); and “preparing a place for
presence” (Exod 35–40).434
Multi-Part Structures
a. J. P. Fokkelman organizes the book of Exodus into five different sections:
Exod 1:1–6:27; 6:28–15:21; 15:22–18:27; 19–31; 32–40.435 Claus Westermann also
divides the book into five sections, which highlight divine action and human
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response: “God’s Saving Act: Deliverance out of Distress” (Exod 1–14); “Man’s
Response in Praise” (Exod 15:1-21); “God’s Action: Preservation” (Exod 15:22–
18:27); “Man’s Response in Obedience” (Exod 19–31); “Transgression and
Renewal” (Exod 32–40).436
b. James Bruckner outlines the book in six separate parts under descriptive
geographical and theological terms: “Exodus” (Exod 1–14); “Journey to Sinai”
(Exod 15–18); “Decalogue and Book of the Covenant” (Exod 19–24); “Tabernacle
Plans” (Exod 25–31); “Golden Calf” (Exod 32–34); and “Tabernacle Constructed”
(Exod 35–40).437 Ross Blackburn also uses a six-part division of Exodus in his
structure of the book and organizes the contents similarly to Bruckner:
“Redemption” (Exod 1–15); “Wilderness” (Exod 16–18); “Law” (Exod 19–24);
“Tabernacle Instruction” (Exod 25–31); “Golden Calf” (35–40); and “Tabernacle
Constructed” (Exod 35–40).438
c. Duane A. Garrett organizes the book into seven main sections in the
following manner: “Until Moses” (Exod 1:1–2:10); “Unlikely Savior” (Exod 2:11–
7:7); “The Twelve Miracles of the Exodus” (Exod 7:8–15:21); “The Journey to God”
(Exod 15:22–19:25); “The Sinai Covenant” (Exod 20:1–24:11); “The Worship of
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God” (Exod 24:12–31:18); “Sin and Restoration” (Exod 32:1–40:38).439
d. Terence E. Fretheim provides a detailed structure of the book in nine main
sections. Like his predecessors, he organizes them based on descriptive geographical
and theological themes: “Growth and Bondage in Egypt” (Exod 1–2); “Moses and
God: Call and Dialogue” (Exod 3:1–7:7); “The Plagues” (Exod 7:8–11:10); “From
Passover to Praise” (Exod 12:1–15:21); “The Wilderness Wanderings” (Exod 15:22–
18:27); “Law and Covenant” (Exod 19:1–24:18); “The Plan for the Tabernacle”
(Exod 25:1–31:18); “The Fall and Restoration of Israel” (Exod 32:1–34:35); “God
Fills the Tabernacle” (Exod 35:1–40:38).440
e. John Sailhamer organizes the contents of Exodus into ten descriptive
theological themes: “The Oppression of the Israelites” (Exod 1:1-22); “The
Preparation of a Deliverer” (Exod 2:1-25); “The Call of Moses” (Exod 3:1–4:31);
“The Deliverance from Egypt” (Exod 5:1–15:21); “Wilderness Wanderings” (Exod
15:22–18:27); “The Covenant at Sinai” (Exod 19:1–24:18); “The Tabernacle” (Exod
25:1–31:18); “The Golden Calf” (Exod 32:1-35); “The Restoration of Israel” (Exod
33:1–34:35); “The Construction of the Tabernacle” (Exod 35:1–40:38).441
f. Victor Hamilton presents a compact fifteen-part structure that covers the
main scenes within the book under one heading: “Oppression” (Exod 1–2:25);
“Trepidation” (Exod 3:1–4:31); “Rejection” (Exod 5:1-23); “Reaffirmation” (Exod
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6:1-30); “Confrontation” (Exod 7:1–12:30); “Liberation” (Exod 12:31–14:31);
“Celebration” (Exod 15:1-21); “Itineration” (Exod 15:22–17:15); “Administration”
(Exod 18:1-27); “Legislation” (Exod 19:1–24:18); “Specifications” (Exod 25:1–
31:18); “Deviation” (Exod 32:1–33:23); “Reconciliation” (Exod 34:1-35);
“Construction” (Exod 35:1–40:33); “Glorification” (Exod 40:34-38).442
Now that an overview of the ways in which scholars organize the contents of
Exodus has been presented, I will introduce what I perceive to be the macro-structure
of Exodus as it presents itself to the reader: namely, a parallel-panel structure.443 This
structure is not conditioned by the extrabiblical conceptions ingrained in the critical
methodologies mentioned above, as it assumes and functions upon the intentional
organization of the text in its final form as it presents itself to the reader.
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The organization of the literary structure to be presented here followed the
descriptive methodology outlined in the introduction to this study. The structure
does not provide the reader with an exhaustive assessment of the God-human
relation in Exodus (especially because much more is at stake in the book than just the
God-human relation). In this study, the structure provides a textual basis upon which
the issues relating to the God-human relation within the book itself might be
identified and addressed. The reader is not obligated to accept the validity of the
structure in order to understand the issues that the book is presenting.
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The Parallel-Panel Structure of Exodus: An Introduction444
The general division of the panel structure follows the hypothesis that the
book of Exodus emphasizes the experience of Moses on one side, and the Israelites
on the other.445 Like many other leaders in the Hebrew Bible, Moses must go through
that which the people will eventually go through. Both Moses and Israel are rescued
from the water; both Moses and Israel are led out into the wilderness and meet God
at Sinai. A second theme that emerges from the general division of the panel

The ideas to be proposed here were perceived and developed in
community. I am deeply indebted to the insights and support of Christian Vogel and
Richard M. Davidson in this section. Christian Vogel noticed the possibility that the
macro-structure of Exodus was fashioned in a parallel-panel structure. Vogel
proposed that this parallel-panel structure sets out to—among other things—show
the similarities and differences between the life of Moses and the life of the Israelites,
as well as the physical Exodus from Egypt and the spiritual Exodus from sin. With
these basic ideas in place and an initial outline, Richard M. Davidson pointed out
that if the author of the book intended to lay out the contents of the book in a
parallel-panel structure, the beginning and ending of the book should provide the
necessary pieces of information for its correct framing. Davidson asserted that the
book ends with the imagery of God’s presence in a cloud filling the tabernacle and
leading the people onward, and that the ending of Exodus 13 presents the same
imagery. This insight uncovered the starting and ending points of the parallel-panel
structure. In the process, Davidson also identified seven different micro-structures
within the book. With these initial insights and a rough outline of the possible
parallel-panel structure, I charted the contents of the book to find further textual
confirmations for these ideas and to reorganize the initial outline according to the
natural literary development of the book. What emerged from the text not only
confirmed the initial hypothesis of a parallel-panel structure functioning as the
macro-structure of the book, but uncovered significant theological insights that could
be useful in different areas. The results of this joint effort will be published in a
forthcoming article. This chapter will continue the work initiated in that article.
444

This idea has been perceived by other scholars as another theme that
emerges from the narrative of Exodus, but I have not found any scholar who noted
the development of the literary structure of the book based on this idea. Some
scholars who point out significant similarities between Moses and Israel that will
reappear in this chapter are Fretheim, Exodus, 41–46; Enns, Exodus, 83.
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structure is the relation between the physical Exodus from Egypt on one side and the
spiritual Exodus from sin on the other. In the lives of Moses and Israel, and in the
Exodus from Egypt and from sin, it is God who is in control; it is God who leads; it
is God's presence that guides. The presence of God provides the theological context
in which these themes are unfolded in the book. For Moses and Israel, in the Exodus
from Egypt and from sin, God's presence guides in different ways. With these main
themes shaping the flow of the book as a whole, the parallel-panel structure of
Exodus unfolds in seven stages or sections.446
The first section consists of A (Exod 1:11–2:15a) and A' (Exod 14:1–15:21),
and highlights both Israel's entrance into Egypt and subsequent oppression under an
unnamed Pharaoh and Israel's exodus out of Egypt and subsequent persecution by
another unnamed Pharaoh.
The second section consists of B (Exod 2:15b–25) and B' (Exod 15:22–18:27),
and includes both Moses' entrance into the wilderness after killing an Egyptian and
Israel's entrance into the wilderness after Egypt is destroyed.
The third section consists of C (Exod 3:1–4:31) and C' (Exod 19–24:11), and
emphasizes God's remembrance of the covenant as YHWH calls and commands
Moses and what is known as "the Book of the Covenant," which includes God's call

The parallel-panel structure of Exodus contains seven sections. There are
no textual markers that justify the transitions between these sections. Because of this,
I arranged the flow of the literary structure taking into consideration significant
turning points within the narrative. The sections are organized so that the reader can
understand the flow of the book in its different stages, which do contain lexical
connections.
446
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and commands to both Moses and the people.
The fourth section consists of D (Exod 5–7:2) and D' (Exod 24:12–32:30). D
comprises Pharaoh's building project without Shabbat, God's command to let his
people go, and Pharaoh's disobedience. D', on the other hand, shows God's
commands in relation to his own building project, which would include Shabbat, and
Israel's disobedience (through the episode of the golden calf).

Table 1. Seven sections of Exodus
Part I: God’s Presence with Israel in
Egypt: Deliverance from Egypt
(Exod 1–13)

Part II: God’s Presence with Israel in the
Wilderness and Mount Sinai: Deliverance
from Sin
(Exod 14–40)

A. Children of Israel Come to Egypt and
Are Oppressed by Pharaoh (1:1–2:15a)

A'. Children of Israel Depart from Egypt
and Are Delivered from Pharaoh (14:1–
15:21)

B. Moses Goes into the Wilderness (2:15b25)

B'. Israel Goes into the Wilderness (15:22–
18:27)

C. God Remembers His Covenant (3:1–
4:31)

C'. Book of the Covenant (19–24:11)

D. Pharaoh's Building Project without
Shabbat: God's Command and Pharaoh's
Disobedience (Part I) (5–7:2)

D'. God's Building Project with Shabbat:
God's Command and Israel's Disobedience
(Part I) (24:12–32:30)

E. Pharaoh's Building Project without
Shabbat: God's Command and Pharaoh's
Second Disobedience (Part II) (7:2-13)

E'. God's Building Project with Shabbat:
God's Command and People's Obedience
(Part II) (32:31–36:7)

F. De-Creation Through Plagues (which
include other commands in the context of
disobedience) and Preparation for
Deliverance from Egypt (7:14–12:32)

F'. Re-Creation Through Tabernacle (which
include other commands in the context of
obedience) and Preparation for Deliverance
from Sin (36:8–40:33)

G. God with People (12:33–13)

G'. God with People (40:34–38)

The fifth section consists of E (Exod 7:2-13) and E' (Exod 32:31–36:7). E
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includes God's second command to Pharaoh to let the people go and Pharaoh's
renewed disobedience; Pharaoh’s second refusal to liberate the people leads into the
ten plagues found in the next section. In E' Moses pleads for the people, new
commands are given with the intention to provide Israel with another chance to
obey, and it ends with Israel's eventual obedience to God's commands. This
acceptance of and obedience to the divine commands leads to the ten phases of the
sanctuary construction in the following section (Exod 36:8–39:43).
The sixth section consists of F (Exod 7:14–12:32) and F' (Exod 36:8–40:33). F
highlights the result of Pharaoh's disobedience: the de-creation of the earth through
the ten plagues. F' attempts to show the results of Israel's obedience to God's
commands, which lead to the re-creation of the world through the establishment of
the tabernacle (interestingly, in ten different stages).
The seventh and final section consists of G (Exod 12:33–13) and G' (Exod
40:34-38) and highlights the actual exodus from Egypt and the potential exodus from
sin marked by the consecration of the tabernacle through God's presence. This final
section ends, as mentioned earlier, with the imagery of the cloud, the fire, and God's
presence leading the people onward on both sides of the panel.
One of the features of the way the book presents itself is the imbalance
between the two sides of the panel. While one would expect a panel structure of a
book of forty chapters to be divided somewhere in the middle, the structure moves
from chapters 1–13 and then from 14–40. This does not show a lack of authorial
intentionality, but the opposite. At least two elements in this structural imbalance
can testify to the intentionality behind its weaving.
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The first insight from the imbalance is that while the deliverance of the people
from Egypt is a great divine act, God’s greatest challenge is not this physical
deliverance, but in reality, the spiritual deliverance of the people from sin.447 The
second part of the panel—God’s plan to deliver the people from their sin—takes up
the majority of the chapters. The plan of salvation established on the right side of the
panel through the construction of the sanctuary was not to be limited to the Israelites
in the wilderness, but was to be central to all the subsequent generations. The
sanctuary, from the book of Exodus onward, becomes the central divine plan of
salvation for all people. After all, a salvation plan that is given in the desert—that is,
the land of no one—should be accessible to everyone. The rest of the Hebrew Bible
testifies to this basic insight that can already be seen in the imbalance of the parallelpanel structure of Exodus.
The second insight that justifies this imbalance would be that while the left
side of the panel emphasizes, to some extent, the actions and experience of Moses,
the right side focuses on God’s provision for the people. As an example, on the left
side of the panel Moses provides deliverance and water for the daughters of Jethro,
while on the right side of the panel God does not limit himself to deliverance or the
provision of water, but also provides food, protection, and other signs of care for the
people. In other words, while Moses is the representative of God to deliver and lead
the people, he is only a shadow of the God of deliverance, who is leading the people

Hamilton correctly observes that if “the book of Exodus is about the
exodus event, then the book should be concluded by the end of chap. 14.” Hamilton,
Exodus, xxi.
447
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onward, showing even more care and goodness.448 God on the right side of the panel
is not only a better Pharaoh—he is a better Moses. Both of these insights tied
together allow the reader to grasp the significance of the imbalance within the panel
structure and the overall theological angle of the book as a whole.
Now that this basic overview of the literary structure of Exodus has been
presented, I will plunge into each of these sections to explore how the book presents
the God-human relation, and how scholars under the influence of extrabiblical
conceptions of the God-human relation interpret such dynamic.

The God-Human Relation in Exodus
This study will approach the biblical text to uncover its understanding of the
God-human relationship through a descriptive analysis of the literary structure of
Exodus, as already introduced in Chapter 1. From the literary structure of the book,
it may be possible to determine how the contents of the book were organized and
derive insights relating to how the divine-human relation is depicted in the book as a
whole. This presentation will serve as a basis to identify both the issues relating to
the God-human relation that emerge from the text and how scholars interpret them
under the influence of extrabiblical assumptions.449
As mentioned earlier, each of the seven sections of the literary structure will
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I am indebted to my colleague Christian Vogel for this crucial insight.

To provide a proper analysis of the God-human relation in the book as a
whole falls beyond the scope of this project. As I assess the scholarly interpretation of
the issues pertaining to the God-human relation in the text, I will provide a few notes
449
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be evaluated in two ways: first, I will provide textual notes that highlight the general
literary flow of the structure as it points to issues concerning the God-human relation
in the text; and second, I will provide notes on how the text depicts the God-human
relation in the context of how scholars understand and interpret these themes
through a different presuppositional framework.450 These two steps will show the
reader how extrabiblical philosophical presuppositions relating to the God-human
relation directly influence interpretations of the depiction of God’s relation to
humanity proposed by the text through its literary development.
Section I: A and A’ (Exodus 1:1–2:15a and 14:1–15:21)
Textual Notes
The first section, A (1:1–2:15a) and A’ (14:1–15:21), contains at least three
important developments: (1) the introduction of the book with Israel’s entrance into
Egypt as well as Israel’s departure from Egypt; (2) Pharaoh’s attempt to destroy
Israel through oppression and murder and a second attempt to destroy Israel by a
different Pharaoh in the Red Sea; (3) Moses’ and Israel’s deliverance out of water
and departure from Egypt. Each of these developments is evaluated below.

on how the text might provide insight for a proper theology/philosophy of God’s
relation to humanity.
Because this section covers the book of Exodus as a whole, the issues to be
selected in the text will be those that both are discussed by commentators and relate
to the question of the God-human relation. The presuppositions regarding the Godhuman relation will be seen in the backdrop of the textual depiction of the Godhuman relation. Also, I will not be able to present an exhaustive account of what has
been written concerning each issue, but I will provide an overview of the insights
seen in the main commentaries and books dealing with Exodus.
450
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Table 2. A and A’ textual notes
A. Children of Israel Come to Egypt and
Are Oppressed by Pharaoh (1:1–2:15a)

Aʹ. Children of Israel Depart from Egypt
and Are Delivered from Pharaoh (14:1–
15:21)

• Children of Israel come to Egypt (1:1-7)

• Children of Israel leave Egypt and come to
the Red Sea (14:1-2)

• Pharaoh tries to destroy Israel/Moses (1:8- • Pharaoh tries to destroy Israel (14:3-10)
22)
• Pharaoh Speech #1: “the children of Israel
will go up from the land” (1:9-10)

• Pharaoh will say: “the children of Israel are
wandering in the land” (14:3)

• Pharaoh Speech #2: “why have you done
this?” (1:15-19)

• Pharaoh and people: “why have we done
this?” (14:5)

• Pharaoh acts/Speech #3: “commanded all • Pharaoh acts: “he took his people” (14:6)
his people” (1:22)
• Moses is saved from water
- Moses is left “by the bank of the Nile”
(2:3)
- Moses cries out (2:6)
- Miriam questions Pharaoh’s daughter (2:7)
- Pharaoh’s daughter replies: go ahead
(2:8-9)
- Moses drawn out of the water (2:10)

• Israel is saved from water
- Israel is left “camping by the sea” (14:9)
- Israel cries out to the Lord (14:10)
- Israel questions Moses/God (14:11-12)
- God replies: go forward (14:15-18)
- Israel drawn out of the water (14:19-31)

• Moses sees the oppression of the Egyptians • Moses sees the approach of the Egyptians
and acts without divine aid (2:11-12)
and acts with divine aid (14:21, 26-27)
• Hebrews and Moses (do not recognize him • Israel and Moses (recognize him as
as authority—“prince or judge”) (2:13-14a) authority—“servant”) (14:31)
• Moses fears and flees (2:14b-15a)

• Israel believes and sings (14:31–15:21)

The first development in A introduces the book with a summary of the people
who entered Egypt with Jacob. The text adds a note about the death of Joseph and
the subsequent multiplication (ׁש ְרצ֛ ּו ַוי ְִּרבּ֥ ּו ַו ַי ַּֽ ַעצ ְ֖מּו ִּבמ ְֹ֣אד מ ְֹ֑אד
ְ ִּ  )פ ָּ֧רּו וַ ַּֽיof the people (cf. Exod
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1:7). In A’ the people turn to the sea in their departure from Egypt with a ע ֶּ֥רב ַ ֖רב
“mixed multitude” (cf. Exod 12:38). While on the one hand the people enter Egypt
and multiply in the shadow of the death of Joseph, on the other, the people are
depicted as accompanied by a mixed multitude who appear at the shadow of the
death of the firstborns, that is, a multitude formed immediately after the last plague.
Death leads to multiplication in both A and A’.
Each section is also marked by attacks upon Israel by Pharaoh. In both
sections, these attacks appear as reactions against two of the divine imperatives
found in Gen 1:28: multiplication and filling the earth. In A, once the people begin
multiplying in Egypt, a Pharaoh who does not know Joseph begins his plan to
control this growth through forced labor, murder at childbirth, and finally, open
genocide of infants. In A’ the threat of death appears as the people begin spreading
out of Egypt into the wilderness and Canaan.451 Several textual connections are
significant in this section. Three elements in three different speeches of Pharaoh in
the first chapter of Exodus are seen again in Exodus 14. These connections seen in
the following scene justify the relation between chapter 1 and 14 and the possibility
that the events within the book not only unfold, but are organized in a parallel-panel
manner.
In the second development in A, the first speech of Pharaoh (Exod 1:9-10)

This ties the literary developments in the events of Exodus to those of
Genesis. In Genesis 11 the people come together under a unified building project and
god intervenes. In Exodus, the people are forced to remain in Egypt to continue a
building project and God, once again, intervenes. The issue of the relation between
Genesis and Exodus will be further explored below.
451
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mentions the threat of the children of Israel ( )בְנֹ֣י יִּש ְָּר ֵ֔אלgoing up from the land ()הָּאָּ ֶַּֽרץ.
In the second speech (Exod 1:18), in response to the Hebrew midwives who did not
kill the Hebrew boys, Pharaoh asks: “Why ( ) ַמ ּ֥דּו ַעhave you done (יתן
ִּ  ) ֲעthis (”?) ַה ֶזֹ֑ה
ֶ֖ ש
The final speech (Exod 1:22) simply expresses Pharaoh’s final command to “all his
people” ()כָּל־ע ַ֖מו. In A’, these same elements are found in Pharaoh’s reasoning and
subsequent persecution of the people toward the Red Sea.
The first textual connection is seen in God’s command to Moses to take the
people toward the sea (Exod 14:3): “Pharaoh will say of the sons of Israel ()בְנֹ֣י יִּש ְָּר ֵ֔אל,
‘they are wandering aimlessly in the land ()ב ָּ ָֹּ֑א ֶרץ.’” The reasoning behind the second
attempt to annihilate the people follows the same rationale and textual elements as
those found in A: the people ( )בְנֹ֣י יִּש ְָּר ֵ֔אלand the land ()ב ָּ ָֹּ֑א ֶרץ. The second connection is
found in another question uttered by Pharaoh concerning the liberation of the people
from the land (Exod 14:5): “Why ( )מַהhave we done (שינּו
ִּ ֵ֔  ) ָּעthis ( ”?)זֹ֣אתThe question
led to the resolution of pursuing the Israelites, once again leading Pharaoh to take
“his people ( ”)עִּמ ַּֽוwith him in this new objective (Exod 14:6).
The third and final development in sections A and A’ presents more
similarities, and serves as an introductory example of how the story of Moses in A
foreshadows the story of Israel in A’. Both Moses and Israel are left “by” a body of
water: Moses by the “banks of the Nile” or  עַל־שְ פַ ּ֥ת ַהי ְאַּֽרand Israel “by the sea” or עַל־
( ַה ֵָּ֔יםExod 2:3, 14:9). Also, both Moses and Israel are rescued from the water (Exod
2:10, 14:19–31). The leader of Israel goes through that which the people will later
experience. Being left by water and rescued from it shows how the existence of
Moses and Israel depends upon divine action. These divine actions might appear
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through the actions of other people in A,452 or through God’s own visible deeds in A’.
This dependence upon the divine is not a theme exclusive to Exodus but runs
through the entire Hebrew Bible. This could point to the reason why the actions of
Moses in what follows in A could be seen as problematic (Exod 2:11-12). Moses sees
the oppression of the Egyptians and kills an Egyptian without any divine indication
for that to take place.453 Because of his actions, the Hebrews question Moses’ ability
to lead or act as their “prince” ()שר
ַׂ֤ or “judge” (( )שֹׁפֵ טExod 2:13-14a), leading Moses
to flee Egypt once his murder is discovered (Exod 2:14b-15). In A’, the text
demonstrates how Moses is still learning how to depend on God as the people go
through that which he went through in the past. Because Moses trusts God to deliver
the people from the Red Sea, the people recognize him as an authority (Exod 14:31).
Yet the authority Israel recognizes in Moses is not that of a prince, or a judge, but of
a servant () ֶעבֶד. Because of this obedience to YHWH’s instructions, both Moses and
Israel cross the Red Sea, and A’ presents the first major difference from A in adding
a large section of poetry known as the “Song of Moses.”

Moses’ rescue from the Nile is the third instance in which a woman serves
as a type of YHWH within the book of Exodus. The midwives of the Hebrews, as
well as Moses’ mother with Miriam, already appeared in the book. Each of these
women act in their contexts as God would later act in the book. The midwives of the
Hebrews save the Hebrew boys from injustice; Moses’ mother and Miriam preserve
life in the midst of oppression; and the daughter of Pharaoh rescues the child from
the water and cares for him.
452

Similarly, in Genesis 12, after Abraham accepts the imperative to leave his
family and land behind, he arrives at the “promised land” where famine has taken
over. Without any divine revelation, Abraham journeys to Egypt. Both in the
narrative of Abraham and in the second chapter of Exodus, the problem is not failing
453
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God-Human Relation Notes
Several notes illuminating the relation between the first section of the literary
structure of Exodus and conceptions of the God-human relation are in order. As
indicated earlier, this section will focus on how extrabiblical conceptions of the Godhuman relation influence the interpretation of the literary content of the Hebrew text.
Two particular issues that emerge from the first section of the literary structure of
Exodus will be analyzed: (1) the relation between Genesis and Exodus; (2) the
relation between the Hebrew text and history.
The relation between Genesis and Exodus
One of the first issues that arises in any commentary on Exodus is the relation
between the texts of Genesis and Exodus. Scholars are generally divided on the
understanding that Exodus is a separate literary unit from Genesis.454 Moshe
Greenberg comments on literary continuation between Genesis and Exodus:
The beginning and the end of the book indicate that it was designed as a distinct
to obey an explicit divine command—especially because there was no command in
both stories—but acting without waiting on God’s word.
For a summary of recent developments in the study of the relation between
Genesis and Exodus, see Dozeman, Exodus, 18–20; D. M. Carr, “Genesis in Relation
to the Moses Story. Diachronic and Synchronic Prespectives,” in André Wénin,
Studies in the Book of Genesis: Literature, Redaction and History (Leuven, Belgium:
Leuven University Press, 2001), 273–96; Thomas B. Dozeman, God at War: Power in
the Exodus Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 171–83. I would
agree with Sarna in his balanced position that “while the book [Exodus] is more or
less a self-contained literary unit, it is incomprehensible except as a sequel to the
Book of Genesis.” Nahum M. Sarna, Exploring Exodus: The Origins of Biblical Israel
(New York: Schocken, 1996), 5.
454

185

literary unit. Exodus 1:1 does not pick up where Gen 50:26 left off. The first
verses of Exodus recapitulate the main event of the last chapters of Genesis: the
descent of Jacob’s family to, and their settlement in, Egypt. Into the
recapitulation the true start of the new narrative has been interwoven (Exod 1:67). This manner of opening the narrative means that an author (or creative
redactor) regarded the events about to be narrated as making a sufficiently
important break with the past to merit a new start. He therefore provided them
with a prologue signifying a new literary unit.455
As noted by Jeffrey Tigay in the prologue to this same volume, Greenberg’s
reasoning in approaching the book of Exodus—like that of most scholars who
sustain a complete or partial disconnection between Genesis and Exodus—is deeply
influenced by the documentary hypothesis.456
By default, this conception does not consider the possibility that the Torah is
a single literary unit based on the evidence outlined in the second chapter of this
study. Such a reasoning not only would go against the seemingly intentional unity of
the book as a whole—as outlined by the literary structure above—but would also
exclude significant theological points that could help in uncovering the author’s
perception of the God-human relation.457 The thematic arrangement of the book

Moshe Greenberg, Understanding Exodus: A Holistic Commentary on Exodus
1–11, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), 2.
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Tigay writes that Greenberg’s contribution inevitably incorporates modern
scholarship, something that would “naturally include the results of biblical criticism,
particularly the Documentary Hypothesis.” Jeffrey H. Tigay, foreword to
Understanding Exodus: A Holistic Commentary on Exodus 1–11, by Moshe Greenberg, 2nd
ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), ix.
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One of the significant transitions in the parallel-panel structure of Exodus is
that the beginnings of sections A and A’ find conclusions in G and G’. A begins, as
noted earlier, with the people entering Egypt, while A’ begins with the people leaving
Egypt. In G, the people begin their journey into the wilderness under the leadership
of God through the cloud and the fire, and in G’ God continues leading the people
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favors the possibility of a unity, be it from one single author or from one or several
redactors who arranged the themes of the book in its final form with a unified vision.
Among these themes that portray unity—something mentioned in passing
above—is divine action. The difference between A and A’ is that while in A’ God is
visibly present and active in the physical deliverance of the people from Egypt, in A
God is seemingly active yet elusive. Traditionally scholars explain the differences by
way of critical tools, yet if the narrative is allowed to flow naturally, a richness of
meaning is uncovered. One could attest to the possibility that God is acting in
Exodus 1 by tracing the signs of blessing that stem from covenant faithfulness. The
description of the people multiplying and spreading out in the land—as noted by
other scholars—is filled with creation language.458 The multiplication of the people
implies that the principle of life stemming from humanity’s connection with the
divine imperative to procreate and inhabit the land is a reality in Exodus. Even so,
God is seemingly absent in A. The first mention of his name is at the end of chapter
1, with an explicit reference to God’s blessings upon the Hebrew midwives who
preferred to sustain life by risking their own. This absence is significant because it

onward with the cloud and fire. The beginning and the ending of the book are
intimately connected. Even so, Greenberg, sustaining the principles of the
documentary hypothesis, questions the possibility of such connections: “The book
thus has an epilogue marking its conclusion no less definitely than the prologue
marks its beginning.” Greenberg, Understanding Exodus, 2.
Victor P. Hamilton observes, for instance, that “the climax of Genesis 1 is
Exodus 1.” Hamilton, Exodus: An Exegetical Commentary, 5. Sailhamer writes that the
first chapter of Exodus “follows the prophetic word about Israel’s future given to
Abraham in Genesis 15:13.” Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 241.
458

187

connects the narrative of Exodus to the narrative that immediately precedes it, in the
book of Genesis.
The God of the patriarchs—contrary to the God depicted in the majority of
books on Christian doctrine—was not omnipresent, nor was he wholly absent,
“dwelling” in a timeless realm.459 The extrabiblical roots that lead to these
conceptions were outlined in the previous chapters. In the Hebrew Bible, YHWH
speaks to Abraham in Gen 18 concerning the fate of the inhabitants of Sodom and
Gomorrah. As soon as YHWH finishes speaking, the Hebrew text says “( יֹ֣לְֶך י ְה ֵ֔ ָּוהthe
Lord departed”; Gen 18:33). And this God, who speaks in particular and departs, is
promised to return before the book of Genesis ends. Twice Joseph mentions the
return of God to his people through the use of the verb “( פקדto visit”). Joseph at his
deathbed says, “I am about to die, but God will surely visit you and bring you up
from this land” (Genesis 50:24, 25) and in the following verse the promise is
reiterated when Joseph asks the sons of Israel to swear: “God will surely visit you.”
The book of Exodus begins in the shadow of this promise, in the void of
divine absence. When will the Lord visit his people? Why is he absent before the
rising oppression of the Egyptians? In the first section of the literary structure of
Exodus, the reader is confronted with two different Pharaohs attempting to thwart

Even some Exodus scholars are uncomfortable with the notion. Carol
Meyers, for instance, writes that “the idea of divine omnipresence is not entirely
convincing.” Meyers, Exodus, 134. And Baruch A. Levine writes: “Rarely does the
biblical spokesman, be he priest, prophet, or Psalmist, assume the omnipresence of
God.” Baruch A. Levine, “On the Presence of God in Biblical Religion,” Religion in
Antiquity, ed. J. Neusner (1968), 72.
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life. The first instance of death is found in the destruction of the infant boys in the
Nile; the second through the annihilation of the entire people in the Red Sea. A
battle between the forces of life and death serves as the introduction to the book. The
question of the visitation of YHWH left unanswered in Genesis is answered in Exod
3:16 when YHWH asks Moses to gather the elders of Israel and tell them: פ ָֹּ֤קד ָּפ ַַ֨קדְ תִּ י
“( אֶתְ ֵֶ֔כםI have surely visited you!”). God has seen what has been done, and now God
will act upon it.
The philosophical principles behind the documentary hypothesis prevent the
reader from seeing these significant literary and theological developments from one
book to the other, which directly influence a possible philosophical reading of God’s
actions in the book of Exodus.460 While scholars in the critical tradition of
interpretation assign different sources and agendas to different sections of the book—
shifting the unified perspective of God’s actions to several distinct perspectives—the
flow of the narrative provides the reader with a unified conception of the Godhuman relation with little room for conflicting agendas.
The relation between the Hebrew text and history
The issue of the relation between the Hebrew text and history was introduced
in the second chapter of this study. The historiography of the writer of Exodus is
conceived by scholars as either a truthful depiction of the events narrated in the

To develop an ontology of the God-human relation is beyond the scope of
this study. At this stage the focus is on how an extrabiblical conception of the Godhuman relation prevents the reader from seeing the principles that could lead to a
biblical portrayal of the God-human dynamic.
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book, or a historiography based on Hebrew faith that is truthful but not as it pertains
to the events themselves (Geschichte).461
Among the scholars who address the issue of the relation between the Hebrew
text and history is Nahum M. Sarna. Sarna’s evaluation of the historiography given
by the writer of Exodus is as follows:
If it [Exodus] has so profoundly affected peoples of widely different cultures, this
is hardly because the biblical narrative is a straightforward account of an
historical event; it is not. . . . It is a document of faith, not a dispassionate, secular
report of the freeing of an oppressed people. . . . Not the preservation and
recording of the past for its own sake but the culling of certain historic events for
didactic purposes is the intent.462
Sarna goes on to say that the various episodes the writer of Exodus narrates “project
Israelite concepts of God and of His relationship to the world; that is, they embody
the fundamental tenets and crucial elements of the religion of Israel and of its
worldview.”463
Sarna uses the theological expression “God’s relationship to the world” in his
commentary, but without reference to the reality to which it points: God’s actual
relation to the world. He speaks of God’s relationship to the world as depicted in the

For more on the different arguments regarding the problem of the
historicity of the book, see Douglas K. Stuart, Exodus, The New American
Commentary, Vol. 2 (Nashville, TN: B&H, 2006), 23–26; Durham, Exodus, xxivxxvi; J. Currid, Ancient Egypt and the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1997);
J. Hoffmeier, Israel in Egypt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Dozeman,
Exodus, 21–26.
461
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Sarna, Exodus, xii–xiii.

Ibid., xiii. For the sake of clarity, the expression “religion of Israel” here
implies a pre-scientific, primitive view of the world, and consequently, of God’s
relation to humanity.
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text, yet denies its factuality, since according to him this report from the writer of
Exodus is an account of faith, not an attestation of a real event. Ontological claims
such as “God chooses to enter into an eternally valid covenantal relationship with
His people”464 are written within the context of a historiography that is divested of its
relation to the events, and consequently, of the philosophical outlook of the biblical
writer who is presenting the reader with a description of the events.
This reality is attested when Sarna writes that “the biblical narratives are
essentially documents of faith, not records of the past.”465 And as documents of faith,
the biblical narratives have the function of communicating matters of faith “through
the forms of history.”466 This implies that the content of the biblical text is the
cultural creation and development of Hebrew faith expressed in historical language
and form. Again, the presupposition hidden in the distinction between faith and
history is that the content the text addresses cannot be determined by the text, but
must be supplied by modernistic philosophical principles that deny any agency of
God, at least as recorded by the text.
So far, I have mentioned how Sarna incorporates presuppositions concerning
the nature of history into his interpretation of Exodus. At this stage, it is important to
balance the discussion with a representation of scholars who are more moderate
when speaking of the historicity of Exodus, since they emphasize not the “Hebrew
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Sarna, Exploring Exodus, 7.
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faith” of the biblical author but the “historicity” of the book proper. Among these is
John I. Durham.
Durham writes:
What we cannot do, without more specific data than we have, however, is
provide historical confirmation for anything or anybody mentioned in the Book
of Exodus, . . . this is not of course to say that the events and persons referred by
Exodus are not historical, only that we have no historical proof of them.467
Durham adds that it “is far better to speak of the narrative of Exodus in History
rather than as history and to be content with the general historical context we can
have rather than longing for specific historical proof we cannot have.”468 Although
this is a more balanced approach to the accuracy of the historiography of Exodus, it
is still open to critical interpretation. In other words, this approach is open to the
possibility that until empirical or archaeological data is provided, Exodus is to be
understood as a “document of faith” in history rather than a description of faith as
history. The truthfulness of the text is not in the text, but external to it, in empirical
archaeological evidence.
In sum, this presupposition concerning the nature of history has significant
implications for biblical interpretation. A modernistic scientific approach to the
biblical text leads to the understanding that the biblical text serves the purpose of
portraying a primitive perspective of the God-human relationship, deprived of any
ontological significance when compared to modern philosophical or scientific
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conceptions of the same relationship.469
With these conceptions in mind, I will now outline how the Hebrew text
might address the issue of history and faith. Historical events in Exodus recur.470 The
literary structure is organized in a way that communicates meaning,471 but this
construed meaning is not independent from life, or the actual events. While the
author of Exodus has control over what he chooses to write about, he cannot control
the events themselves. In this sense, the writer of Exodus is not a mere recorder of
events, but a witness of recurrent events.
The parallel-panel structure narrates in A and A’ how Moses goes through the
very same things that Israel will eventually go through. This is not primarily a
literary device: it is the way in which the historical events unfold. In this sense, the
flow of history and God’s actions within it are theological. The recurrent events
happened before the author wrote about them. The author is not a historian in the
sense that he is organizing the events at a distance from them; he is a witness to the

John H. Walton has argued that Gen 1–2 was written “for us” but not “to
us.” See Walton, Lost World of Genesis, 9. In this way, Walton attempts to
accommodate what the text affirms to the scientific perspective of the time. He adds,
“Israel understood its God in reference to what others around them believed.” See
Walton, Lost World of Genesis, 13. Because Walton sustains a modernistic scientific
approach to the text, his reading of the text is affected by the conditions the approach
creates.
469

I will not call these repetitions typological at this stage. For more on the
issue of typology, see Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture: A Study of
Hermeneutical Typos Structures (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1981);
and Leithart, Deep Exegesis.
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development of historical events that are inherently theological. The story repeats
itself in the text because history repeated itself in reality. The author’s recording of
history implies a theological viewpoint, yet at the same time, the events unfolded
theologically.
Apart from the fact that in this sense historical events and their recording take
place in the realm of time and history, two additional elements can be noted. The
first is the possibility of interpreting history theologically. This is attested by the
promise of the visitation of God mentioned above. One looks toward the future,
toward the historical events to come theologically, that is, waiting for the promise of
God to be fulfilled. The second element is the possibility that within a divine
promise, with its inherent anticipation of future events, history is still open. God
does not determine actual events—which would eliminate human freedom and
choice—but only his actions. What the text portrays is the dynamic of God in
freedom and history with man in freedom and history, acting and interacting toward
the fulfillment of the promises of God within an open conception of history.
The literary structure highlights changes of events. Sometimes an event in A
or A’ has no counterpart on the other side. For example, in A Moses flees to the
desert in silence after killing an Egyptian, acting without divine aid, and the story
moves into the scene in Midian and a problem with water. In A’, because Moses and
the people trust in God, before they are led into the desert the text diverts to chapter

There were certainly more historical events than those recorded in the
book. I do not believe that the author provides a window into everything that
happened. History writing implies selectivity.
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15, with the “Song of Moses.” This change in the flow of the book highlights how
history is not closed. There is no counterpart to the “Song of Moses” in A.
If indeed history was determined, the structure of Exodus would reflect an
unreal organization of events in perfect parallel to each other. Yet the text portrays
the fact that humanity can freely interact with God in a historical flow that is open to
change based on free will and action, and this affects the very structure of the book.
God determines his actions; he promises; he saves; he visits. And at the same time,
humanity is free to act in the flow of history and within the determined acts of God
for their salvation. This will not be the first time that the relation between God and
man in freedom and history is central to the development of the narrative.
Section II: B and B’ (Exodus 2:15b-25 and 15:22–18:27)
Textual Notes
The second section in the literary structure of Exodus, B (2:15b-25) and B’
(15:22–18:27), contains two important scenes: (1) Moses and Israel in the wilderness,
the imagery of water, and additional signs of divine care for Israel; and (2) Moses’
family. The comparison between the experiences of Moses and Israel continues from
A and A’ into B and B’. The number of similarities between B and B’ here is beyond
mere coincidence.472

While some could assign the same source to these similar sections,
frequently scholars assign different sources to sections that are seemingly parallel to
each other.
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Table 3. B and B’ textual notes
B. Moses Goes into the Wilderness (2:15b- Bʹ. Israel Goes into the Wilderness (15:22–
25)
18:27)
• Moses goes into the wilderness (2:15b)

• Israel goes into the wilderness (15:22a)

• Women and water (2:16-17a)

• Israel and water (15:22b–23)

• Moses is challenged (2:17b)

• Moses is challenged (15:24)

• Moses provides water (Israel cries out in
Egypt) (2:17b–2:23)

• God/Moses provide water (Moses cries
out to the Lord) (15:25a)

• God “hears the cry of Israel” (2:23-24)

• Israel to “hear the voice of the Lord God”
(15:25b–26)

• God remembers His covenant and
“knows” Israel (2:24–25)

• God makes a statute/regulation and tests
Israel (15:26–27)
• Additional signs of divine provision (16:1–
17:16)
- God provides bread (16:1–7)
- God provides bread/meat (16:8–21)
- Shabbat and bread (16:22–36)
- God/Moses provide water (17:1–7)
- People question the presence of God
(17:7b)
- Battle against Amalek (17:8–16)

• Jethro (2:16, 18)

• Jethro (18:1)

• Egypt (2:19)

• Egypt (18:1)

• Daughter Zipporah (2:21)

• Daughter Zipporah (18:2)

• Gershom (2:22)

• Gershom and Eliezer (18:3–4)

• Meal (“eat bread”) (2:20)

• Meal (“eat bread”) (18:12)

Now in the wilderness, both Moses and Israel encounter the problem of lack
of water (Exod 2:16-17a and 15:22b-23). In both instances Moses is challenged: the
first time by the shepherds ( )רעהin Midian (Exod 2:17), and the second by the very
people of Israel (Exod 15:24). In Midian Moses’ actions—like God’s actions in
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Exodus 14:13, 30 and 15:2—are considered acts of “salvation,” indicated by the use
of the verb “( יׁשעto save”). Moses provides water for the women, and in partnership
with God in Exodus 15:25a also provides water for Israel.
Exodus 2 ends with God remembering the covenant and a note on His
knowledge of the suffering of the people (2:23–25). After the provision of water to
Israel, YHWH sets statutes ( )חקand regulations (ׁשפָּט
ְ  ) ִּמindicating the conditions of
His relation to the people. YHWH’s covenantal relation to Israel in B provides the
context for the actions that follow. At the same time, the statutes and regulations
YHWH establishes for Israel as they enter the desert in B’ also provide the context
for the actions that will follow.
As noted earlier, B’ provides additional signs of divine care for Israel in the
wilderness. The reason for this is perhaps to show how YHWH is a greater Moses.
While Moses provides the women in Midian with water, YHWH demonstrates his
care for the people by providing water, food, and protection throughout their
journeys.
The second main section in B and B’ points to Moses’ relatives on both sides
of the parallel-panel. As Moses in B and Israel in B’ begin settling in the wilderness,
the names of Jethro (Exod 2:16, 18 and 18:1), Zipporah (Exod 2:21 and 18:2),
Gershom (Exod 2:22 and 18:3-4), and a reference to Egypt (Exod 2:19 and 18:1) are
mentioned.473 In both instances, the meeting with Jethro ends with a meal (Exod 2:20

Because this is an issue that goes beyond the depiction of the God-human
relation in the text, it is important to mention that scholars trace the appearance of
Jethro in these two sections of Exodus to an early source. Sarna writes: “The friendly
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and 18:12), with them eating ( )אכלbread () ָּלחֶם. When Israel questions the existence
of YHWH in Exod 17:7 by saying “( הֲיׁ֧ש י ְהוָּ ֛ה ְב ִּק ְר ֖בנּו ִּאם־אָּ ַּֽי ִּןis YHWH among us or
not”), the first battle against a foreign enemy takes place.

God-Human Relation Notes
At least two important issues relating to the God-human relation in Exodus
must be pursued in this section in the context of how scholars perceive and interpret
them: (1) God’s actions in relation to Israel in Egypt and in the wilderness, and (2)
Israel’s response to God’s actions.
Divine action: Egypt and wilderness
The actions of YHWH for Israel on both sides of the parallel-panel are
sparked by his covenant faithfulness. In B, God is reminded of the covenant made
with Abraham, and acts in accordance with what he promised (cf. Gen 15:13–16).
This is also the first time the expression “( ב ְִּריתcovenant”) appears in Exodus.
Scholars have no difficulty seeing this idea in the text. Greenberg writes: “They
[Israel] cried out because of their labor, and their cry reached God. Mindful of his

relations between Israel and the Midianites that are reflected in the story of Moses
are consonant with the account in Genesis 25:2 that traces the lineage of Midian
back to Abraham. They also accord with the later report in Exodus Chapter 18 of
Midianite influence upon the organization of the Israelite judiciary system. This
amicable situation must be both authentic and quite early because toward the end of
the period of the wilderness wanderings, and during the period of the Judges,
relations between Israel and Midian were thoroughly hostile.” Sarna, Exploring
Exodus, 35. If indeed the mentions of the Midianites in Exod 2 and Exod 18 are from
the same source, their being tied together in the literary structure of Exodus implies
that the final redactor (or R) had exquisite capabilities to organize source materials
into a meaningful whole.
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covenant, God took note of the people’s distress and considered what he must do.”474
This is yet another text in the narrative of the Exodus that attests to YHWH’s
intimate involvement in what is taking place in Egypt.475 Remembering his covenant,
at the right time,476 he acts. In B’, the unusual episode after the deliverance at the Red
Sea ends with God’s establishment of statutes in covenant language.477 These terms
inform Israel about how God will act toward them in the subsequent chapters. The
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Greenberg, Understanding Exodus, 41.

God had already fulfilled part of His promise to Abraham—the
multiplication of the people—in the first chapter of Exodus. Greenberg observes:
“When God is said in verse 24 to have remembered his covenant with the patriarchs,
the reference is to its second part, the promise of a land for their descendants. (Its
first part, the promise to make them numerous, had already been fulfilled.)”
Greenberg, Understanding Exodus, 44. This enhances the possibility that though
elusive in the first chapters of Exodus, God was active in providing the conditions for
his covenant promises to be fulfilled.
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Another anticipation of the actions of God in Exodus seen in Genesis—
apart from the idea of “visitation” mentioned earlier—is God’s promise to Abraham
in Gen 15:13. God tells Abraham that his descendants will be enslaved and
oppressed as strangers in a foreign land for a total of four hundred years.
Furthermore, in Gen 15:16 God reiterates this prophetic insight as he promises that
in the fourth generation the people will return to the land. To discuss the dating of
Exodus and the historical background of these numbers is beyond the scope of this
study. What is in the interest of this section is the fact that God anticipated in
Genesis, through covenant, how he would proceed in the future events of the
Exodus. As mentioned earlier, the book begins with this expectation of God’s
visitation, as well as the fulfillment of the promise. History flows freely within God’s
promises.
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Frank H. Polak sees covenantal language in this section: “The notion of
imposing ‘law and justice’ may remind one of the covenant theme, and especially of
the ceremony at Shechem (Joshua 24:25). This suggestion would be in line with the
sequel, which opens with a summary statement of the covenant idea (15:26a),
followed by a conditional blessing (v. 26b).” Frank H. Polak, “Water, Rock, and
Wood: Structure and Thought Pattern in the Exodus Narrative,” Journal of the
Ancient Near Eastern Society 25 (1997): 21.
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general pattern of how God acts for the people does not change from B to B’.
YHWH’s actions for the people follow promises, statutes, regulations, and covenant.
Even so, scholars are generally divided in assigning a particular source to the
two sides of this section. Recent research sees the addition of statutes and regulations
in B’ (Exod 15:26) as pointing to a possible deuteronomistic source.478 At the same
time, scholars understand that YHWH’s remembrance of the covenant in B—the
counterpart to this section—pertains to the priestly source.479 Again, the assumption
of the documentary hypothesis diverts the attention of the reader to speculation
rather than to the natural flow of the book. Once two different sources are assigned
to the two sections (B and B’), any continuous or harmonious portrayal of God’s
relation to humanity is dismissed by extrabiblical commitments established a priori.
Through such a conception, the God who remembers the covenant in B is different
from the God who establishes statutes and regulations in B’. This makes it
impossible to trace a pattern of divine action based on His covenant promises in
Genesis and Exodus.
YHWH’s actions based on covenant and promise raise additional questions
about the nature of God’s actions in the book: namely, the epistemological question

See A. Schart, “Moses und Israel in Konflikt,” Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis
98 (Freiburg-Göttingen, 1990), 173–77; Childs, Exodus, 266–67. Dozeman
understands that this section pertains to non-P History: Exodus, 371–74. Durham
summarizes the source-critical predicament in this section: “The tendency of the
source critics has been to assign different motifs to different sources, or at least to
different layers in the same source.” For his summary on how scholars interpret this
section, see Durham, Exodus, 212.
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See Dozeman, Exodus, 92; Childs, Book of Exodus, 28; Durham, Exodus, 25.
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of the knowledge of God and the ontological question of the location of the presence
of God.
In regard to God’s knowledge, in Exod 2:23–25 “four terms give voice to
Israel’s suffering: ‘groaning,’ ‘cried out,’ ‘cry for help,’ ‘moaning’; and four verbs
express God’s response.”480 God hears the cry of the people, God remembers his
covenant, God sees the people, and God knows. The Hebrew text unusually presents
no object for this divine knowing. Dozeman notes that there is “no object for the
divine knowledge, creating a parallel with the Israelite cry in v. 23,”481 which also has
no object.
Dozeman understands that the objectless knowledge of God matches the
objectless cry of Israel and “underscores the anguish of their situation and most likely
their lack of knowledge of God.”482 In other words, even though the people of Israel
forget God in the context of their suffering, God still remembers them. Conservative
scholars assert that the cry of Israel was a prayer, even though no object is given.483
Even so, not much is said by commentators about God’s knowledge or the nature of
his actions, apart from the fact that they are triggered by the cries of Israel and that
they anticipate the next section in the narrative. The general consensus is that God
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Ibid., 93. The problem with this perspective is that the Hebrew text does
indicate knowledge of God (in the episode of the Hebrew midwives who “feared
God” in Exod 1:17), and the results of covenant blessing (in the multiplication of the
people in the first chapter).
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acts because the people cry, and no attention is given to the significance of the
knowledge of God in the text.
Each of these readings assume a particular conception of God and of Israel’s
condition. Dozeman’s conclusion is based on the assumption that Israel had no
knowledge of God: their cry is objectless because, like the Pharaoh who did not
know Joseph, Israel also forgot Joseph and his God. Stuart’s perspective that the
objectless cry of the people rises up to the heavens as a prayer is based on the
assumption that the people still maintained a connection with God.
The Hebrew text presents the information that the people simply cry ()זעק, this
cry raises up to God as a cry for help (ׁש ְועָּה
ַ ), God remembers his covenant, and acts.
The action of God is not primarily based—as indicated by the majority of scholars—
on their cry, but on God’s remembrance of the covenant. God acts in favor of a
people who—as indicated by Dozeman—might not have even called upon his name.
What precedes divine action is his own promise, his covenant stipulations, as well as
a sensitivity toward the condition of the people.
Again, to tear the text apart into different sources with different conceptions
of the divine-human relation would lead the reader away from the unified emphasis
on God’s action in the context of a covenant that is introduced in the early Genesis
accounts and still valid in Exodus. To reduce conceptions of God and his actions to
the agenda of the redactors in each source period neglects the complexity of the God
who acts in the context of covenant. To simplify God and his actions into formulas
pertaining to different sources misses the richness of what the text is presenting.
In regard to God’s presence, it is significant to note that the first time God is
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explicitly mentioned—apart from Exod 1:17, 20-21 in the context of the blessing
upon the midwives—is in Exod 2:23. The Hebrew text says that the cry of Israel
“rose up to God” ( ֱֹלהים
ַ )ו ַ ַ֧תעַל.484 God is not in Egypt, not in Midian, but
֖ ִּ ׁש ְוע ָָּּת֛ם אֶל־ ָּהא
upward. Commentaries are generally silent on the location of the divine in this text.
Donald Gowan correctly observes that the “theme of the presence of God has been a
popular subject in Old Testament studies, but its opposite has been generally
neglected.”485 The significance of this text is that before God manifests himself in the
next section, the first two chapters are marked by divine absence.
As indicated in the first chapters of this study, theologians normally begin
their evaluation of the actions of God with an already established idea of who God
is. God’s actions are then understood and interpreted in the context of the reality of
God, thus onto-theology. If the theological construct begins with what the text
presents in relation to God, the picture changes. The ontological question about the
divine location in the book of Exodus provides insight on the discussion by
highlighting God’s awareness of what is taking place in Egypt from this upward
location, and his subsequent action through revelation to Moses in the world and
within the flow of history. Reflection on the reality of who God is—if it is a proper
object of reflection—must begin with an evaluation of the text itself that primarily
depicts his actions, thus theo-ontology. The reader understands who God is through

I already mentioned the dialogue between Abraham and YHWH that
preceded YHWH going up. The idea of the divine being located in the heavens can
be found throughout the Hebrew Bible (1 Sam 5:12, Jonah 1:2, Jer 16:2, etc.).
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the textual depiction of how he acts.486 The Hebrew text in B, then, presents the
reader with an understanding that although absent, God is aware, and will act in the
world and for man because of his covenant. In B’, God is fully present and
interacting with Israel throughout their journeys.
Israel’s rebellion: wilderness
So far, this section has focused on God’s actions in relation to Israel. At this
time, I will explore the human side of the God-human relation with a focus on the
battle of the Amalekites depicted in B’ (Exod 17:8-16). Because the battle of the
Amalekites appears at the backdrop of the question of divine presence, it seems an
appropriate setting to continue the exposition of the God-human relation in the text.
For several scholars, the battle with the Amalekites appears in the text for
varied reasons, so different theories abound.487 The preceding narrative (Exod 17:1-7)

Donald E. Gowan, Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a
Commentary (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 7.
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It is also important to note that this same dynamic functioned for the
Israelites. As readers of the text, the Israelites were not given a description of who
God is in any section of Exodus. They only experienced the acts of God. The acts of
God gave the people a glimpse into what we now consider the ontological question
of the nature of God. The focus of the text is not on the nature, but on the acts, in the
context of divine faithfulness to the covenant God established with the patriarchs.
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Stuart and Durham see the reason as historical and trace the relation of
Israel and Amalek to the book of Genesis; see Stuart, Exodus, 387; Durham, Exodus,
234. Garrett writes that the reason for the attack was the vulnerability of a people
deprived of water. See Garrett, Commentary on Exodus, 433. Sarna agrees with this
assessment, which is in harmony with Deut 25:17–19; Sarna, Exodus, 95. Meyers
writes that, like the lack of water, this is yet another challenge in the wilderness; see
Meyers, Exodus, 134. And finally, Hamilton sees no apparent reason for the attack.
See Hamilton, Exodus, 269.
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indicates another problem with water. Israel grumbles, Moses turns to God, and God
indicates that He will “stand before” ( )עמד ְל ָּפ ֶַ֨ניָך ָּ ּ֥שםMoses and a rock that is to be
struck (Exod 17:6). The text, contrary to the beginning of the book, makes explicit
God’s presence with the people in this particular scene. According to the text, this is
not a speech act or an illusion. The Hebrew language cannot communicate
something in a clearer fashion: God was present there and then. Whether interpreted
as myth or reality, this is the perspective of the author. It is surprising, then, that in
the conclusion of this episode, the people—who are unaware of the dialogue between
God and Moses—question the presence of a God who was there. The people ask, “Is
the Lord in our midst, or not?” ( ;הֲיׁ֧ש י ְהוָּ ֛ה ְב ִּק ְר ֖בנּו אִּם־אָּ ַּֽי ִּןExod 17:7b).488
It is important to note that in this instance, what determines God’s actions is
not any particular covenantal commitment—apart from the fact that he is still
leading the people to the promised land—but Moses’ intercession for the people.
This movement between Moses and God will continue throughout the book and
serves as another argument against the idea of a timeless God outside of time and
space. God interacts with Moses in time, and these altercations change the flow of
the narrative.
The questioning of the divine presence leads not only to Moses’ intervention,
but to the seemingly unexplainable appearance of the Amalekites. This is the only

The people question God’s presence here, and in chapter 32 they will
question Moses’ presence in their midst. There seems to be an underlying theme
relating to the people’s need for a divine figure constantly present with them. By
questioning and fashioning a divinity that will be present at all times, they sin.
488
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time in Exodus that a foreign nation attacks Israel. Because scholars generally assign
the section of Exod 17:1-7 to P and 17:8-16 to J or E,489 any proposal in the narrative
that assumes a continuation from one section to the other is rare.490 Even so, it seems
natural to see that there would be challenges in the wilderness journey toward Sinai:
water, and now war. The people’s reaction of questioning the divine presence is
significant not only because it provides another window into the freedom God and
humanity have in their interactions in history, but because it provides insight into the
way Israel evaluates God’s actions. Although the reader is informed of God’s
presence in the provision of water—through the dialogue between God and Moses—
the people do not associate the water with the immediate provision of a God who
acts for them in the wilderness.
The human perception of the divine continues to be in focus in the next
section, regarding YHWH’s appearance to Moses through the burning bush.
Section III: C and C’ (Exodus 3:11–4:31 and 19–24:11)
Textual Notes
The third section of the literary structure of Exodus, C (Exod 3:11–4:31) and
C’ (Exod 19–24:11), develops in three distinct parts: (1) Moses’ approach to the
mountain of God and Israel’s approach to the mountain of God (both including
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Childs, Exodus, 306, 312–13.

Because Dozeman has a different source-critical approach, he does allow
for the possibility of the two narratives being seen together. See Dozeman, Exodus,
393.
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theophanies); (2) the dialogue between Moses and God both the first (plan to deliver
people) and the second time (Decalogue and mishpatim) he goes up the mountain;

Table 4. C and C’ textual notes
C. God Remembers His Covenant (3:1–
4:31)

Cʹ. The Book of the Covenant (19–24:11)

• Moses comes to Horeb (with the flock of
Jethro) (3:1)

• Moses comes to Sinai (with the flock of
God) (19:1-2)

• God “called to him from the bush” (3:4)

• God “called to him from the mountain”
(19:3)

• God: “I have come down” (3:8)

• God: “I have bore you on eagles’ wings”
(19:4a)

• The cry of the people was “brought to me”
(3:9)

• Israel I “brought to myself” (19:4b)

• Moses commissioned (3:10)

• Moses commissioned (19:6)

• Moses questions God (3:11)

• Moses obeys God (19:7)

• Sign: Israel will worship Me on this
mountain (3:12)

• Israel prepares to worship God at the
mountain (19:7-25)

• God reveals His name “I AM” (3:13-15)

• God reveals His character “I AM”:
Decalogue and Mishpatim (20–23:19)

• Promised signs of God’s Presence (3:16–
4:17)

• Promised sign of the Angel’s Presence
(23:20-33)

• Moses makes preparations to depart (4:1823)

• Moses makes preparations to go up (24:14a)

• Covenant neglected: cutting foreskin and
blood (4:24-26)

• Covenant established: cutting covenant and
blood (24:4b-8)

• Moses, Aaron, and Elders worship God
(4:27-31)

• Moses, Aaron, and Elders worship God
(24:9-11)

(3) Moses’ preparation to return to Egypt with a scene of covenant and
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worship, and Moses’ preparation to go up the mountain as God instructed along
with a second scene of covenant and worship. Several other interesting links between
C and C’ relating to Moses and Israel are significant here. In both episodes, Exod 3:4
and 19:3, God calls Moses. In the first instance, God calls from the midst of a small
bush (as Elohim):  ַויִּק ְָּרא א ַָּ֨ליו אֱֹל ִִּ֜הים מִּ ֹ֣תוְך ַה ְס ֶֶ֗נה. In the second instance—and the only
time God has called him since that first instance—God calls Moses from the
mountain itself (as YHWH):  ַויִּק ְַָּ֨רא א ָּלֹ֤יו י ְהוָּה מִּן־ה ָּ ָֹּ֣הר. While in Exod 3:9 God tells Moses
that the cry of the people was “brought” to him (ש ָּר ֖אל ָּבָֹ֣אה א ָּלֹ֑י
ְ ִּ ) ַצע ַ ֲּ֥קת בְני־י, the first thing
brought to God himself after that is the Israelites themselves, in Exod 19:4b ( ָָּאבּ֥א
ִּ ו
)אֶ תְ ֶ ֖כם אלָּ ַּֽי. This first scene in C and C’ ends with the sign of the worship of God at the
same mountain—mentioned in passing—in Exod 3:12 and the preparations for the
people to worship God at the mountain in Exod 19:7-25.
The second scene is largely composed of divine speeches. While in C God
presents Moses with the knowledge of his name (Exod 3:13-15), along with signs of
his future care and commitment to Israel (Exod 3:16–4:17), in C’ God reveals his
character by giving Israel, through Moses, the Decalogue (Exod 20:1-17), a series of
commands (Exod 20:22–23:19), and the promise of his care and presence through his
angel (Exod 23:20-33). The relation between narrative and law and possible reasons
for the differences between C and C’ will be pursued in the next section, dealing with
how scholars understand this dynamic in the text.
The final scene in the third section of the literary structure deals with
preparations. While in C Moses prepares to return to Egypt to confront Pharaoh
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after speaking with God on the mountain (Exod 4:18-23),491 in C’ Moses prepares
himself to go up the mountain to confront God (Exod 24:1-4a). The text of Exodus
not only presents a contrast between Moses as a leader and God as a leader, but a
contrast between God as king and Pharaoh as king. This section begins the
comparison.
What follows in C is one of the most complicated sections of the book (Exod
4:24-26). Moses is faced with an angel seeking his death, and Zipporah acts quickly
to intervene for her husband by cutting ( )כרתthe foreskin of their child. The mention
of blood ( )דָּ םin this scene is also important. Scholars generally point out the unusual
appearance of this episode in the narrative, and this is why the events in C’ might
provide insight into the resolution of the many problems the text presents the reader.
As in C, the text of C’ presents the reader with the “cutting” ( )כרתof a covenant
(Exod 24:8), and the mention of blood ()דָּ ם. Before Moses goes to Egypt to confront
Pharaoh, he neglects the covenant marked by circumcision, in a scene filled with
blood. Before Moses goes up to meet God, he establishes a covenant with the elders,
in a scene also marked by blood.

God-Human Relation Notes
One of the main issues touching upon the God-human relation in this section
was addressed in the introduction of this study: how the interpretation of the Hebrew

For more on this particular text in Exod 4, see Athena E. Gorospe,
Narrative and Identity: An Ethical Reading of Exodus 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
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Bible hinges upon the understanding of what happened in the “Sinai event.”492 The
general idea is that if something in the descriptions of the book of Exodus did happen
in history, it happened in the Sinai narratives with God revealing himself to the
Israelite people. This revelation of God to Israel resulted in the creation of what is
termed the “book of the Covenant.”493
Some scholars observe that the event of Sinai is traditionally understood “as
the exclusive and normative model for subsequent revelation in Judaism”494 and that
this conception is a “longstanding”495 presupposition. While this perception has
never been questioned, this long held presupposition is starting to be overcome in
scholarly writings.496 So far, this study has aimed at expanding this movement of
noticing important divine-human events beyond Sinai. Although the depiction of the

In the introduction I presented this issue through the work of Langdon B.
Gilkey. At this stage, as I move into the text, examples closer to biblical studies are
in order. For more on this particular issue, see Sommer, “Revelation at Sinai.”
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For specific studies on this section in particular, see: Martin Ravndal
Hauge, The Descent from the Mountain: Narrative Patterns in Exodus 19–40 (Sheffield,
England: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001); Thomas B. Dozeman, God on the
Mountain: A Study of Redaction, Theology and Canon in Exodus 19–24 (Atlanta: Scholars
Press, 1989). For the relation of revelation, narrative, and law, see Nanette Stahl,
Law and Liminality in the Bible (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995),
51–73.
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George J. Brooke, Hindy Najman, and Loren T. Stuckenbruck,
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Some even conclude that some events outside of Exodus were more
important than the Sinai event, affirming that “the Mosaic discourse in year 40 [in
the book of Deuteronomy] is more important than the Sinai/Horeb event.” Ibid.
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God-human relation is pivotal at the Sinai event, it is not the only significant
instance of divine action/revelation in the book of Exodus that deserves serious
consideration.497 After all, the Sinai event follows another Sinai event between God
and Moses in Exod 3.
With these issues in mind, a few themes within the context of C and C’
relating to the God-human relation must be taken into consideration at this stage: (1)
the Sinai event and law, and (2) the Sinai event and revelation.
The Sinai event and law
Because the textual depiction of the God-human dynamic centered at the
Sinai event creates the Book of the Covenant,498 the first issue to appear in scholarly
considerations is the relation between the Sinai event and law.499 The general premise
within scholarship—already mentioned in passing when this study dealt with the
issue of history—is that God did not reveal himself in history to Israel at Sinai.
Although this is what the text says, this is not what actually happened. Von Rad

Although I agree with the movement beyond Sinai, I must emphasize yet
again that I do not share the historical-critical inclinations or source-critical
motivations of these scholars. Instead, I intend to uncover how other instances of
divine revelation are just as important as Sinai. This partial conclusion is based on
how the literary structure of the book of Exodus presents the focus of the author
going beyond just the Sinai event.
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Stahl describes these critical moments between God and humanity as
“liminal moments,” and argues that the appearance of law within the biblical
narratives indicates a significant transition. See Stahl, Law and Liminality, 12–13.
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For more on this see Baruch J. Schwartz, “The Priestly Account of the
Theophany and Lawgiving at Sinai,” in Texts, Temples, and Traditions: A Tribute to
499

211

summarizes the idea well as he writes that nowhere “else in Old Testament is there
to be found such a huge presentation of traditions, made up of so many strands, and
attached to one single event (the revelation at Sinai).”500 So the question is: where
does the idea of law come from, if God did not actually speak to Israel in the
wilderness as the text indicates?
Marc Zvi Brettler phrases it well as he says that the “problems involved with
the narrative description of revelation, and the connections between the narrative
and the law, seem truly intractable.”501 The question remains: how “did it happen
that Israel’s laws came to be attributed to the authorship of a deity, YHWH
himself?”502 Unfortunately, the answers given to the question do not stem from any
textual, theological, or even philosophical understanding, but are generally formed
through a source-critical analysis of the text within its ANE background (in the
parameters set forth by the presuppositions delineated earlier).503
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James L. Kugel, for instance, proposes that the origin of the idea of “divine
law” came “not at some conclave at the foot of Mt. Sinai, but in the hill country of
ancient Canaan, as different tribes and ethnic groups in Canaan sought to pull
themselves together, through a common code of conduct and a common deity, into
some sort of tribal coalition.”504 In other words, the discussion moves from law in the
context of a possible divine revelation—common in pre-critical interpretations but
not present in current exegetical discussions—to law as a cultural product of

approach emphasized how redactors were “passive tridents, whose primary aim was
to preserve tradition, rather than creative theologians who critically transformed
tradition.” Dozeman, God on the Mountain, 2. Among those who subscribe to this old
approach are Wellhausen, Gressmann, and Von Rad. Dozeman and others propose
a more positive perspective of the work of the redactors. Yet these new solutions still
function under the philosophical parameters set forth by the documentary
hypothesis. For instance, Perlitt argues that what the redactors did was a creative
endeavor, the turning of an account of theophany into that of legislation. See L.
Perlitt, Bundestheologie in Alten Testament, Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum
Alten und Neuen Testament 36 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969),
156–238. Another significant contribution to those who argue for the human creation
of the covenant code is found in David P. Wright, Inventing God’s Law: How the
Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009). The change from a negative to a positive assessment of the
role of the redactors still functions under the umbrella of extrabiblical assumptions
leading to the idea that the text is a collection of writings from different authors, in
different periods, with different worldviews and agendas. Dozeman proposes a
model of interpretation that traces the growth of the Sinai narrative in three stages:
pre-exilic Mountain of God tradition, a late pre-exilic/exilic deuteronomistic
redaction, and finally an exilic/early post-exilic priestly redaction. Again, the
dynamic changes, but the platform remains the same.
Kugel, “Some Unanticipated Consequences,” 5. Von Rad also negates the
historicity of the event as he writes that “this narrative sequence does not derive
directly from historical events, but is probably the ‘festival legend’ belonging to a
major cultic celebration, the old festival of the renewal of the covenant.” See Von
Rad, Old Testament Theology, 189.
504
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Hebrews in Canaan during the “period of the Judges.”505
With this movement from divine action/revelation to human product, the
nature and function of law within Exodus are established upon extrabiblical
parameters. In short, divine law becomes human law: that is, a human creation to
establish the idea that the divine-human relation is only possible through the keeping
of law. Kugel concludes:
The religion of laws, although never envisaged as such when God first spoke at
Sinai, turned out to be no less an effective way of keeping the deity at arm’s
length. He was way up there, and we humans were way down here; what
connected us was not direct contact but a set of clearly established ground rules—
or, one might say, a set of clearly visible electric wires along which the current of
divine-human relations was to flow.506
The problem here is that, for Kugel and others, there is no electricity in the wire;
there is no real connection between humanity and God because such a reality is
dismissed via the presuppositions of historical criticism. Once the origin of divine
law is established as human, the reality of covenant and law and their relation to the
narrative of Exodus becomes not only intractable textually and historically, but
unrealistic theologically and philosophically. The historical-critical outlook
determines what is and is not realistic in the text, and with this basic structure in
place, the apparent contradictions and differences within the text are used to
continuously support the critical structure, never to challenge it.507
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Whenever an apparent contradiction is found within the text, the
immediate procedure is to consider the source-critical aspect of the contradiction.
Rarely do scholars attempt to find alternate ways of understanding these
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Before I continue unpacking the presuppositions that shape the understanding
of the event of Sinai, it is important to point out that the critical use of myth in the
robes of history to communicate an idea (in this case, the idea of law) is inherently
Platonic. Critical scholars, through the use of the documentary hypothesis, project
upon the text—and the authors of the text—their own biases. They assume, a priori,
that the text with its reconstructed history devoid of divine action is a means to
communicate a message (be it from the J, D, E, or P source). This movement is
Platonic at its root, since Plato as an idealist began his description of reality with a
myth that would communicate an already set system of ideas. The myth is used to
carry the system. In this classical framework, any possibility of the text
communicating actual historical events is denied in favor of the message or idea they
are trying to communicate through the fabrication of historical myth. The idea to be
conveyed precedes myth and consequently history.508 So, the use of the documentary
hypothesis, the idea of sources with agendas, and the fabrication of myth/history to
communicate theological viewpoints are, at their roots, Platonic.509
These extrabiblical premises, then, limit the creation of law to some human

contradictions (which vary in many ways) outside the source-critical approach. This
study will attempt to find alternate ways of dealing with the portions of Exodus that
have been considered problematic.
I am thankful for the classes I took with Jacques B. Doukhan, who
constantly pointed out the dependence of critical scholarship upon classical literature
that assumed a Platonic foundation.
508

This same mindset is found in the positivist philosophy of Descartes, where
the idea/thinking precedes existence/history. So, in the documentary hypothesis,
Platonic and Cartesian philosophical frameworks harmonize.
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production that would grant authority to the priests who serve the God of the law, as
well as their “divinely given” agendas. This perspective entirely subverts what the
text is attempting to convey. Stahl is correct in assessing that “in their concise
presentation in the Decalogue, the laws are a distillation of the entire legal corpus of
the Bible, and they emblematize—in their iconic inscription on the tablets—the
importance of law in their relationship between God and Israel.”510 To reduce the
law and its theological weight to ideas conveyed by myth, as an ahistorical human
fabrication, is to miss the richness of what the law implies for the divine-human
relation.
When evaluating the textual flow indicated by the literary structure of
Exodus, the reader can see how the text transitions into law only in C’. The point of
Moses’ meeting with God in C is related to the Exodus of the people from Egypt. In
this instance, God speaks to Moses and acts for Israel. In C’, the sign given to Moses
finds its fulfillment, and God’s intention is to not only act for the people, but speak to
them directly. The experience of Moses anticipates that of the people. Although the
people cannot stand the direct revelation of God and Moses has to resume his role as
intercessor, the appearance of law here indicates a change in the dynamic of the
book. Now that they are delivered from Egypt, God will expound on how they will
be delivered from their bondage to sin. Yet, as indicated previously, God will not act
without parameters: he will continue to act through covenant. Cassuto correctly
observes that the Ten Words function in the narrative as an introduction to the
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covenant:
The Ten Words are not the substance of the covenant, nor its conditions, but the
introduction to it. Before the particulars and terms of the covenant are conveyed
by the intermediary, God himself makes a prefatory declaration that establishes
the basic principles on which the covenant will be founded.511
In this sense, there is no distinction between narrative and law. What leads up
to the law is a series of divine actions in favor of the people depicted in narrative
form. The law is the climax and new starting point for more divine actions based on
grace. The appearance of law throughout the book indicates the conditions under
which God will act for the people. Here, they anticipate the way God will deliver the
people from their sin. Writing about Deuteronomy, Daniel Block is correct in
observing that the law is a “gift of grace to guide the redeemed in the way of
righteousness, leading to life.”512 This idea will continue in the subsequent sections
dealing with the construction of the sanctuary.
The Sinai event and revelation
So far, I have outlined how the interpretation of the Sinai event affects the
interpretation of Exodus in the context of the creation of law (either as revelation or
human product). A second question that presents itself in this section of the book of
Exodus considers the relation between the Sinai event and revelation.
The source-critical understanding that within Exodus there is a conflict of
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worldviews or philosophies, especially as it pertains to the God-human relation, also
stems from conceptions of the relation between revelation and text. Above I have
shown that for historical critics, the “electric wire” between God and humanity is a
law that is human, not divine. There was no divine revelation (promulgation) of law,
just the creation of laws that provided a means of connection between humanity and
an elusive god. Others, especially within the Jewish tradition, understand that divine
revelation did take place, yet without any content. The biblical text is a reporting of
this contentless revelation, but not revelation in itself.513
Sommer, for example, writes about the Sinai event as he attempts to
harmonize the texts of the books of Exodus and Deuteronomy and asserts that the
revelation at Sinai “imparted specific content; it was not only an overwhelming
event,”514 and that the people heard a voice “articulating sounds in order to
communicate meaning.”515 However, even though this seems an appropriate
evaluation of the biblical text, Sommer concludes, based on internal inconsistencies
within Exodus as well as between Exodus and Deuteronomy, that the people “heard
no words, just as they saw no form, because there were no words to hear.”516 Because
of this assessment and lack of ontological import as well as cognitive communication
in the Sinai event, Sommer indicates that the Torah and all the writings within
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Jewish tradition are “tradition, commentary, and reflection.”517
In addition to this assessment, Sommer underscores, following a timeless
conception of Being, that in reality there are two Torahs: a phenomenal Torah (the
Torah of Moses) and a noumenal Torah (the Torah of God). The latter, he explains,
“cannot be limited by rational categories of time and space.”518 So, as one can notice,
even the perspectives that come as close as possible to what the text is presenting are
not exempt from extrabiblical philosophical presuppositions that shape them.
The biblical text leaves no space for a differentiation between a revelation in
space and time and a meaning beyond time. In C, Exod 3:3 presents Moses
approaching the burning bush and calling it a “marvelous sight” ()אֶת־ ַה ַמ ְראֶ ּ֥ה ַהג ָּ֖דל.
Moses is unaware of the presence of God. Visible manifestations by themselves are
not enough for Moses to be sure of divine presence. What allows Moses to
understand that he is indeed in the presence of God is divine speech. Once God
speaks, Moses realizes he is in the presence of God. This divine longing to
communicate with humanity is also attested in C’, but as indicated earlier, the people
respond negatively to this divine approximation.
Yet the text leaves no room for contestation: the realm of the heavens is not in
another dimension, but close enough that people can hear the voice of God. Exodus
20:22 says, “You yourselves have seen that I have spoken to you from heaven” ( אַ ֶ ֹ֣תם
ש ֵַ֔מי ִּם ִּד ַ ֖ב ְרתִּ י עִּמָּכֶ ַּֽם
ָּ )ר ִּאיתֵֶ֔ ם ִּ֚ ִּכי מִּן־ ַה.
ְ Any other evaluation of this dynamic forces the text to
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say something it is not presenting about how God relates to humanity according to
the perspective of the author of Exodus.
Section IV: D and D’ (Exodus 5–7:2a and 24:12–32:30)
Textual Notes
The fourth section of the literary structure of Exodus, D (Exod 5–7:2a) and D’
(Exod 24:12–32:30), develops in what can be summarized as two main scenes: (1)
God’s command to Pharaoh in D and God’s command to Israel in D’, and (2)
Pharaoh’s disobedience in D and Israel’s disobedience in D’.

Table 5. D and D’ textual notes
D. Pharaoh’s Building Project without
Shabbat: God’s Command and Pharaoh’s
Disobedience (Part I) (5–7:2a)

Dʹ. God’s Building Project with Shabbat:
God’s Command and People’s
Disobedience/Obedience (Part I) (24:12–
32:30)

• Moses in the presence of Pharaoh (5:1–5)

• Moses in the presence of God (24:12–18)

• God’s command : “Let my people go”
(5:1)

• God’s command: “Let them make me a
sanctuary” (25:1–31:18)
• The “Lord spoke to Moses” (7x) dividing
God’s building project into seven sections,
with the last section about the Shabbat
(25:1–31:18), paralleling the six days of
creation followed by the Shabbat (cf. Gen
11:–2:4a)
Section 1 (25:1–30:10)
Section 2 (30:11–16)
Section 3 (30:17–21)
Section 4 (30:22–23)
Section 5 (30:34–38)
Section 6 (31:1–11)
Section 7: Shabbat (31:12–18)
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Table 5—Continued
• Pharaoh’s response (disobedience): “who
is the Lord, I do not know the Lord, I will
not let Israel go” (5:2–3)

• People’s response (disobedience): “Come
make us a god who will go before us, and
as of Moses we do not know what has
become of him” (32:1–2)

• Pharaoh’s building project involves seven
commands and seven verbs (or verb pairs),
beginning with Pharaoh’s rejection of the
Shabbat (5:4–9)

• People’s building project initiated and
divine reaction (32:3–10)

Command 1: Shabbat is denied (5:4–5)
Command 2: “give/add” (yasaph) (5:7a)
Command 3: “go” and “gather” (halak
and qashash) (5:7b)
Command 4: “lay/put” (sim) (5:8a)
Command 5: “diminish” (raga`) (5:8b)
Command 6: “let be heavier” (kabad)
(5:9a)
Command 7: “pay attention” (sha`ah)
(5:9b)
• Pharaoh says to Israelites: “Go and work”
(5:18)

• Israelites “rose up to play” (32:6)

• Moses questions God: “Why (lamah) have • Moses questions God: “Why (lamah) does
You brought trouble on this people?”
Your wrath burn hot against Your
(5:22-23)
people?” (32:11)
• God speaks: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and
Covenant (by the Lord I did not make
myself known) (6:1-8)

• Moses speaks: Abraham, Isaac, Israel, and
Covenant (32:13)

• Moses speaks and people do not hear
(6:9a)

• Moses speaks and God hears (32:14)

• Israel’s “cruel bondage” to Pharaoh (6:9b)

• Israel “breaks loose” (para’) in debauchery
and bondage to sin (32:25)

• Summary of God’s command to Israel and
Pharaoh though Moses and Aaron (6:12–
13)
• Credentials (family history) of God’s
spokespersons to Israel and Pharaoh (6:14–
27)
• Conflict between Moses and God: Moses
as God, Aaron as Prophet - (6:28–7:1)

• Conflict between Moses and Aaron: Calf
as god, Aaron as Prophet (32:15–30)
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Yet within these commands one notices a contrast between God as a leader of
the people and Pharaoh as a leader of the people. In D’ the commands of God
relating to the sanctuary extend from Exod 25–31 with no interruption. In these
chapters, God lays out the plan for the construction of the sanctuary in seven
different stages, as seen in Table 5. The commands of God relating to the
construction of the sanctuary, then, follow the creation rhythm of seven ending with
rest or ׁשבָּת
ַ . God’s “building project” has the purpose of God dwelling with people,
and its construction is not forced, but voluntary (Exod 25:2), and includes rest (Exod
31:12-18).
Pharaoh’s response to God’s command to let go of the people is negative. He
questions the very existence of God and initiates a “building project” of his own.
Like God’s building project, Pharaoh’s project also contains seven stages indicated
by seven verbs and verb pairs. It is the very reversal of any creative act that respects
life. In the course of these commands of forced labor upon the people, Pharaoh
denies any possibility of rest/ceasing to labor or ׁשבָּת
ַ (in Exod 5:5 Pharaoh asks,
“You would have them cease from their labor?”). In the idea of a building project
marked by a rhythm of seven and an emphasis on rest or lack thereof, the contrast
between Pharaoh and God is set.
Yet as Pharaoh responds negatively to God’s command in D, the people in D’
also reject the principles of God’s commands that they heard from the mountain.
Ignorant of the dialogue between God and Moses relating to a building project taking
place on the mountain, the people initiate a rebellious building project of their own:
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the construction of the golden calf.519 Like Pharaoh in Exod 5:2 saying, “I do not
know the Lord” ()ֹלֹ֤ א י ָּדַַ֨ עְתִּ י, the people express themselves in Exod 32:1b by saying,
“We do not know what has become of him [Moses]” ( )ֹלּ֥ א י ַ ָּ֖דעְנּו. The similarities
between Pharaoh and the people here are significant. The contrast between their
experiences will be evaluated in the next section on E and E’.

God-Human Relation Notes
The history of interpretation of Exod 25–31 is as vast as it is complex.520 Yet
the main issue that relates to the God-human relation within D and D’ is the
construction of the sanctuary and consequently, the conception of sacred space.521
Biblical scholars normally evaluate the text and its history without giving heed to the
reality it points to. If the author/redactor were allowed to speak without the

This connection between the two building projects has been noted by other
scholars such as Terrence Fretheim. See Fretheim, Exodus, 267.
519

Jews and Christians have attempted to make sense of this portion of
Exodus in different ways. Scott M. Langston writes that “Christians used these
chapters to exalt the church, Jews to glorify Torah.” Langston, Exodus through the
Centuries, 227. For more see Childs, Exodus, 547–50.
520

Daniel C. Timmer recognizes that there are several noteworthy issues
surrounding the text of Exod 25–40: “sacred space, sacred time, divine presence, and
creation.” Daniel C. Timmer, Creation, Tabernacle, and Sabbath: The Sabbath Frame of
Exodus 31:12–17; 35:1–3 in Exegetical and Theological Perspective (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 32. Definitions of sacred space also carry within
themselves philosophical assumptions. The common conception among scholars can
be summarized in the idea that sacred spaces are “religious centers at which the
heavenly and earthly meet, sites that act as bridges between the human and divine
worlds. They are locations at which the divine ruptures through the mundane and
reveals itself to humans.” Ron Eduard Hassner, War on Sacred Ground (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2009), 22. For more on this particular theological issue see
John Inge, A Christian Theology of Place (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003).
521
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suspicion of a predetermined agenda, what would the description say about God,
humanity, and their relation? Traditionally, the description of the text is not enough,
and an interpretative inference must be made to make sense of the description in the
reality of the reader.
As indicated earlier, the interpretative task is descriptive. Yet when scholars
do speak of what the text is attempting to convey, when they jump to the inference of
“what it means” in regards to sacred space,522 the works of two authors appear as
common references: Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane523 and R. E.
Clements’s God and Temple.524 Daniel C. Timmer writes that “any discussion of
sacred space must take account of the work of Mircea Eliade, which has been no less
influential in biblical studies than in anthropology.”525 In regard to the influence of
Clements, some key works in the interpretation of Exodus and Old Testament

Here I imply scholars dealing with the book of Exodus or Torah. For a
thorough analysis of temples and divine presence in the context of the God-human
relation in the Ancient Near East see Michael B. Hundley, Gods in Dwellings: Temples
and Divine Presence in the Ancient Near East, ed. Amélie Kuhrt, SBLWAW Supplement
Series 3 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013).
522

Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1959).
523
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R. E. Clements, God and Temple (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1965).

Timmer, Creation, Tabernacle, and Sabbath, 32. This does not imply that
scholars unanimously follow the work of Eliade. For other perspectives of sacred
space see J. Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987); S. Japhet, “Some Biblical Concepts of Sacred Place,” in Sacred
Space: Shrine, City, Land, ed. B. Z. Kedar and R. J. Z. Werblowsky (New York: New
York University Press, 1998), 55–72.
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theology support his writings.526
The works of Eliade and Clements are quite influential when biblical scholars
attempt to articulate the understanding of sacred space in the text. The philosophical
assumptions that form these works will be the focus of this section, since they
directly affect the subsequent interpretation of the Hebrew text. In addition, I will
attempt to show how the ideas proposed by Eliade and Clements are found within
interpretations of Exod 25:8.
Sacred space in the work of Mircea Eliade and R. E. Clements
Eliade sees manifestations of the divine as “hierophanies”527 and writes: “the
sacred always manifests itself as a reality of a wholly different order from ‘natural’
realities.”528 This supernatural revelation is depicted by Eliade as “a reality that does
not belong to our world, in objects that are an integral part of our natural ‘profane’
world.”529 It is this distinction between the sacred and the profane that allows Eliade

Dozeman writes that “Clements argued that the center of ancient Israelite
religious is Yaweh dwelling in a sacred cultic site,” and adds that “the more recent
work of J. Milgrom on the complex theologies of the sacred and the profane . . .
reinforce the insight of Clements, alerting us to the important role of the sanctuary in
Exodus.” Dozeman, Exodus, 5. Kaiser also relies on the work of Clements to write
about divine presence and the sacred in Exod 25:8. See Kaiser, Old Testament
Theology, 120.
526
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to categorize differences in spaces as modes of being.530 These introductory insights
assume a dualistic conception of reality that stems from the dualistic conception of
the world found in the writings of Plato.
For Plato, the idea of the sacred and the profane is expounded in the
articulation of the concept of the holy, which is quite similar to Eliade’s distinction of
sacred and profane. Commenting on Plato, Thomas L. Pangle writes:
The “sacred” (hieron) is what is filled with the divine presence, what the gods
reserve to themselves; the “pious” (hosion) is what they allocate to, or require of,
humans. Hence, a temple and the space around it, the place of the god, is called
“sacred” (hieron) rather than “pious” (hosion); the rest of the city is “pious” or
“profane” (hosion), but not “sacred” (hieron).531
Other scholars also see the relation between the work of Eliade and the principles of
Plato. Among them is John Daniel Dadosky, who writes:
Eliade, in the fashion of the idealist tradition which goes back to Plato, views the
world dualistically: there is appearance, and there is reality. Reality is
unchanging, eternal, sacred, and as a consequence meaningful. Appearance is
inconstant, ephemeral, profane and therefore, meaningless.532
It is this philosophical orientation, then, that provides the context for Eliade to write:
“When the sacred manifests itself in any hierophany, there is not only a break in the

For example, when speaking about the difference between the church and a
common street, Eliade writes: “The threshold that separates the two spaces also
indicates the distance between two modes of being, the profane and the religious.”
Ibid., 25.
530

Plato and Thomas L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), 518.
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John Daniel Dadosky, The Structure of Religious Knowing: Encountering the
Sacred in Eliade and Lonergan (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
2004), 105. Dadosky also mentions the places in Eliade’s work where Eliade himself
recognizes his debt to Plato.
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homogeneity of space; there is also revelation of absolute reality, opposed to the non
reality of the vast surrounding expanse.”533
In addition to the Platonic conception of the world, the manner in which
Eliade articulates hierophanies indicates a panentheistic perception of reality.534 In
describing the manifestation of the sacred, Eliade argues that “by manifesting the
sacred, any object becomes something else, yet it continues to remain itself, for it
continues to participate in its surrounding cosmic milieu.”535 In other words, “for
those who have a religious experience all nature is capable of revealing itself as
cosmic sacrality . . . the cosmos in its entirety can become a hierophany.”536 This idea
of the sacred supernatural manifesting itself within the natural is the basis for
panentheistic conceptions of the world and has implications toward how God relates
to humanity. If the temple is understood according to the terms and philosophical
principles Eliade sets forth, then it represents “an opening in the upward direction
and ensures communication with the world of the gods.”537 This conception subverts
the textual presentation of the temple that supports a downward movement from
God in heaven to people.
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Eliade, Sacred and Profane, 21.

Panentheism, in short, is “the incarnational presence of the divine in
embodied reality.” Jane Erricker, Cathy Ota, and Clive Erricker, Spiritual Education:
Cultural, Religious, and Social Differences, New Perspectives for the 21st Century
(Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 2001), 96.
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An evaluation of the text as it presents itself to the reader indicates—
beginning with the voice from the heavens that is heard in the world—a proximity
between heaven and earth without the essential dichotomy between sacred and
profane that stems from a Platonic conception of reality. In the Hebrew text of
Exodus, the object of sanctification provides insight into the discussion, since space
(Exod 3:5), time (Exod 16:23; 20:11), people (13:2), and even God himself can be
objects of sanctification (if Num 20:12 is taken into consideration). Thus, a proper
evaluation of how the text presents the idea of sacredness without the extrabiblical
philosophical principles that shape current studies of the issue is necessary.538
After examining the basic premises within Eliade’s understanding of sacred
space—premises that influence the interpretation of Exodus—I will turn my
attention to the work of Clements, which is also commonly referenced in the
scholarly understanding of sacred space. While Eliade’s work is indebted to Platonic
cosmology, the work of Clements centers on ANE reconstructions to articulate the
understanding of sacred space. Clements writes: “To obtain an understanding of the
immediate background of Israel’s religion, with its ideas of divine presence, it is
instructive to examine closely the ideas of the divine dwelling-places which were
current in Canaanite mythology.”539 Furthermore, he states that “the religion of
Canaan undoubtedly formed a strong and persistent influence upon the Israelite

Perhaps such a study would begin by rejecting the Platonic assumption that
the world or matter is evil, or profane. The world is good, and within this good world
the divine manifests itself. Sacredness cannot be defined in contrast to the profane,
but with the biblical assumption that creation is good.
538
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tribes, and its sanctuaries provided an environment of vigorous religious activity
which the Israelites could hardly ignore.”540
To evaluate the text in the context of the ANE is not problematic. Yet how
and to what extent these sources are used to explain the text could become
problematic. To deny the significance of the ANE context in the formation of the
book of Exodus is naive. Yet to assert that the main sources from which to
understand the significance and theology of the sanctuary and sacred space are
extrabiblical ANE sources is to depart from the pointers in the text itself. One
representative of those who see this intimate relation between the ANE theological
import and the biblical temple is John H. Walton. For Walton, the ANE sources
provide the key to understand the nature and function of the temple. Walton writes:
When Israel was instructed to build the tabernacle, and thus define sacred space,
ancient Near Eastern concepts were behind the entire undertaking, and they gave
shape to the theology of sacred space. The orientation toward the east, the
centering of the most important objects, the creation of zones of increasing
sacredness, the ideas about what materials would be most appropriate to sacred
space, and the rules for access to sacred space—all these draw heavily from the
ancient Near East and comprise the theology of the temple.541
In this sense, what determines the meaning of the temple, its nature and function, is
both the text and a deep correlation of ANE sources.
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John H. Walton, “Ancient Near Eastern Background Studies,” in
Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer et al.
(London: SPCK, 2005), 42. For an example of a more balanced relation between
ANE sources and the textual pointers within the text in the context of ritual, see Roy
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Sacred space in the interpretation of Exodus
The work of Eliade and Clements provides at least two ways to understand
sacred space: through a Platonic cosmology with possible panentheistic implications,
and through a close relation between ANE sources and the text. These two
approaches are commonly seen in commentaries on the book of Exodus.
Signs of a Platonic understanding of the world influencing the interpretation
of Exodus can be traced as early as the formation of the LXX. The subjective
influence upon the text as it relates to the interpretation of words and concepts is also
known as theological tendenz, or theological tendency. Staffan Olofsson defines this
theological influence or “exegesis” of the translator as the “interpretation of a phrase
or a term in the Hebrew that is at variance with the literal meaning.”542 This tendency
in interpretation—one that was highly influenced by the effects of Hellenization on
culture and thinking—can be noticed in the interpretation of the verb “( ׁשכןto dwell”)
in the book of Exodus by LXX translators. Since the idea of the divine God dwelling
with man is difficult to harmonize with a Platonic conception of the world,
translators intentionally changed the meaning of the word in order to fit their
conceptions of reality. Table 6 illustrates the point.

Gane, Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005).
Staffan Olofsson, God Is My Rock: A Study of Translation Technique and
Theological Exegesis in the Septuagint (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International,
1990), 2.
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Table 6. Translations of ׁשכן
Text

MT

Exod 24:16

ַּויִש ְֵ֤כ ֹן
ַּל־הר
ַ֣ ַּ כְבֹוד־י ְהוָּה ע
סִי ִַּ֔ני

Exod 25:8

וְעָּ ָׂ֥שּו ִלֵ֖י
ִמ ְק ָּ ָּ֑דש וְשָּ ַּכנ ִ ְֵ֖תי
בְתֹוכָּ ֶּֽם

Exod 29:45

LXX

English
Translation of
MT

English
Translation of
LXX

καὶ κατέβη ἡ
δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ
ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρος τὸ
Σινα

And the glory of And the glory of
the Lord dwelt
God came down
on mount Sinai. upon mount
Sinai.

καὶ ποιήσεις μοι
ἁγίασμα, καὶ
ὀφθήσομαι ἐν
ὑμῖν

And they will
build for me a
sanctuary, so
that I may dwell
in their midst.

And I will dwell
 ו ָּ ְַ֣ש ַּכנְתִִ֔ י ב ְֵ֖תֹוְך בְנַ֣יκαὶ
ἐπικληθήσομαι
ἐν
in the midst of
י ִׂשְ ָּר ָּ֑אל
τοῖς υἱοῖς Ισραηλ

the children of
Israel.

And you will
make me a
sanctuary and I
will appear
among you.

And I will be
called upon
among the
children of
Israel.

Exod 29:46

ְוי ָּדְ ֗עּו ִכַ֣י ֲא ִנֵ֤י י ְהוָּה
יהם א ֲֶ֨שר
ִ֔ אֱלַ֣ ה
הֹוצֵ֧אתִ י א ָֹּתָ֛ם מאָ֥רץ
ש ְכ ִנַ֣י
ָּ ִמצ ַּ ְֵ֖רי ִם ְל
ְתֹוכָּ֑ם
ָּ ב

καὶ γνώσονται ὅτι
ἐγώ εἰμι κύριος ὁ
θεὸς αὐτῶν ὁ
ἐξαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς
ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου
ἐπικληθῆναι
αὐτοῖς

And they will
know that I am
the Lord their
God who
brought them
from the land of
Egypt so that I
will dwell in their
midst.

And they will
know that I am
the Lord their
God who
brought them
forth out of the
land of Egypt to
be called upon by
them.

Exod 40:35

וְלא־י ַָּ֣כ ֹל מ ֹ֗שה לָּבֹוא
מֹועד כִ ֶּֽי־
ִ֔ ל־א ֹהל
ַ֣ א
שָּכַּ ָ֥ן ע ָָּּלֵ֖יו הע ָָּּנָּ֑ן

καὶ οὐκ
ἠδυνάσθη
Μωυσῆς
εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν
σκηνὴν τοῦ
μαρτυρίου, ὅτι
ἐπεσκίαζεν ἐπʼ
αὐτὴν ἡ νεφέλη

And Moses was
not able to enter
into the tent of
meeting because
the cloud dwelt
over it.

And Moses was
not able to enter
into the
tabernacle of
testimony
because the
cloud
overshadowed it.
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Moisés Silva illustrates the context of LXX translators well as he writes that “in
making linguistic decisions, translators had no choice but to rely upon the exegetical
traditions of their day,”543 namely, the Alexandrian method of exegesis.544 Modern
interpreters of Exodus do not break from the philosophical categories that create a
dichotomy between sacred and profane in the articulation of sacred space in the
context of the ANE background. In commentaries on Exodus, the idea of the
tabernacle as the actual dwelling of God is undermined by both philosophical
commitments and reliance upon ANE sources as a key to understand it.
Dozeman and Jacob Milgrom follow the insights of Eliade in this manner.
Dozeman writes that the “descent of God into the tabernacle and the approach of the
priestly representatives into the tent of meeting bridge the gap between the sacred
and the profane, which was not possible during the original theophany on Mount
Sinai.”545 Jacob Milgrom follows a similar dynamic in asserting that the entrance of
God and the entrance of humans are different based on the same categories.546

Karen H. Jobes and Moisés Silva, Invitation to the Septuagint (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2000), 92.
543

For more on the historical roots and Platonic philosophy of Alexandrian
exegesis, see David S. Dockery, Biblical Interpretation Then and Now: Contemporary
Hermeneutics in the Light of the Early Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1992); Maren
R. Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria (Cambridge, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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Dozeman, Exodus, 599. Such an idea bypasses the theophany at Sinai in
Exod 3, and the reality that Mount Sinai also has grades of holiness, like the
sanctuary.
545

Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday,
2001), 2085.
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Apart from the explicit use of an ontological dichotomy between the sacred
and the profane, other scholars opt to deny the literalness of the Sinai theophanies or
the idea of an actual divine dwelling in a place. As indicated in the previous chapters,
the negation of any literal component in the description of the theophany leading to
a spiritualized or analogical reading of the text also stems from a timeless conception
of Being that stems from a Platonic ontology. As an example, Sarna writes that “the
sanctuary is not meant to be understood literally as God’s abode.”547 Meyers shares a
similar perspective, as she writes that the “idea of the tabernacle as a dwelling may
be more metaphoric than literal”548 and concludes that it “does not necessarily mean
that God was believed to be literally or physically present in it.”549 These
conclusions, again, do not stem from what the text presents in itself, but from
methodological commitments that assume extrabiblical philosophical categories.
Section V: E and E’ (Exodus 7:2-13 and 24:12–32:31–36:7)
Textual Notes
The fifth section of the literary structure of Exodus, E (Exod 7:2–13) and E’
(Exod 32:31–36:7), presents the reader with an apparent repetition of the previous
section. As Moses enters Pharaoh’s presence in D and God’s presence in D’, he will
do so again in E and E’. The two main scenes in this section, then, are: (1) Moses in
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Sarna, Exodus, 158.
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Meyers, Exodus, 222.
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Table 7. E and E’ textual notes
E. Pharaoh’s Building Project without
Shabbat: God’s Command and Pharaoh’s
Second Disobedience (Part II) (7:2-13)

Eʹ. God’s Building Project with Shabbat:
God’s Command and People’s Obedience
(Part II) (32:31–36:7)

• Moses and Aaron enter Pharaoh’s
presence (7:2a)

• Moses intercedes in God’s presence (32:3134)

• God’s command to let the Israelites go,
• God’s command for Israel to remove their
and prediction of judgments upon Pharaoh ornaments, with Israel under judgment for
for disobedience (7:2b–4)
disobedience (God’s presence no longer in
their midst); Israel obeys (32:35–33:11)
• Egyptians will know that YHWH is the
Lord (7:5)

• Moses longs to know YHWH more
intimately (33:12–17)

• God reveals His power to Pharaoh: sign of
serpent and renewed chance of obedience
(7:6–12)

• God reveals His glory/goodness/name to
Moses (33:18–34:9)
• Covenant re-established and renewed
chance of obedience (34:10–36:1)
• Emphasis on God’s initiative: “I will do”
(34:10)
• Cultic “Decalogue” with emphasis on
worship, Shabbat, and sanctuary (34:11–26)
• God commands Moses to write down
these words and closing remarks (34:27-28)
• Moses’ face shines on the way down
(34:29-35)
• Moses assembles the people and says the
commands of God:
a. Shabbat (35:1–3)
b. Contributions of different materials,
spices, and oils (35:4–9)
c. Convocation of skillful men (35:10–19)

• Pharaoh’s response (disobedience): heart
hardened after second chance to obey
(7:13)

• People’s response (obedience): people bring
contribution and are restrained from
bringing more (35:20–36:7)

PHARAOH’S DISOBEDIENCE LEADS
TO WHAT FOLLOWS: DE-CREATION
THROUGH PLAGUES
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OBEDIENCE OF PEOPLE LEADS TO
WHAT FOLLOWS: RE-CREATION
THROUGH TABERNACLE

the presence of Pharaoh and God; and (2) what results from this meeting.
As indicated above, the first scene in E and E’ is similar to the beginning of D
and D’. In the previous section a command is given to both Pharaoh and Israel, and
both Pharaoh and Israel disobey God’s commands. In E, Moses appears in the
presence of Pharaoh once again, with a renewed chance for obedience. This renewed
chance for obedience appears in the repetition of the original command to let the
people go in Exod 7:2. In order for Pharaoh and Egypt (Exod 7:5) to know ()ידע
God, the second command is given with a revelation of the power of God through
signs (Exod 7:6-12). E ends with Pharaoh’s response to the renewed chance for
obedience and the signs: disobedience indicated by a hardened heart (Exod 7:13).
Like D’, E’ begins with Moses in the presence of God once again after the
disobedience of the people in the episode of the golden calf. Moses enters the
presence of God to intercede for the people, causing God to give the people a
renewed chance for obedience. Like Pharaoh, the people also receive a revision of
the original command given to them. In this context God reveals himself to Moses,
who, unlike the Egyptians, is willing to know ( )ידעGod (Exod 33:13). Exodus 34
revises many of the legislative elements seen throughout the book already, along with
the ordinances that would provide the people with rest (Exod 34:11-26 and 35:1-3).550
Moses assembles the people and speaks as God told him to. The speech that begins

The discrepancies between E and E’ are due to the fact that God’s
commands to Israel in the context of the covenant were significantly more detailed
than God’s command to Pharaoh. The revision of the commands seen in E’ has no
counterpart in E because the context of the God-human relation is different.
550
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in Exod 35 includes a renewed convocation of skillful Israelites who will work on
God’s building project. Like E, E’ ends with a renewed opportunity for obedience.
Unlike Pharaoh in D and E, Israel obeys God in E’ (Exod 35:20–36:7). The chapter
ends with the people willingly obeying the word of God through Moses and
contributing to the construction of the sanctuary.
The significance of this section to a possible construction of the God-human
relation in the book of Exodus is that Pharaoh’s and Israel’s responses in E and E’ to
the commands of God shape what happens next in the book. Pharaoh’s disobedience
to God’s command to liberate the Israelites (implying life) leads into the undoing of
creation in F. At the same time, Israel’s obedience to the commands of God (also
implying life from the seven stages in which the commands were given) leads into
the re-creation of the world through the construction of the sanctuary in F’.

God-Human Relation Notes
Since the previous section focused on the scholarly interpretation of sacred
space sparked by the text of Exod 25:8, this section will focus on the scholarly
interpretation of the dynamic between God and Moses on the mountain in the text of
Exod 33:12–34:8.551 I will begin by assessing something only mentioned indirectly so
far: the scholarly interpretation of the notion of God’s presence.552

For a few studies on this particular subject see Dozeman, God on the
Mountain, and Hauge, Descent from the Mountain.
551

As indicated before, the theme of presence is crucial in the book of Exodus.
The book begins with divine absence; then God visits the people, delivers them, and
shows signs of presence up until the golden calf incident. This episode creates the
552
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Divine presence: God and Moses on the mountain
Baruch A. Levine is correct in noticing that a “concern with the presence of
God and his nearness is a major theme”553 in the Hebrew Bible. A brief look at the
literary structure above proves that this is not different in Exodus, especially in the
context of chapters 33–34. Childs writes about the divine presence in these chapters,
“The most definite thing which one can say is that all these stories revolve about the
one theme of God’s presence.”554
The concept of God’s presence is introduced—not for the first time in the
book, but in this particular section—in Exod 32:34. After the sin of Israel with the
golden calf, God tells Moses that he will send an angel to go ahead of the people into
the land, as he promised. This information about the angel going with the people yet
without divine presence is repeated in Exod 33:2-3, causing the people to mourn in
an act of contrition (Exod 33:4-6).555 The text pauses to insert a note—that is one of

possibility of divine absence again, but after Moses’ intercession for the people and
covenant renewal, the people can enjoy God’s presence again through the
construction of the sanctuary. Durham correctly observes—yet without the insight
that the book begins with absence—that Exod 33:17 “is at the very center of the
composite narrative of Presence-Absence-Presence which provides the theological
center of Israel’s struggle to belong to Yahweh.” Durham, Exodus, 446.
553

Levine, “On the Presence of God,” 72.

Childs, Exodus, 585. Dozeman sees two main themes: the divine guidance
in the wilderness and the revelation of God at the mountain. Dozeman, Exodus, 717.
And Noth sees that the central theme in the section is the presence of God in the
midst of the people. See Martin Noth, Exodus: A Commentary (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1962), 253.
554

Dozeman argues that the stripping away of jewelry here indicates a
possible divorce between God and the people. Dozeman, Exodus, 722–23.
555
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the major issues in the interpretation of this text for the majority of scholars—about
the tent of meeting, adding the information (Exod 33:11) that God spoke to Moses
“face to face” () ָּפ ִּנֹ֣ים אֶל־ ָּפ ִֵּ֔נים. What follows is the textual presentation of God’s
presence in at least three ways: the significance of the presence of God leading the
people (Exod 33:12-16), Moses’ request to see the glory ( )כָּבודof God (Exod 33:17–
18), and God’s response to Moses’ request by revealing His name ( )ׁשםand actions
for Israel (Exod 33:19–34:8).
Childs observes that there are at least two ways in which this text is
interpreted.556 The first emphasizes that what is being revealed is the essence of
God,557 while the second emphasizes that what is being revealed are the attributes of
God. Sarna—favoring the former—writes that the glory (“ )כָּבודoften signifies God’s
self-manifestation, some outward, visible sign of His essential presence,”558 that is,
not the disclosure of the divine essence itself, but only a sign. This interpretation of
the text inevitably assumes the impossibility of grasping any essential element of
God’s being in time or history. What humanity perceives are only signs of something
beyond human experience. This partial rendering of meaning implies an analogical

Normally what organizes the interpretative context for these passages are
the abundant source-critical considerations. I could observe these considerations as
other signs of the influence of extrabiblical assumptions operating in biblical
interpretation. But since I have already pointed this out before, I will focus on the
two alternatives proposed by Childs.
556

Childs writes that the “classic Jewish and Christian commentators of the
medieval period were fully agreed that no mortal man can see the essence of God
and live.” Childs, Exodus, 598.
557

558

Sarna, Exodus, 213–14.
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reading of the text that stems from a timeless conception of reality (analogia entis).
Childs correctly equates the attributes of God proclaimed in the text with his
essential nature: that is, the only way to know the essence of God is through his
attributes.559 These insights in the text provide a fascinating window into any
ontological discussion of the divine nature. Again, the text enforces the reality that
there is no dichotomy between the appearance and acts of God and his essence and
nature. In this sense, the text creates a condition in which any timeless conception of
Being—that implies the manifestation of God’s presence through fire, glory, and
name as “signs” of a timeless reality—becomes incompatible with the text itself.
What the text indicates once again is the unified perspective of God’s nature and
actions in the context of his movement with the people in history and time. There is
no dichotomy between appearance and reality; the appearance is the reality. God’s
actions for the people are a window into his being.
Another point about divine presence must be made here. The breaking of the
covenant in Exod 32 implies that the people no longer adhere to the stipulations that
allow God to be present among them and act for them, leading God to present them
with the threat of absence. Durham correctly observes, in regard to the significance
of divine presence, that “the people had somehow not realized this until they were
under the prospect of Yahweh’s Absence; then it became all too terribly clear, and
they were overwhelmed by bitter grief.”560 To break the covenant implies living

559

Childs, Exodus, 596.

560

Durham, Exodus, 447.

239

without the presence of a God who is present and acts in and through the covenant
relationship. Anxiety about the divine absence in their bondage in Egypt would turn
into anxiety about the divine absence in their bondage to sin. So, once again, in the
narrative the significance of divine presence is attested in a situation where divine
absence is a real possibility.
To conclude this brief evaluation of the scholarly interpretation of divine
presence, it is significant to point out that the influence of extrabiblical
presuppositions in biblical interpretation does not imply that biblical scholars are
constantly aware of them in their work. As noted in this section, several biblical
scholars are able to grasp what the text is saying without inferring any extrabiblical
categories to interpret it. Yet this volatile interpretative environment only enhances
the fact that philosophical presuppositions within exegetical methods and within the
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars are unaccounted for in the process
of interpretation.
Section VI: F and F’ (Exodus 7:14–12:32 and 36:8–40:33)
Textual Notes
The sixth section of the literary structure of Exodus, F (Exod 7:14–12:32) and
F’ (Exod 36:8–40:33), presents the reader with at least two different scenes: (1) the
result of Pharaoh’s second disobedience (de-creation through the plagues) and the
result of Israel’s obedience (re-creation through the construction of the sanctuary);
and (2) the specifications for the Passover (symbol of Israel’s deliverance from Egypt)
and the specifications for the construction of the sanctuary (symbol of Israel’s
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Table 8. F and F’ textual notes
F. De-Creation through Plagues (which
include other commands in the context of
disobedience) and Preparation for
Deliverance from Egypt (7:14–12:32)

Fʹ. Re-Creation through Tabernacle
(which include other commands in the
context of obedience) and Preparation for
Deliverance from Sin (36:8–40:33)

• Plague 1 (Water into Blood) (7:14-25)

• Construction Step 1 - Curtains (36:8-19)

• Plague 2 (Frogs) (8:1-15)

• Construction Step 2 - Boards, Sockets, and
Veil (36:20-38)

• Plague 3 (Insects) (8:16-19)

• Construction Step 3 - The Ark (37:1-9)

• Plague 4 (Flies) (8:20-32)

• Construction Step 4 - The Table (37:10-16)

• Plague 5 (Cattle Die) (9:1-7)

• Construction Step 5 - The Lampstand (37:1724)

• Plague 6 (Boils) (9:8-12)

• Construction Step 6 - The Altar of Incense
(37:25-29)

• Plague 7 (Hail) (9:13-35)

• Construction Step 7 - The Altar of Burnt
Offering (38:1-7)

• Plague 8 (Locusts) (10:1-20)

• Construction Step 8 - The Laver of Bronze
(38:8)

• Plague 9 (Darkness) (10:21-29)

• Construction Step 9 - The Court Items (38:920)

• Intro to Plague 10 (Death of Firstborn) (11)

• Construction Step 10 - The Priestly Garments
(39:1-31)
People finish the work done “according to
what the Lord had commanded Moses” /
Moses evaluates the work and blesses them
(39:32-43)

• God details the procedure for the Passover
(symbol of people’s deliverance from
Egypt):

• God details the procedure for the erection
of the tabernacle (symbol of people’s
deliverance from sin):

a. God speaks in the land of Egypt
(Pharaoh’s Land) (12:1)
b. First month of the year (hakhodesh)
(12:2)
c. Passover instructions (12:2-27a)

a. God speaks in the desert (No Man’s
Land) (40:1)
b. First day of month (hakhodesh) (40:2)
c. Tabernacle instructions (40:2-16)
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Table 8—Continued
• The people worship and do according to
what “the Lord had commanded Moses”
(12:27b-28)

• Place of worship established and Moses
does according to what “the Lord
commanded Moses” in seven-day pattern:
1. Pillars, sockets, and tent (40:17-19)
2. Ark of the Testimony (40:20-21)
3. Table and bread (40:22-23)
4. Lampstand and light (40:24-25)
5. Altar of incense (40:26-27)
6. Veil and altar of burnt offering with
sacrifice (40:28-29)
7. Laver of bronze and washing (40:30-32)

• Conclusion: Plague 10 (Death of Firstborn): • Conclusion: Moses finishes the work, erects
Pharaoh evaluates the finished work of
the court and hangs up veil for gateway:
God, obeys, and asks for blessing (12:29-32) “thus Moses finished the work” (40:33)

deliverance from sin).
In F’ a different dynamic takes place. In contrast to Pharaoh, Israel obeys
God’s commands at the end of section E’. The people freely give from what they
have, and the stage is set for the construction of the sanctuary. Because of the
people’s obedience, the narrative moves into a scene of re-creation. The relation
between the construction of the sanctuary and the creation has been noted by several
scholars.561 Already at the beginning of section D’ the reader is able to attest that, like

See Peter J. Leithart, “Making and Mis-Making: Poiesis in Exodus 25–40,”
International Journal of Systematic Theology 2, no. 3 (November 2000): 313; Joseph
Blenkinsopp, “The Structure of P,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1976): 275–
92; Peter J. Kearney, “Creation and Liturgy: The P Redaction of Ex 25–40,”
Zeitschrift für die alttestameutliche Wissenschaft 89 (1977): 375–87; Sarna, Exploring
Exodus, 213–14; Joshua Berman, The Temple: Its Symbolism and Meaning Then and Now
(Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1995), 14–15; Fretheim, Exodus, 269–71.
561
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the creation, the plan to construct the sanctuary unfolds in seven sections ending
with shabbat (Exod 25:1–31:18),562 and this same seven-stage pattern is seen in the
inauguration of the sanctuary in Exod 40:17-32.563 In F’, paralleling the undoing of
creation in F, the construction of the sanctuary takes place in ten different stages.
Just as in F creation was undone in ten steps because of disobedience, in F’, because
of Israel’s obedience, it takes ten steps to re-create the cosmos in a wilderness setting.
In addition to these parallels, at the end of the undoing of creation in F (Exod
12:32) Pharaoh asks for a blessing ()ברך, and at the end of the redoing of creation in
F’ Moses blesses ( )ברךthe people (Exod 39:43).
The second scene in this text is marked by specifications for the Passover in F,
and for the erection of the sanctuary in F’. This parallel emphasizes one of the main
thematic elements in the book: the Exodus from Egypt and God’s plan to liberate the

Although I am emphasizing the element of creation in the construction of
the sanctuary, I am aware that it is not the only thematic element that emerges from
its presentation in the text. Myung Soo Suh focuses on the military nature of the
sanctuary and writes that in the construction of the tabernacle “the Israelites form a
cultic-military community in the wilderness.” Myung Soo Suh, The Tabernacle in the
Narrative of Israel from the Exodus to the Conquest (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 1.
562

It is significant to note another parallel between Exodus and the creation
account here. It is common knowledge that the creation account in Gen 1 is
organized in a parallel form emphasizing the forming and filling dynamic of
creation. While the first three days of creation gave form to what had no form, the
second set of three days filled that which now had form. In Exodus, Bezalel gives
form to the sanctuary in ten different stages (Exod 36:8–39:31), and Moses walks
into the sanctuary and fills it with the elements it needs to function (Exod 40:17–32).
The understanding of the plagues as a war against the deities of Egypt would fit in
well with such a perspective. One should also keep in mind that the creation
account—as noted by other scholars—also serves as a polemic against the deities of
Egypt, so the elements of creation and war/polemic are not mutually exclusive.
563
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people from sin through the sanctuary. In both F (Exod 12:2) and F’ (Exod 40:2), the
expression “the first day” is used ()ה ַ֧חדֶ ׁש, shedding even more light on the relation
between both sections. Ten plagues lead to the demarcation of “the first day” of the
year, and the ten steps in the construction of the sanctuary lead to the demarcation of
the “first day” of the month. As indicated earlier, F ends with the conclusion of
God’s work of de-creation in the death of the firstborn of Egypt (Exod 12:29-32), and
F’ ends with the final touches upon the sanctuary and the blessing of Moses upon the
people (Exod 40:33).

God-Human Relation Notes
There are at least two issues that touch upon the God-human relation in F
and F’: (1) the way scholars interpret and explain the plagues, and (2) the divine
movement in the Passover.
Divine action: plagues and Passover
The section of the plagues beginning in Exod 7:8 is traditionally taken as a
proper example “on which to demonstrate the role of sources.”564 Yet Childs
recognizes the insufficiency of source- or form-critical analysis to penetrate the
meaning of the encounter before Moses and the king as he writes, “It is apparent that
the essential problem with which we began is not ultimately form-critical in nature,

Childs, Exodus, 130. Among those who see a unified structure in this
section is Cassuto, Exodus, 92.
564
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but profoundly theological.”565 As noted so far, God reveals his nature through his
acts within the covenant toward Moses and Israel. The plagues should not be seen as
separate from this general idea, for they also reveal the character of a God who
responds to evil through action.566
Yet in this theological setting, the extrabiblical assumptions within the
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars shift their perception of the textual
indicators of a theological explanation of the plagues. The focus is turned to the
exegetical elements that would justify the possibility of a natural cause for the
plagues.567 For example, Pharaoh’s lack of response to the first plague (Exod 7:14-25)
is interpreted as a “slight exegetical basis for seeing some relation between the
tradition of the first plague and the natural seasonal reddening of the Nile.”568
Lawrence Boadt agrees and adds that the “first nine plagues all have natural

565

Childs, Exodus, 149.

The actions of God for Israel and for Egypt also carry the intent to impart
knowledge of God, a knowledge that is sometimes obeyed and sometimes rejected.
Dru Johnson points out that “in Exodus, we are able to clearly distinguish knowing
and error from each along several lines: knowers who refuse to listen to the
authenticated authority and knows who listen yet fail to embody the authority’s
instructions to the degree required.” Johnson, Biblical Knowing, 65. What this study
shows so far is that different human reactions to God’s commands lead to different
divine actions toward humanity and the land. Obedience leads to life; disobedience
leads to the advancement of death. Once again the flow of the narrative shows its
dependence upon the creation and fall narratives. For more on the emphasis of
knowing in Exodus, see Blackburn, God Who Makes Himself.
566

Fretheim is one scholar who goes beyond the natural/supernatural debate
and proposes that the plagues represent a hypernatural situation where nature is
presented in excess. See Fretheim, Exodus, 109.
567

568

Childs, Exodus, 154.
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explanation in conditions found even today in Egypt.”569 Sarna follows this lead and
asserts that while the possibility of natural causes has been proposed by several
scholars, the “entire account has a didactic and theological purpose, not a
historiographic one.”570 The idea that the “J and E authors are responsible for eight
plagues, and P has added two others”571 as well as the possibility of natural causes
takes away any realistic reading of the text,572 and inevitably affects the text’s
theological portrayal of a God of war who acts against the forces of evil in the
world.573
Regarding God’s involvement in the Passover, much can be said. F and F’
begin with an emphasis on time. While the Passover marks the beginning of all
months (Exod 12:2), the tabernacle is to be set up on the first day of the first month
(Exod 40:2). God’s involvement in and appointment of periods of time in the text
is—as noted several times in this study—incompatible with the timeless conception

Lawrence Boadt, Reading the Old Testament: An Introduction (Mahwah, NJ:
Paulist Press, 1984), 167. One of the main proposals for the natural development of
the plagues is seen in Greta Hort, “The Plagues of Egypt,” Zeitschrift für die
Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 69 (1957): 84–103; 70 (1958): 48–59.
569

570

Sarna, Exploring Exodus, 76–77.

571

Boadt, Reading the Old Testament, 167.

The obvious issue that arises when the natural theory is proposed is that
without “God’s intervention Moses and Aaron could not have foreseen the coming
of these disasters with such precision.” Herbert Wolf, An Introduction to the Old
Testament Pentateuch (Chicago: Moody, 1991), 161.
572

573

For more see Thomas B. Dozeman, God at War, 15–24.
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of God entertained in theological writings.574 Yet apart from the evident
compatibility between God and time/history, another issue deserves attention at this
stage.
So far I have touched upon conceptions of divine presence and sacred space
in the context of sanctuary and ritual.575 The focus of this section will be on at least

On the actions of God in history, Neil B. MacDonald correctly observes
that “Von Rad’s insight that Israel’s foundational experience of YHWH was of a soteriological
identity implied a historical experience of YHWH acting in their life then and there . . . If one
looks at Augustine through Anselm and Aquinas to Calvin, one sees that all of them
presuppose a God acting from eternity predestinating all that was to happen in
human history from eternity. If Von Rad is right this cannot be the appropriate
hermeneutical category for the locus of divine action in the life of Israel.” MacDonald adds,
in the context of Exodus, that the “Exodus narrative is quite clear that God speaks to
Israel and Moses in particular then and there; the narrative-agent that is God is not
speaking from eternity.” MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel, xiii, xiv.
Although MacDonald is right in his observations concerning the actions of God in
history as portrayed by the text, his solution to make sense of these explicit assertions
assumes the same philosophical assumptions he criticizes. MacDonald writes: “I
argue that the witness of the Old Testament, and Old Testament narrative in
particular, is that YHWH is essentially a judging yet desisting forbearing self. But
this God may remain an essentially fictional self, condemned to remain within the
literary confines of the narrative unless we can find some way for this God to break
into historical reality.” Ibid., xiv. The dichotomy between the reality presented in the
text and history—as noted before—co-appears with a timeless interpretation of
Being: the same framework that allows Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin to construct
their theology.
574

Because sacred space was dealt with earlier in the context of sanctuary and
ritual, in this study the idea of place will be distinguished from it. Craig G.
Bartholomew argues that “place is part of our lived, everyday experience, whereas
space, especially in our modern world, is a theoretical concept and as such an
abstraction from the lived experience of place.” Craig G. Bartholomew, Where Mortals
Dwell: A Christian View of Place for Today (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011),
3. Whether the text supports these distinctions or not is a question for further studies.
What can be noted at this time is that there is one distinction between the presence of
God in the context of what scholars call sacred space and in place: in the sanctuary,
God intends to “dwell” ( )ׁשכןwith Israel by his own initiative (and not by any
ritualistic invocation the people might perform), but the divine presence in common
575
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one example of how extrabiblical assumptions influence the scholarly interpretation
of God and place. The rationale of divine involvement in the event of the Passover
(Exod 12:12-13) is expressed by the text through the imagery that God would “go
through the land of Egypt” ( ) ָּעב ְַר ִּ ֹ֣תי בְאֶ ֶַּֽרץ־ ִּמצ ְַרי ִּםbut would “pass over” ()ּו ָּפ ַסח ִּ ְ֖תי עֲל ֶכֹ֑ם
those who chose the appointed plan of escape (Exod 12:3-11). As in the beginning of
the book, the location of divine presence is significant for the Passover to take place.
Because of the extrabiblical conception of a timeless God—a conception that
permeates critical and uncritical commentaries of both Christian and Jewish origin—
scholars vary in their interpretation of how God moves through places. Sarna, for
instance, to justify the textual portrayal of God’s movement, interprets the “moving
through” the land as an “anthropomorphism, or ascription to God of human
activity, in order to make His active Presence in history more vividly and
dramatically perceived.”576 In other words, because God cannot move in space/place
due to philosophical commitments established a priori, the way to justify the
language of the text is through the inference that God is “made” historical by the
writer through anthropomorphism. The language of the text is made compatible with
the reality of the reader via the assumption of a biblical writer who “makes” God
historical.

places never implies dwelling. In Exod 12, God “moves through” ( )עברthe land. The
former carries the imagery of Bedouin living; the latter, warfare. See Dozeman,
Exodus, 269.
576

Sarna, Exodus, 56.
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Section VII: G and G’ (Exodus 12:32–13 and 36:8–40:34–38)
Textual Notes
The seventh and final section of the literary structure of Exodus, G (Exod
12:32–13) and G’ (Exod 40:34–38), presents the reader with the transitional point of
the parallel-panel structure in G and with the conclusion of the book in G’.

Table 9. G and G’ textual notes
G. Exodus from Egypt (God with People)
(12:33–13)

G’. Exodus from Sin (God with People)
(40:34-38)

• Exodus from Egypt: in haste, silver and
gold, geographical note (Rameses to
Succoth), mixed multitude, and dateline
(430 years) (12:33–41)
• Passover instructions (12:42–51)
• God asks for the consecration of firstborn
(13:1–2)
• Moses speaks of feast of unleavened bread
(13:3–10)
• Moses speaks of consecration of firstborn
(13:11–16)
• Israel begins to journey (nasa`) into the
wilderness (13:17–20)

• Israel continues to journey (nasa`) in the
wilderness (40:37)

• God leads the people onward in a pillar of
cloud and fire (13:21–22)

• God leads the people onward in a pillar of
cloud and fire and rests upon the tabernacle
(40:34–38)

One of the interesting features of G is the presentation of additional
information concerning the Passover and laws concerning the consecration of the
firstborn (Exod 12:42–13:16). In G’ there is no counterpart to these laws. The idea is
that while the physical deliverance from Egypt is anticipated and celebrated through
the Passover feast, the final Exodus from sin is never accomplished in G’. The
249

construction of the sanctuary functions as a temporary means to resolve the problem
of sin and grant the people the privilege of living under the shadow of YHWH. This
is why both sections end with the same imagery.
G ends with Israel “journeying” ( )נסעinto the wilderness under the protection
of the cloud ( ) ָּענָּןand the fire (( )אׁשExod 13:17-22). G’ ends with the continuation of
this journey ( )נסעand the continual protection of YHWH through the cloud ( ) ָּענָּןand
the fire (( )אׁשExod 40:37-38). The journey continues; the spiritual Exodus from sin is
much longer than the physical Exodus from Egypt. Yet the people can trust that the
God who acts through covenant will continue guiding them on.

God-Human Relation Notes
The final section dealing with how extrabiblical conceptions of the Godhuman relation influence the interpretation of the God-human relation in Exodus
will focus on the obvious element in this section: the interpretation of the fire and
cloud as indicators of divine presence.
Divine presence: cloud and fire
Because of these extrabiblical conceptions, any literal or univocal reading of
the narrative implies, to say the least, a great degree of naiveté. Sarna explicitly
addresses the conception that drives the majority of interpretations regarding the
cloud and fire as personifications of the divine:
The God of the Hebrew Bible is a Being who transcends the limits of time and
space, and thus surpasses human imagining. Hence, God’s indwelling Presence
in the world is symbolized, however inadequately, by the mysterious, intangible,
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incorporeal elements of fire and cloud. . . . this should always be understood as
figurative language.577
With this basic premise in mind, one can see at least two ways in which the pillars of
cloud and fire are interpreted: through a dismissal of the supernatural via sourcecritical and literary arguments; or through arguments related to possible natural
causes.
Fretheim writes concerning these unrealistic imageries that the “combination
of various sources provides a kaleidoscope of images: divine messengers, pillars of
fire and cloud,”578 and these elements are present in the narrative due to “liturgical
interests and powerful storytelling skills.”579 Fretheim summarizes his point by
insisting that “trying to sort it [these depictions of God] out in literal fashion, or
suggesting that Israel considered the detail to correspond precisely to reality, is like
retouching Renoir’s paintings to make them look like photographs.”580 In this light,
the narratives—along with their depictions of God—must be appreciated as works of
literature with no correspondence to reality.581 Such an inference does not come from
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M. F. Unger is correct in assessing the situation in Old Testament
scholarship in the following way: “The critical theory has been deliberately
fabricated and foisted in Old Testament scholarship to explain away the
supernatural, whether in revelation, miracle or fulfilled prophecy. This is its
fundamental error.” M. F. Unger, Introductory Guide to the Old Testament (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1951), 271.
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any textual unusualness, but from the categories that prevent any possible literal
reading of God’s actions through fire or cloud, in a world where pillars of cloud and
fire do not guide people.
Yet, as with other texts depicting the supernatural, in addition to the sourcecritical or literary dismissal of the supernatural is the explanation of the phenomena
of the cloud and fire through natural causes. As C. Houtman puts it, “unwilling to
consider it a product of pure fantasy, they search for the origin of this imagery.”582
Among these is Noth, who explains the pillar of cloud and fire by way of natural
causes in the following manner: “The phenomenon of the pillars of cloud and fire
presumably goes back to observation of an active volcano, to which allusion is
without a doubt made in the account of the events on Sinai.”583
Once again, whether in source-critical/literary arguments or arguments
pertaining to natural causes, a timeless conception of reality implies that God is
beyond the realm of space and time, so these images must be taken into
consideration only if understood as figurative. In other words, the dichotomy created
by a timeless conception of reality between what appears and what is causes the
interpretation of what appears to be merely figurative, since it is distinct from reality
itself.

C. Houtman, Exodus, Vol. 2 (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok, 1996), 255. For
other examples of the imagery as fantasy or as a literary feature, see Laura Feldt, The
Fantastic in Religious Narrative from Exodus to Elisha (New York: Routledge, 2012),
105.
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Noth, Exodus: A Commentary, 109.
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Summary
This section attempted to trace the influence of extrabiblical conceptions upon
the interpretation of the God-human relation presented by the text itself. The chapter
began by providing the reader with a fresh assessment of the literary structure of the
book, showing the possible intention of the author/final redactor in organizing the
material in a parallel-panel structure. From this seven-part structure, issues
pertaining to the God-human relation were uncovered and the extrabiblical
influences upon the interpretation of the text laid out. These delimitations and
conceptions are not final, but provide the ground for the descriptive analysis of the
God human relation to take place, with an emphasis on the effect of presuppositions
upon interpretation.
Extrabiblical conceptions of the God-human relation influence interpretation
in varied ways. From a reliance upon the documentary hypothesis and its dissection
of the text to the use of analogical language to explain the supernatural elements in
the text, scholars, through method and their own presuppositional frameworks, are
bound to a conception of the God-human relation that is, many times, foreign to the
text.
Table 10 provides an overview of how textual depictions of the God-human
relation are reinterpreted through extrabiblical categories. The first column points
out the issues observed in each of the seven sections; the second column pinpoints
the actual assumption that guides the interpretation of the particular issues
mentioned; the third column shows the means by which the assumption operates in
interpretation; and the final column depicts the effects of such assumptions upon the
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interpretation of the text.

Table 10. Effects of extrabiblical assumptions on interpretations of the Godhuman relation
Textual
Issues

Assumption

Means of Application

The Relation
Between
Genesis and
Exodus

a. Impossibility of
unified conception
of divine action
between Genesis
and Exodus.

The Relation
Between
Hebrew Faith
and History

a. Timeless
a. Dichotomy between
conception of reality Hebrew faith and
(nature x
history.
supernature).

Divine Action: a. No connection
Egypt and
between the
Wilderness
emphasis on
covenant and divine
action in different
sections of the book.
b. Ontology
precedes theology.
Israel’s
Rebellion:
Wilderness

a. Distinction
between sections of
the book.

Sinai and Law a. Law has no
divine origin.

Sinai and
Revelation

a. Impossibility of
divine
communication
between God and
humanity (timeless
conception of God).

a. Documentary
hypothesis.

a. Documentary
hypothesis.
b. Philosophical
principles (established
via method or
individual convictions)
precede theological
enquiry and shapes it.

Effect
a. The text does not
present a unified depiction
of a single author, but the
worldview of several
authors. God’s actions
reflect the worldview of the
source it is assigned to.
a. The text does not
provide a depiction of real
historical events, only the
recounting of faith of an
uncertain sequence of
unknown events.
a. Impossibility of a unified
perspective of the actions
of God for the people in
the book.
b. The location of God is
shaped by an ontology
foreign to the textual
depiction of divine action.

a. Documentary
hypothesis.

a. Israel’s questioning of
divine presence unrelated
to the battle of the
Amalakites.

a. ANE, historical
criticism, and
documentary
hypothesis.

a. Law is understood as
cultural product with no
correspondence to reality.

a. Phenomenal and
Noumenal Torah and
parallel studies with
Deuteronomy.

a. The people heard no
voice and the actual events
that resulted in the Law are
untraceable. Textual
depiction of the events is
incomplete.
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Table 10—Continued
Sacred Space

a. Platonic/timeless a. Eliade and the
conception of
appropriation of sacred
reality.
and profane language.
And the use of
b. Worldview of the Alexandrian
ANE.
hermeneutics to
determine the veracity
of biblical language.
b. Clements and the
reliance on ANE
sources to reconstruct
the intention of the
biblical author.

Divine
Presence: God
and Moses on
the Mountain

a. Platonic/timeless a. Translation and
conception of
inference.
reality.

Divine Action: a. Impossibility of
Plagues and
supernatural
Passover
actions.
b. Impossibility of
divine action in the
land.

a. Biblical conceptions of
divine presence and ritual
understood in terms of
sacred and profane along
with the assumptions they
carry. The translation of
biblical words into words
that would carry a
Hellenized conception of
the world.
b. The text does not depict
a complex and profound
conception of the divine
but a primitive account of
reality influenced by the
sources the Israelites had
in their world.
a. The idea of glory and
presence is understood in
distinction to the divine
essence. A temporal sign of
a timeless reality.

a. Interpretation of
a. Plagues understood as
plagues through natural not having occurred as the
causes or myth/fiction. text depicts and given
meaning either through
b. Anthropomorphism. natural explanations of
their appearance or
through setting them under
the context of fiction
writing.
b. The depictions of God
are shaped by the creativity
of the writer as they have
no correspondence to
history or reality.

Divine
Presence:
Cloud and
Fire

a. Platonic/timeless a. Natural causes or
conception of
literary fiction in the
reality.
depiction of divine
appearance texts.
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a. The cloud and the fire
are interpreted either
through natural causes or
through literary
fiction/myth.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
No exegesis or act of interpretation is presuppositionless. Accordingly, this
study addressed the question of the influence of philosophical presuppositions upon
the interpretation of the God-human relation in Exodus. Chapter 1 provided a brief
introduction to why such analysis is necessary. The chapter explored the neglected
issue of presuppositions in exegesis and why Exodus was an appropriate platform
upon which to evaluate them. It also presented the purpose and methodological
approach of this study, namely, descriptive analysis of the text. Chapter 2 addressed
the philosophical issues behind the conception of the God-human relation, namely
the notion of ontology (God), the notion of epistemology (human), and the notion of
history (relationship). Chapter 3 identified these philosophical conceptions in the
foundation of two interpretative traditions: the historical-grammatical and historicalcritical methods. Chapter 4 traced the influence of these presuppositions within the
interpretation of Exodus in general, and in the context of the notion of the Godhuman relation in particular.
At this stage I will provide a brief overview and summary of Chapters 2-4 and
conclude with some implications this study creates for scholarship as well as life.
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The God-Human Relation as Presuppositions
The second chapter of this study was written to introduce the reader to three
basic presuppositions that are operative in any act of interpretation. I organized these
presuppositions in what this study calls the God-human relation. The
presuppositions that make up this structure are ontology (God), epistemology
(human), and history (the mode in which the relation takes place).
Epistemology
I began this section by outlining the context in which interpretation takes
place, that is, the question of how one attains knowledge and forms meaning. At the
center of this discussion was the epistemological notion of the subject-object
relationship. Although tentative, the subject-object relation provided a way to see
broad historical developments relating to how humanity attains knowledge. Two
distinct historical transitions were highlighted in this section. The first transition—
one that emphasized an objectivist epistemological perception—focused on the role
of the object in interpretation as the subject took on a passive role. As for the
understanding of Being in this period, it was interpreted as timeless and dependent
upon a Platonic ontology. The second transition—one that emphasized a subjectivist
epistemological perception—was characterized by a change of emphasis from the
object to the subject. By understanding the subject differently from its predecessors,
postmodernity provided the context for the appearance of a temporal and historical
dimension of reality at the level of the subject. Yet the full implications of this
transition have not yet been integrated into the understanding of Being.
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Some preliminary implications for biblical interpretation within these
epistemological concerns are in order. Objectivist epistemology created the Platonic
distinction between subject and object, leading biblical interpretation into a scientific
age where empirical evidence determined truth and the seemingly “primitive”
biblical narratives were turned into folklore. The possibility of humanity to
apprehend any revelation from God if not denied could only be devised in timeless
categories. In the modern period, this distance between humanity and any notion of
the divine was extended even more.
Subjectivist epistemology placed the human subject upon a new platform
where time, history, and language implied a relative outlook upon reality as a whole,
but has yet not extended this temporal ontological flow into the level of the object,
that is, to the interpretation of Being. The possibility of humanity apprehending any
revelation from the divine in history—because this change has not been realized—
becomes even more complex. Biblical stories with divine events become records of
communities of faith who experienced something that can only be experienced as
testimonies of faith, devoid of any ontological import.
Ontology
The second section of this chapter addressed how ontological premises
influence interpretation of what a text is and of the God who acts within the text.
Emphasis was given to the concept of timelessness and how it carries within itself
two basic assumptions that influence interpretation: the dichotomy between things as
they appear and things as they are, and the understanding of Being as timeless. The
immediate consequence of assuming a timeless conception of Being is the
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dichotomized perception of appearance and reality. As indicated in this study, both
liberal and conservative scholars assume such an ontology. The examples of
Bultmann and Vanhoozer showed how scholars wrestle with this dichotomy in
interpretation. While on the one hand Bultmann interpreted the mythological divine
acts in the text through a scientific and existential approach, on the other Vanhoozer,
explained the divine acts within the parameters of speech-act theory. The ontological
conception of timeless Being, then, directly affects not only interpretation, but how
scholars perceive God and his actions. This section also provided a few alternative
ways to understand and interpret a temporal perspective of Being.
History
The third and final section of this chapter dealt with the locus in which God
interacts with humanity: history. It began by noting how, at the turn of the
eighteenth century, historians departed from a pre-critical approach to the text and
embraced a scientific approach along with its macro-hermeneutical commitments. By
the twentieth century, these conceptions were, to some extent, left behind due to the
turn to the subject. During this transition, there was an emphasis on the fact that the
historian was not exempt from biases and assumptions. History was then perceived
as a biased reconstruction of historical events. This period brought forth the
approach known as historiography, which in turn was also not exempt from macrohermeneutical influences.
The analysis of the principle of history also shed light on the implications of
scientific presuppositions concerning the nature of history for biblical interpretation
in general and the book of Exodus in particular. From this analysis I was able to
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outline how the distinction between fact and faith is still prevalent in the
interpretation of Exodus. This reality allows for the gap between the assumptions of
the interpreter and of the biblical writer/audience to be widened, since the biblical
record only points to what the writers believed, exempt of any revelation. In order
for biblical scholarship to remain a scientific discipline, these assumptions cannot be
left behind.
The uncovering of the presupposition of the God-human relation—a notion
operative in the presuppositional frameworks of interpreters—provided the content
to be traced throughout the subsequent chapters of this study. Once it was
uncovered, this study attempted to trace the presupposition within interpretative
traditions (Chapter 3) and within the interpretation of Exodus (Chapter 4).

Presuppositions in Interpretative Traditions
The third chapter of this study, as noted earlier, attempted to trace the
philosophical presuppositions concerning the God-human relation within two
interpretative methods: the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods.
This analysis examined the formative periods of each method, focusing on
representative examples who influenced the methods’ conception.
The Historical-Grammatical Method
The analysis of the method was divided into two main parts. The first dealt
with the principle of history (as well as the relation between text and meaning) and
the second with the principle of ontology. The first section pointed out how in the
formative periods of the method, and through the work of Ernesti, the grammatical
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method developed with an emphasis upon philology. No role was given to the reader
apart from the rigorous application of the philological approach. What this indicates
is that the mindset of the time followed classical epistemology, where the subject is
passive in the generation of meaning. Although Ernesti understood the grammatical
method as one interpretative action—that is, the grammatical is the historical—
interpreters after Ernesti understood the method as two interpretative actions—a
grammatical as well as a historical. As noted earlier, what this implies is that, in
time, the influence of historical criticism grew and immersed itself in a grammatical
approach that was volatile enough to incorporate any presupposition into its
application. The second section dealt with the principle of ontology. Because the
words of the text (verba) were signs pointing to a truth or reality within the text (res),
in the end, the words themselves became disposable. Regardless of the way in which
the grammatical method is used, this interpretative context created by Platonic
categories of reality remains.
The Historical-Critical Method
The explicit use of philosophical presuppositions within the formation of
what is today known as historical criticism began with the work of Spinoza. Spinoza
did not create the historical-critical method, but created the necessary principles
upon which it would function. Among these principles are: (1) the primacy of reason
(as primary source) over the biblical text, ruling out by default any supernatural
elements such as divine voices, miracles, and theophanies, as well as any connection
between textual depictions of reality and reality itself; (2) the dichotomy between
Scripture (ethical piety) and philosophy (truth); (3) the dichotomy between the words
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of man (subject to imagination) and the word of God (conceived as the ethical
content that passes the validation of reason); (4) the general idea that the text and its
history are a wrapping around the ethical essence, or content. In time, these ideas
were developed and infused into the general practice of biblical interpretation.
Another representative scholar mentioned in this section was Julius
Wellhausen. Wellhausen is an example of those who implemented these ideas into
interpretation. Along with Spinoza, Wellhausen attempted to affirm that the
presuppositions given to the reader by the text are false and must be corrected by
reason through different means. Among the presuppositions that guided the work of
Wellhausen are: (1) as it pertains to epistemology, the Cartesian principle of doubt
along with its reliance and dependence on human reason (what is presented in the
text cannot be accepted at face value); (2) as it pertains to ontology, a timeless
conception of Being that inevitably creates a dichotomy between text and reality, as
well as the need for a historical-scientific evaluation of the text. In this sense, the
interpreted historical principle within the structure of historical criticism is inevitably
tied to specific philosophical commitments.
What this brief evaluation attempted to show was that interpretative
traditions are not exempt from philosophical commitments, whether the interpreter
realizes this or not. The manners in which these philosophical assumptions are
implemented into the formation of these methods are as varied as they are effective.

Presuppositions in the Interpretation of Exodus
The fourth and final chapter of this study attempted to trace the influence of
presuppositions relating to the God-human relation upon the interpretation of the
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God-human relation within the text of Exodus. This descriptive analysis took place
through an evaluation of the literary structure of Exodus. Knowing that scholars
generally organize the literary contents of Exodus around thematic/theological and
geographical markers, this study proposed a fresh evaluation of the intentional
organization of the book: a parallel-panel structure that emphasized the leadership of
both Moses and God, as well as God’s actions for Israel in their deliverance from
Egypt and in their deliverance from sin. This new assessment of the literary structure
provided the direction for the evaluation of the relation between presuppositions and
the God-human relation in the text. From the literary structure of Exodus, at least
ten issues relating to the God-human relation were uncovered. A brief summary of
the extrabiblical philosophical presuppositions that influence the scholarly
interpretations of these issues are in order.
The Relation between Genesis and Exodus
The first issue attempted to show that while the text points to a possible
unified continuation—literary and philosophical—between Genesis and Exodus, the
assignment of different sources to the ending of Genesis and the beginning of Exodus
points in another direction. The philosophical conceptions that lead to the
impossibility of a unified conception of God’s action as presented in the text enter
interpretation via the documentary hypothesis. In the end, under these extrabiblical
conceptions within the Documentary Hypothesis, the text is not able to present a
unified depiction of God and his acts from one book to the other. Through the
Documentary Hypothesis the possibility of a unified conception of God’s relation to
humanity is exchanged by a fragmented perception of the same notion through the
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work of several redactors from different sources and contexts. Under these
assumptions, any possibility of divine revelation implying a unified view of his
actions in the text, is dismissed.
The Relation between Hebrew Faith and History
The scholarly assumption here is related to the timeless conception of Being
that leads to the dichotomization of reality. This distinction between what appears
and what is can also be seen in biblical interpretation concerning the issue of history,
where there is a radical distance between the written descriptions of the biblical
authors concerning what happened (based on faith according to biblical scholars) and
the actual historical processes that took place (dictated by reason). The general
agreement among scholars is that what happened in history is not what is described
in the text, since this primitive description was based either on faith or on the
conflicting agendas of redactors from different time periods. The possibility that the
biblical author presents a realistic perception of the events—including the
supernatural elements—is negated. Scientific and sociological insights are favored,
and the biblical text is filtered through them.
Divine Action: Egypt and Wilderness
At least two assumptions appear regarding this particular issue in the
interpretation of Exodus: the fragmented perception of divine action from one
section of the book to another, as well as the influence of onto-theology—the
precedence of extrabiblical conceptions of Being over the textual description—upon
interpretation. Because the first issue, concerning the fragmented perception of God’s
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actions proposed by scholars, is recurrent in this study and has already been pointed
out above, I will focus here on the precedence of ontology over theology. Because
philosophical concepts are generally foreign to biblical scholars, the presence of
philosophical concepts in their work happens via the method of interpretation.
Because interpretative methods carry concepts of Being in themselves, these concepts
inevitably shape and condition the results of interpretation. In relation to God’s
actions in Egypt and in the wilderness, the idea of the location of God and the
possibility of his actions in history as they are depicted in the text are changed by an
ontology not portrayed by the text. Thus, while the text depicts an action of God, the
possibility and theological implications of the action are shifted by inferences that
change the question of “what it means.” The text might say that God acted in this or
that way, but what it means is inferred from the assumptions carried into
interpretation via method.
Israel’s Rebellion: Wilderness
Once again, the issue here is the fragmented perception of the text brought
about by the use of the documentary hypothesis. To develop a theology or
philosophy of God’s actions following the insight of biblical scholars in general
would create a problem. In this case, Israel’s questioning of the guidance and
presence of God in the wilderness would have no relation to the description of the
battle of the Amalekites that follows the questioning. Because the relation of human
choice, the flow of the narrative, and God’s actions are intimately related in Exodus,
depending on scholarly insights seems problematic to develop a unified conception
of God’s relation to humanity, a conception seemingly favored by the arrangement
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of the text.
Sinai and Law
The denial of the supernatural that takes place both in the presuppositional
frameworks of biblical scholars and in the formation of their methodologies leads to
the conclusion that the laws given in the different sections of Exodus and especially
at Sinai have no divine origin. This extrabiblical assumption places a filter on the text
and infers understanding from outside of it. While the text depicts God speaking to
Moses, the elders, and the people in the giving of the law, the scholarly conclusions
are reached through different means. A reliance upon ANE sources and the general
principles of historical criticism have led to scholars seeing the law as a product of
nomadic people, of priests with varied and conflicting agendas, with no
correspondence to reality or to the modern-day reader. The historical-critical mindset
determines beforehand what can and cannot be realistic in interpretation and in the
text, and with this basic structure formed, any difference in viewpoint in the text or
any apparent contradiction is used to favor their basic assumptions, never to present
a nuanced understanding of God’s relation to humanity or even to challenge the
assumptions themselves.
Sinai and Revelation
Following the issue above, a timeless conception of Being makes any
communication between God and humanity impossible, at least not on the terms the
text sets forth. This assumption becomes visible in interpretation when notions such
as the phenomenal and noumenal Torah are introduced in scholarship, leading to a
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dichotomized conception of revelation and the law itself. The assumption behind the
interpretation of Sinai—based on a timeless conception of Being—leads to the idea
that Israel could not have heard any voices, and that the actual events that led into
the giving of the law are untraceable. The textual depiction of how the law was
formed is, according to some scholars, incomplete. The gaps in the narrative created
by denial of the supernatural are filled, in interpretation, through inferences
influenced by ANE cultural/sociological reconstructions that radically depart from
what the text attempts to portray.
Sacred Space
The timeless conception of reality is operative in some scholarly work relating
to the notion of sacred space. As noted earlier, a good number of scholars rely upon
the work of Eliade in their appropriation of the concepts of sacred and profane. At
the same time, a good number of scholars see the worldview presented in the text as
strictly related to the ANE context of the writers, as seen in the work of Clements
and many others. While this assumption is not completely wrong, the problem arises
when the supernatural is excluded and the text has no divine counterpoint justifying
its unified perception of reality and God’s relation to humanity. The result is that
biblical conception of divine presence and ritual are understood in terms of the
extrabiblical assumptions within the work of Eliade and others. These ideas place a
grid upon the text. This problem was also seen in the LXX, where Alexandrian
hermeneutics shaped the very translation of the Hebrew words related to divine
presence into words that would be compatible with their worldview. So interpreters
shift the worldview of the text—along with its divine insights given through
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revelation—to either the worldview of translators who shifted the language to a
realistic portrayal of reality as they saw it, or to the worldview of the biblical
redactors themselves (primitive and based on ANE reconstructions).
Divine Presence: God and Moses on the Mountain
The texts that point directly to the divine and human relation in Exodus are
crucial to trace the influence of presuppositions in their interpretation. The episode of
God and Moses on the mountain in Exodus 33–34 is no different. In texts depicting
a divine manifestation of power, glory, or presence, the influence of a timeless
conception of Being is clearer than in other instances. In this particular context, some
scholars’ interpretations of the manifestation of the glory of God set forth the idea
that the glory and presence in time and before Moses are distinct from the divine
essence. What appears in the text is not as it is in reality; the manifestation of the
glory is a temporal sign of a timeless reality. These presuppositions can be seen in the
biblical interpretations of some scholars. The preeminence of ontology over theology
is once again noticeable.
Divine Action: Plagues and Passover
As mentioned earlier, whenever the biblical text depicts explicit supernatural
actions of God, the influence of presuppositions is just as explicit. In the context of
the textual depiction of the plagues, at least two assumptions are operative: the
impossibility of divinely intended supernatural actions as well as the impossibility of
divine action in the land. Both of these assumptions are motivated by a timeless
conception of Being and a scientific perception of reality. These assumptions lead
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some interpreters to interpret the plagues differently from the textual pointers,
favoring natural causes or the creation of myths to explain the meaning that the text
is attempting to convey. In regard to God’s presence in the land during the Passover,
because of the same assumptions, scholars point to the use of anthropomorphism to
provide intelligibility to the textual descriptions. In this sense, the actions of God are
shaped by the creativity of the writers and have no connection to the historical
processes themselves or reality as a whole.
Divine Presence: Cloud and Fire
The parallel-panel structure of Exodus ends on both sides with a presentation
of divine guidance through the cloud and fire. As in the case of the plagues, these
supernatural appearances are explained through the means of natural causes or
literary fiction/myth. These explanations are given at the backdrop of an ontology
foreign to the biblical text. Because a timeless conception of Being creates a
dichotomy between what appears and what is, the analogical understanding of the
textual content leads, as pointed out earlier, to unintelligible analogy. The biblical
interpreter understands what appears through the description of the text, but because
the interpreter has no access to its timeless correspondent, the interpreter resorts to
scientific arguments in the flow of history and time to justify its meaning. In the
majority of cases, interpreters draw the meanings of supernatural actions such as the
plagues, God’s presence, and the appearance of cloud and fire from conditions set
forth by science, reason, and the reconstructed worldview of ANE people.
Now that a general overview of the ideas set forth by this study has been
presented, I would like to end this study by addressing the implications of its findings
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for scholarship and life.

Implications for Scholarship and Life
In these concluding lines, I will attempt to outline some implications of this
study for scholarship and life, beginning with scholarship. This study traced the
philosophical presuppositions relating to the God-human relation (ontology,
epistemology, and history) that directly influence interpretation, be it from the
interpreter’s experience or methodology. What can be perceived within each of the
chapters is that while the text is attempting to convey a picture of the God-human
relation, the philosophical principles that shape interpretation prevent readers from
seeing that presentation as real for different reasons.
This problem raises the old question of the relation between philosophy and
the Bible. Because the Bible has been knowingly or unknowingly historically subject
to philosophy—and more recently science—its philosophical content and weight is
undermined. Yet this study indicates that a healthy movement between philosophy
and biblical interpretation should be to: (1) allow philosophy, the human subject, or
the biblical text to ask the questions; (2) allow the biblical text, with its own wording,
to shape, validate, or reject the philosophical questions themselves. In this way, the
control is found in the textual presentation and not in an extrabiblical philosophical
scheme applied to the text. This approach assumes that the only reliable source of
information, or window into reality itself, is found in the biblical text.
While a proper implementation of this approach would be the object of
another project, this study does attest that the text presents a philosophical picture of
the God-human relation that is unattainable in much of scholarly interpretation
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because of conflicting conceptions of the God-human relation based on extrabiblical
categories. Methodologically speaking, interpretation is bound to depart from the
text once its conceptions about a particular topic are interpreted through an
extrabiblical lens.
This study ends with a question: what would biblical interpretation, or the
uncovering of a biblical philosophy, look like if the text had foundational
preeminence over the human subject? It is in this intersection of philosophy, text,
and interpreter that this study merges into the realm of existence. Choosing to let go
or suspend one’s conception of reality is more than a methodological task: it is an
existential choice. As in the narrative of Exodus, human choice changes the flow of
the story. Perhaps the history of biblical interpretation still has a few chapters to go
before it makes this leap of faith into the uncharted territory of the philosophy of the
Hebrew writers. This philosophy, as mentioned earlier, carries the results of human
rational and artistic powers as well as the element that makes biblical philosophy the
authoritative source of information: revelation. The author’s conception of reality is
informed by revelation and developed through reason. To allow the biblical authors
to address the philosophical questions of past and contemporary times is the
challenge. Yet, for that meal to be served, the tables must first be rearranged and
cleaned.
This study concludes, then, with the merging of the academic and existential
tasks in one question: what would biblical interpretation, or the uncovering of a
biblical philosophy, look like if the text had a foundational preeminence and priority
over the presuppositional framework and life of the human interpreter?
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